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Before the United States entered World War II, the President was
concerned with the security of the Western hemisphere. Military plan-
ners addressed themselves to the strategic problems of hemispheric
defense and to the potential threat which would be posed by Axis control
of North and West Africa. On the diplomatic scene Secretary of State
Cordell Hull negotiated the Act of Havana in 1940 with its far reaching
no transfer principle. The United States also maintained diplomatic
relations with the government of Marshal Petain at Vichy in an attempt
to encourage French independence from Germany or at the very least
to inhibit a collaboration policy.
When the United States entered the war in December 1941, the
necessity for dealing with Vichy still remained. However, prosecution
of the war required contacts with the French National Committee under
the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle. The United States needed
the use of landing fields and other facilities in the Pacific and in the sub-
Saharan portions of the French Empire. These colonies had declared
their support for General de Gaulle. Thus the United States had to deal
with a legal French government at Vichy and with a dissident French
movement.

While still maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy, the
United States in July 1942 designated Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and Brigadier General
Charles L. Bolte, USA, to consult with the French National Committee
on all matters relative to the conduct of the war. Within a short time,
Admiral Stark became a de facto ambassador, conducting consultations
on political as well as on technical military questions. His diplomatic
duties continued until the French Committee of National Liberation,
formed in June 1943, obtained recognition by the United States following
the Quebec Conference in August 1943.
Despite the official designation of an Army officer as an
associate, Admiral Stark by virtue of his rank and because of his
capable staff, including Commander Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR,
shouldered the main burden of the diplomatic functions, which were
performed in close cooperation with the American Ambassador and
his staff.
The North African landings in November, 1942, produced a major
crisis in American relations with the French National Committee. While
admitting the necessity of an Allied understanding with Admiral Darlan
and the French authorities in North Africa, General de Gaulle was out-
raged that the Allies, and particularly the Americans, did not turn to
him to lead the French forces in that area. A meeting in Washington
between President Roosevelt and General de Gaulle was arranged for the
end of December 1942 or early January 1943 for the purpose of recon-

ciling or at the very least, ameli orating opposing views.
The assassination of Admiral Darlan on Christmas Eve, 1942
removed a political embarrassment for the Allies. The selection of
General Henri Giraud to succeed him created a rival to General de Gaulle
for leadership of all the French forces opposing Germany. The ensuing
six months saw a political struggle between Generals de Gaulle and
Giraud in the guise of negotiations for the unification of French forces.
While the United States supported General Giraud, Great Britain tended
to back General de Gaulle, but not to the detriment of the Anglo-American
special relationship. These differing views complicated matters and at
times threatened to produce severe strains.
Admiral Stark in London dealt with General de Gaulle in an attempt
to further the unification of the French forces. Much of his diplomatic
duties consisted simply of reporting to Washington on the status of the
de Gaulle-Giraud negotiations.
Gaullist recruiting of seamen from North African French ships in
American and British ports threatened to disrupt shipping needed for the
war effort. The Secretary of State specifically requested Admiral Stark
to discuss the question with General de Gaulle. These consultations
were fruitless. Indeed, the ultimate solution was an agreement with
General Giraud on the unification issue.
The question of recruitment of seamen came to a head in the
JAMAIQUE incident. To forestall Gaullist recruitment and possible
desertions from a North African French ship, chartered to the Supreme

Allied Commander in North Africa, and at that time in the Clyde,
Admiral Stark ordered an American armed guard placed on board.
This extraordinary act created an uproar among the Fighting French,
who saw the issue as a political one relating to the right to control the
crew. Admiral Stark saw the issue in terms of operational necessity.
The JAMAIQUE incident illustrated the vast difference in outlook
between American policy and that of the Fighting French. General de
Gaulle sought the political salvation of France. To this end, he
endeavored to achieve the greatest political advantage for his movement
and for France, particularly since he saw the Axis defeat as inevitable.
The United States, on the other hand, felt the war should be won before
political commitments were made. This divergence in outlook was never
resolved and explains much of the troubles encountered.
Political differences were only exacerbated by the incompatible
personalities of the President and General de Gaulle. Fortunately,
Admiral Stark was able to establish a good working relationship with
General de Gaulle and in this way he was able to minimize difficulties
as they arose. Admiral Stark's success can be measured in terms of
accurate observations and reporting, and; particularly, in terms of good






In the world of 1968, Charles de Gaulle as President of the French
Republic has irritated and angered many of France 's oldest friends and
closest allies. Today it may be truly said that Franco-American rela-
tions are at a low point. Much scholarly and journalistic attention has
quite properly been given to the current state of relations. Since in the
very real sense of practical politics, Charles de Gaulle is France, a
study of the early contacts during World War II between General de
Gaulle and the United States may tend to shed some light on present
relations
.
There is always a danger in any historical writing of assigning
more importance to past events than is really due in an attempt to assert
a causal relationship of some sort. In examining the conduct of the first
official political contacts between the United States and General de Gaulle,
no such assertion will be made. The purpose of this study will be to
elucidate for the record the significant features of the consultations
conducted by Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, with the French National
Committee. By doing so, some elements of General de Gaulle's outlook
and understanding will surface. The application of such elements of
Gaullism to the contemporary scene must be left to others.
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In the grim days of early 1942, Admiral Stark was sent to London
to assume duties as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. This
command was the successor to that of Special Naval Observer, London,
which, prior to American entry into the war, facilitated all possible
Anglo-American naval cooperation. The scope of Admiral Stark's
duties was as broad as the duties themselves were varied. As the senior
military representative in Europe, he was the logical choice to conduct
consultations with the French National Committee relative to the conduct
of the war. Although such consultations were originally intended for
technical military and naval purposes, they quickly expanded into full-
fledged political consultations. These consultations were the first
official political relations the United States established with General de
Gaulle, at that time President of the French National Committee.
Admiral Stark's official files, still held by the Navy, provided the
bulk of the primary source material. Without the most willing, if not
eager cooperation and assistance of Dr. Dean C. Allard of the Naval
History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, I would never
have come upon this fascinating topic in the first place, let alone discover
the rich sources of documentary material. I am grateful to him, and to
his staff of conscientious archivists for free and open access to the files
and records. Indeed, without their help, the basic research could not
have been accomplished. For the very real and practical necessity of
declassifying quarter of a century old documents, I am indebted to
Commander Burton R. Trexler, USN. Without the assistance of
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Arthur S. Kogan of the State Department, I never could have had access
to the diplomatic papers in the U. S. National Archives.
Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, was particularly kind in granting
me several hours of his tiine . His recollection was as keen as his wit.
It is seldom that an officer of my rank has the opportunity to talk at
length and informally with a Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Stark
by his comments and reminiscences brought to life the events recorded
and commented upon in the documents I had read.
He was trusting enough to make to me in fullest confidence com-
ments and observations which corroborated many of my own. This
confidence has not been betrayed. If honor were not a sufficient reason,
certainly a realization that there is no divine right of absolute disclosure
in historical writing is. Scholarship must depend on integrity and dis-
cretion, as well as on candidness.
General Charles L. Bolte, USA, was most helpful in answering
questions about the participation of the Army representatives. In conver-
sation General Bolte stressed the significance of Army-Navy cooperation
in the consultations with the Fighting French. This cooperation was at
great variance with his own experience as junior officer and was, in his
mind, a much belated improvement of great significance.
There are many persons who gave freely of their time and made
many helpful suggestions. Chief among them are my study director,
Professor Ernest R. May of Harvard University, who took on this addi-
tional task in the midst of a hectic sabbatical.

IV
To my other reader, Professor Ruhl J. Bartlett of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, I owe a special debt of gratitude not only
for his interest in my work and for his comments on the thesis as it
progressed, but more especially for the extraordinary example of
scholarly integrity and openmindedne ss he has set for all of us at the
Fletcher School. Those of us who have been fortunate enough to know
him, would do well to follow his example.
The COMNAVEU staff apparently has a loyal and enthusiastic
group of alumni. Those to whom I spoke were more than pleased to
share their recollections with me. Professor Robert Robbins of the
Fletcher School and Tufts University was the officer who brought the
records from London to the United States. He provided useful back-
ground information and the names of other former staff members.
Those to whom I spoke included William S. Sims, Sidney Connor and
Paul A. Borel.
In expository writing any given point may be perfectly clear to
the author, but not necessarily to others. In this regard, the sharp
pencil of my Navy friend and partner in crime, Lieutenant John H. Rixse,
III, USN, was most helpful in puncturing pomposities and in identifying
murky corners and ambiguous phrases and passages.
Finally, without the ghostly assistance of the late Captain Tracy
B. Kittredge, USNR, whose papers, diaries and notes I used exclusively,
this dissertation could never have been written. Unfortunately Captain
Kittredge never completed the definitive work on United States - French

relations he contemplated and for which he collected so much hitherto
unused material. American scholarship is poorer for it. With this in
mind, and with great trepidation, I undertook to write a small segment
of the greater work. Had Captain Kittredge completed his book, it
would have been a fine work.
No amount of expressed thanks to the many persons who helped
me in this labor of love can relieve me of the ultimate responsibility
for its accuracy and contents. The faults, shortcoming and errors are,
and will remain, mine alone.
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The German victory over France in June 1940 was as stunning in
its suddenness as it was far-reaching in its strategic import. At one
blow, one of the two major opponents of Germany was removed from
the conflict. The fall of France left England alone to face Germany.
Many felt that she, too, would soon sue for peace.
In the United States isolation still encumbered much of public
opinion. But President Roosevelt and the Army and Navy planners
were thinking in terms of broad strategic questions. Their first and
most immediate concern was the security of the Western hemisphere
against the extension of non-American military or political control.
To this end, the United States adopted a policy of extending military
and diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in its war
against Germany.
The fall of France, following the German conquest of the Nether-
lands, produced the danger to American security of the possible
1. Letter from Joint Planning Committee to Joint Board, January
21, 1941, in Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942, (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, 1953), p. 30.

transfer of French and Dutch colonies in the Western hemisphere to
unfriendly or potentially hostile powers. The danger England faced
added the British colonies to the list of threatened possessions.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was instrumental in concerting
hemispheric opinion against any transfers of colonies in the Western
hemisphere. In the Act of Havana, concluded in the summer of 1940-,.
the American republics declared their intention to prevent the transfer
of any colonies by seizing them, if necessary. If seizure of any
colony by a non-American power were imminent, any of the republics,
acting alone or jointly, could seize any threatened colony until the
machinery established by the treaty could be implemented. Since only
the United States and, possibly, Brazil were in any position to act
immediately, this amounted to an advance sanction of unilateral action.
The fate of the French colony of Martinique was a source of great
concern to the United States. Unlike the Dutch Government, the French
government had not gone into exile. Instead, it had concluded an
armistice with the Germans and had named Marshal Petain chief of
state. Pierre Laval, a man whose motives and politics were always
suspect, was the head of the Vichy government in a truncated France.
The United States maintained relations with Vichy in an attempt to keep
the Empire out of Axis hands, among other reasons. The success or
2
effectiveness of this particular policy was debatable at best. Certainly,
2. Langer, William L. , Our Vichy Gamble, (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1947), p. 389^

the United States could have seized Martinique at will. Contingency
plans to this effect were drawn up by the Navy.
While the presence of units of the French fleet under the command
of Admiral Robert at Martinique presented a possible danger to the
security of the area, planners were also greatly concerned with the
prospect of an Axis invasion of the Western hemisphere. As they saw
it, German occupation of North and West Africa, particularly Dakar,
would give them a jumping off place for an attack on northeast Brazil.
With such a foothold, the Nazis could extend their influence into South
America, where they enjoyed considerable sympathy, or even northward
into the Caribbean area. In either event, the United States would be
faced with a threat of alarming proportions.
The military planners conceived operation POT OF GOLD to
meet such a contingency. On the diplomatic side, the State Department
maintained relations with the French government at Vichy. In this way,
the United States retained consuls in North Africa and sought to
strengthen the French position there by concluding the Murphy-Wcygand
Agreement in January 1941. The purpose of this accord was to provide
the North African authorities with supplies sufficient to prevent unrest
and thereby to deny the Germans a pretext for intervening. By so doing,
3. Conference of President Roosevelt with principal military
advisors, May 16, 1940, in Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild,
The Framework of Hemispheric Defense, (Washington: Office
of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, I960),
pp. 31-33.

the United States would be facilitating General Maxime Weygard's task
of making that part of the Empire strong enough to resist Germany.
Perhaps most important of all, by having consuls supervise the dis-
tribution of supplies, the United States kept a foothold in North Africa.
The contacts thus derived were to prove extremely beneficial to the
United States at the time of the North African landings in November 1942.
Until the United States entered the war there was no particular
reason for any dealing with General Charles de Gaulle and the French
National Committee in London. In the period from the fall of France to
Pearl Harbor, the United States dealt with Vichy to neutralize at the very
least the threats to the Western hemisphere.
Meanwhile General de Gaulle was rallying bits and pieces of the
French Empire. By mid- 1941, the Pacific possessions of New
Caledonia and the Wallis Islands, as well as French Equatorial Africa
had rallied to him. In early June 1941 General de Gaulle offered the
United States, through the American Minister in Egypt, the use of
French African ports and airfields under his control in the event the
United States entered the war. The United States assigned a Naval
Observer, Lieutenant- Commander John Mitchell, USNR, to survey
4. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 388.
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air routes in French Equatorial Africa.
French territories under the control of General de Gaulle did not
really become strategically important until the United States entered
the war. However, the Free French were not completely ignored in
the period before Pearl Harbor. On November 11, 1941, the President
recognized that the defense of territories under Free French control
was necessary to that of the United States. He authorized the extension
of Lend-lease aid to the Free French on a re-transfer basis of aid
extended to the British.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
thrust the United States into a war that extended to the farthest reaches
of the Pacific and beyond into India and Burma. Hitler's gratuitous
declaration of war four days later made official the unofficial naval
war the United States had been waging against Germany since the
summer of 1941. The United States was engaged in a global conflict
of extraordinary proportions.
The most immediate military and diplomatic tasks were to stem
or at least to slow down the Japanese advance in the Pacific, to main-
tain the lifelines to Britain, to prevent German occupation of French
North and West Africa and to maintain the political status quo in the
5. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,(7 vols., Washing-
ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959) Vol. 2, pp. 570,
578. LCDR Mitchell accoinpanied Colonel Harry F. Cunningham
of the War Department. This interesting "mission" has been
described by Dorothy S. White in Seeds of Discord, (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1964), pp. 266-271.

Western hemisphere. All these tasks had to be accomplished while
the United States built up its military machine.
While the United States was occupied with problems of the
greatest magnitude and was sustaining severe reverses in the Pacific,
General de Gaulle suddenly ordered the seizure of the two small French
islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon without the prior knowledge of
Canadian, American or British authorities. In fact, the British had
specifically advised against Free French seizure of the islands.
The military importance of these islands was more potential
than real. Under Vichy control of the Islands, there was a possibility
that the radio station there could transmit information to German
submarines. In fact, it never did. But the political importance of
these islands far out-weighed whatever military importance they might
have or did have.
This unilateral act by General de Gaulle disturbed the status quo
in the Western hemisphere and thus it was contrary to the interests of
the United States. Following Vichy's proclamation of neutrality, the
President had assured Vichy of his intention to maintain the status quo
in the Western hemisphere. Furthermore, the Act of Havana was the
legal instrument binding upon the United States by which the forcible
transfer of sovereignty, possession or control of any possession was
6. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, (6 vols. ,
Washington:' U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961) vol. 2,
p. 657.

outlawed. The seizure of these islands put the United States in a most
difficult position.
The upshot of this incident was that the Free French retained
control of St. Pierre and Miquelon, despite Hull's most vehement
objections. But the price they paid was unfortunate: the lingering
antipathy of Hull, which bordered at times on the unreasonable. This
incident largely determined the official American attitude towards
General de Gaulle. This attitude was essentially unsympathetic and
at least partially explains the subsequent failure of Washington to
understand the nature of the Gaullist position, despite perceptive
reports submitted by the American representatives to General de Gaulle.
As the war progressed in 1942, it became necessary for strategic
reasons to deal with General de Gaulle and the Free French. Admiral
Harold R. Stark, Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, and Brigadier
General Charles L. Bolte were designated to conduct consultations with
the French National Committee relative to the conduct of the war. At
first, these consultations were conceived to be of a purely military
nature. But as events unfolded, it became apparent that Admiral
Stark and his army colleague were de facto ambassadors, dealing with
political matters as well as with purely military questions.
The change in substance of these consultations was directly
related to the change in the relative positions and importance to the
interests of the United States of the Vichy government and of the French
National Coinmittee. As the fortunes of Mar shal Petain waned, those

of General de Gaulle waxed.
When the United States entered the war, General de Gaulle
commanded a handful of courageous Frenchmen in the British Isles,
and the loyalties of some parts of the Empire. Vichy, on the other
hand, still retained control of the fonnidable French fleet, then in
Toulon, and French North and West Africa. The sizeable French .
North African army was still loyal to Vichy. Therefore, it was in the
interest of the United States to maintain relations with Vichy. It
became even more necessary to do so when the cross-channel operation
was postponed in favor of a more feasible operation in North Africa.
To facilitate this latter operation, it was necessary to make every
attempt to enlist the support of the French authorities in North Africa,
or at least to avoid their outright opposition. The considerable success
with which the United States achieved this goal provided the justification
of this policy.
The problem of dealing with General de Gaulle was difficult from
the start. The United States was faced with the difficulties of dealing
with two French groups, one of which it formally recognized as the
legal government of France at Vichy, and in the other, Fighting France,
it saw a source of military aid against the Axis. Each group had
anathematized the other.
St. Pierre and Miquelon soured American relations with General
de Gaulle from the beginning. This inauspicious start was followed by
fundamental conflicts of interests which were never resolved. The

United States sought to win the war first, before the President would be
willing to discuss political settlements or to make commitments,
General de Gaulle, on the other hand put politics first. To him
n
victory was definitively assured with America's entry. To him the
war was but an interlude. The relative position of France among the
victors at the end of the war was the important thing. If General de
Gaulle and the French National Committee were to achieve their goals
of restoring France to her rightful position of greatness, they must
unify the French war effort and obtain Allied recognition of their right
to speak for France.
As if the bad start and the co:aflicting fundamental interests were
not sufficient, the antithetical personalities of the President and General
de Gaulle were to create additional difficulties. It is a historical fact
that the conduct of affairs of state can be influenced for good or for ill
by the personalities of the actors. The interests of all parties
concerned, including those of General de Gaulle, were at times
adversely affected by the personalities of the actors. On the other
hand, the compatible natures of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill worked greatly to the benefit of the Allied wartime alliance.
The initial reasons for dealing with Ge:ieral de Gaulle were
strategic. He and the French National Committee controlled areas the
7. Colonel Passy (Andre Dewavrin), 2e Bureau Londres, (vol. 1
Souvenirs, 2 vols., Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947), p. 236.
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United States needed for war purposes. This was the reason the United
States designated representatives to consult with him in the first place.
Vichy's position soon became fatally weakened as the North
African invasions brought German occupation of the whole of France.
Vichy also lost the fleet at Toulon by scuttling it. General de Gaulle's
position, however became stronger as that of Vichy weakened and
ultimately evaporated.
While it had been necessary at first to deal with General de
Gaulle for strategic reasons, it became necessary in the ensuing
period to deal with him for political reasons. In early 1943 General
de Gaulle, the symbol of resistance to the Germans became a rallying
point for many, if not for most Frenchmen. The difficulties of
ascertaining or measuring popular support in metropolitan France
prevented a real determination of how much popular support he actually
had. By May 1943 General de Gaulle had established control over the
organized resistance in France and to that extent could quite justifiably
claim popular support in his active opposition to the Germans.
This second period saw the greatest difficulties in dealing with
General de Gaulle and the French National Committee. The United
States was firmly wedded to a policy of winning the war first, and would
brook no interference for lesser political reasons. General de Gaulle's
position was diametrically opposed. Since he was gaining support among
the French, he was able to create more difficulties for the United States
by his insistence on achieving his goals.
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At his post in London, Admiral Stark bore the brunt of the day
to day conduct of relations with General de 'Gaulle and the French
National Committee. There was always a designated Army representa-
tive so that the United States officially had two representatives. As
time wore on Admiral Stark in effect became the United States
representative, especially in political discussions. His functions
were two-fold: first, to consult with the French National Committee
on military and, as it turned out, on political matters. In consultations
on political matters, Admiral Stark and his staff worked closely with
members of the Embassy staff. Second, to report matters of interest
to the Secretary of the Navy and to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet.
To put many of the specific questions Admiral Stark and his
staff took up with the Fighting French into a proper perspective, it is
necessary to sketch at the very least the tangled skein of Gaullist
and North African French politics. Without such a supporting fabric,
American diplomacy in this respect, as conducted by Admiral Starkj
would be a series of isolated anecdotes.
Admiral Stark discharged his diplomatic duties with honor and
skill. In so doing, he demonstrated great tact and patience. These
qualities led to good personal relations with General de Gaulle, In
discharging his reporting tasks to his seniors, he was ably assisted by
Lieutenant- Commander (later Commander) Tracy B. Kittredgc, USNR,
who not only performed the duties of a faithful Boswell, but also

12
brought an extensive personal experience of living on the continent
and a wide range of contacts among the French intelligensia. Both
Admiral Stark and Kittredge had served on Admiral William S. Sims
London staff during the First World War.
The quality of the staff work was scholarly without being pedantic,
accurate and generally unbiased. A study of the relevant papers
revealed no particular biases. Indeed, at times it was difficult to
ascertain the writer's opinion, until he specifically stated it. For this
reason, it was extraordinarily difficult at times to tell how Fighting
French actions appeared to Admiral Stark and his staff, other than in
the most factual manner.
This is not to say that Admiral Stark and his staff were without
opinions, but it is to say that fact was clearly separated from opinion
as far as it was possible. Analysis and judgment were separated from
the evidence from which they were derived. Admiral Stark kept a
steady flow to Washington of memoranda on many aspects of the
Fighting French movement. One of the most perceptive was a summary
analysis of the course of the development of United States relations
with General de Gaulle. Admiral Stark sent it to the Secretary of the
Navy, Frank Knox, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence in
o
Washington.
8. Memorandum, March 1, 1943, in "Selected Documents froin
Correspondence of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. Navy,




This memorandum accurately focused on the essential differences
in position and outlook that existed between General de Gaulle and the
British and Americans, but it characterized those differences from
the standpoint of the Americans. For example, General de Gaulle's
unflinching and unwavering adherence to his principles was seen as
intransigent patriotism and as a misconception of the role he and his
movement should play among the United Nations. But it did show that
at root the difficulties encountered with General de Gaulle lay in
differing conceptions of his movement. General de Gaulle claimed
to represent all French interests and France'herself
. The British
recognized him as a leader of those who wished to join him. The
United States simply accepted the fact that he did lead some French
forces and that he exercised control over parts of the Empire.
r
The memorandum erred by attributing to General de Gaulle a
claim of constituting the legal government of France. The essence of
the Gaullist claim was not that of legality or constitutionality. On the
contrary, the Gaullists claimed the Vichy regime had forfeited what-
ever claims to legitimacy it may have had. Therefore, General de
Gaulle and his followers were acting in a fiduciary capacity until the
French people would be able to choose their own form of government
and elect new leaders.
Regardless of whether General de Gaulle acted as a fiduciary or
claimed governmental powers, he still claimed to speak for all of
France. The extreme bitterness of the Fighting French over American
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policy in North Africa, particularly after the landings in November
1942, can be attributed to the American failure to force North Africa
to follow General de Gaulle. The United States, by establishing a rival
regime in North Africa, regardless of the reasons for doing so, was
seen by the Fighting French to have put traitors into power. They
thought North Africa should have been forced to follow their true
representative of France.
The memorandum noted that from, the time the Free French
changed the name of their movement to Fighting France on July 14,
1942, General de Gaulle virtually ceased to function as a military
General. Instead, he became primarily a symbol of French resistance
and a controversial center of French politics. This development was
in keeping with General de Gaulle's concept of the salvation of France,
now that he assumed the war had been inevitably won. But the Americans
and British, who had to wage the war, were more interested in military
support from General de Gaulle than in playing his political game.
1
The then poor relations between Fighting France, on the one
hand, and the United States and Great Britain, on the other, the
memorandum observed, did not reflect any change in General de
Gaulle's policy or outlook. Rather it reflected a lack of change. By
dealing with officials having had past connections with Vichy, the
United States in particular soiled the honor of France. General de
Gaulle was particularly sensitive on this latter point. It is not
surprising that he was sensitive to real or imagined affronts to his
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highly developed conception of French honor.
The most perceptive comment of the memorandum was the
observation not that General de Gaulle had not changed since June
1940, but that he had failed to change to adapt to changing circum-
stances. This implied criticism of General de Gaulle clearly illus-
trated the vast differences in perception of the role of Fighting France
held by General de Gaulle and by the United States. The United States
sought to prosecute the war by all means available and adopted a policy
attunedto opportunity and expediency. General de Gaulle, seeing an
ultimate Allied victory, utterly refused to countenance anything but
the principles he laid down for the preservation and honor of France.
There is little evidence what, if any, effect this memorandum
had on Washington. In all probability it had no effect, but not because
Q
of callousness of the Secretary of the Navy and of the State Department.
Rather, it was because the United States was engaged in a global war
of titanic proportions, General de Gaulle and the Fighting French were
relatively unimportant compared to the other problems daily forcing •*
themselves upon the policy makers in Washington. It fell to Adiniral
Stark to cope with General de Gaulle.
9. A search of the State Department files did not reveal either
the memorandum or a reference to it. Apparently it did not





The exigencies of waging war in the Pacific, European and
African theaters required that the United States deal with French
authorities. It seemed important to preserve a presence in North
Africa. To complete the air route to the Middle East/ which had to
run south of Axis controlled North Africa, the United States needed
an air base at Pointe Noire in French Equatorial Africa. In the
Pacific it needed landing fields and bases on French islands.
These requirements meant that the United States had to deal
with both the Vichy regime and the Free French, whom Vichy
anathematized. By mid- 1942, though the United States had recalled
Ambassador Leahy from Vichy, it still maintained diplomatic rela-
tions with the Government of Marshal Petain. The Government at
Vichy controlled North Africa, while the Free French effectively con-
trolled France's sub-Saharan and Pacific territories. The problem
was to preserve this tie with Vichy while establishing a relationship
with the Free French.
A first step had been taken on November 11, 1941, when the
President declared the defense of territories controlled by the Free




the extension of lend lease aid to the Free French. A Free French
delegation had been sent to Washington in 1941 under Rene Pleven.
With the entry of the United States into the war, more direct
contact with General Charles de Gaulle and the French National
Committee became desirable. Even the State Department, still
rankling from the St. Pierre and Miquelon episode, saw this need.
Since the conclusion of the de Gaulle- Churchill Agreement in the
summer of 1940, the British had recognized General de Gaulle as the
leader of those Frenchmen who refused to accept the armistice and
wished to continue to fight. After formation of the French National
Committee in January 1942, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in
Washington, informed the State Department that the British Govern-
ment would recognize it as competent to represent such Frenchmen
and French territories as had rallied to the movement and he expressed
hope that the United States Government would follow suit.
Secretary of State Cordcll Hull responded that the British re-
quest would be given "very careful consideration. " Actually, thinking
in the State Department ran along rather different lines.
What these lines were can be inferred from a conversation on
May 8, 1942, between Lord Halifax and Under Secretary of State
1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,(7 vols.
,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962),
vol. 2, p. 511.
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Sumner Welles. Unfortunately, though Welles confessed that he had
not had opportunity to discuss the question in full detail with the
Secretary, he professed to be familiar with the broad outlines of
thinking and then went on to give his own, personal opinion.
Welles felt that the French National Committee should never in
any circumstances be recognized as a provisional government of
France, because it would preclude the determination by the French
people of their own form of government in the post-war period. As to
the Free French movement, Welles felt that it was rapidly falling to
pieces. The result would be exceedingly unfortunate for the morale of
the French people and it would make it infinitely more difficult for the
United Nations to deal with the French territories and colonies not
under the control of Vichy. Welles did not indicate how, according to
the United States policy of dealing with local authorities in French over-
seas territories, as opposed to a central authority in Vichy or in
London, it would make any difference if a central authority were
existent or not.
To end the bickering and quarrels which then sullied the image
of the French National Committee, Welles felt that new members
should be included who would be "really representative of liberal
democratic French thought. " In any event, prompt action by the





complete collapse of any semblance of unity among the Free French
elements.
A few days later, Welles told Halifax that it was "urgently neces-
sary" that the British and American Governments agree as to what
steps should be taken. Part of the urgency can be attributed to what
Welles undoubtedly felt were organizational difficulties in the French
National Committee in London, but a large part was due to the possible
revision of American policy towards the Vichy government. Welles
hinted that it "might be modified drastically in the near future. "
Halifax amplified the views of the British Government in an aide
4
memoire delivered to the State Department on May 14. In no case
should the French National Committee be regarded as a government
to which recognition could be extended then or later. The sole function
of the National Committee was to encourage French resistance to the
Germans. Halifax pointed out that, despite his defects, General de
Gaulle had brought over important French territories, kept the French
flag flying in the war, and made himself the symbol of resistance
which was rising in occupied France. It would not be practicable for
the American and British Governments to handpick any members of
the National Committee, despite any hopes for a broadening of







was to recruit members of the resistance movements in France itself.
Welles questioned the support for General de Gaulle among the
resistance groups. His information showed that while soine resistance
groups might be responsive to the General, other equally important if
not more important groups were opposed to him. Welles felt it would
be unwise and politically inexpedient officially to acknowledge General
de Gaulle as the leader of resistance elements in France which showed
no inclination to accept his leadership. He did not identify these
other groups.
The next week Halifax and Hull discussed the Free French.
Halifax told Hull that he thought General de Gaulle could well put out
a statement that he was engaged in the prosecution of the war and that
in the meantime he would be engaged in building up a political organi-
zation for the post-war government of France.
By way of reply, Hull categorically stated that the United States
did not propose to take up with General de Gaulle any phase of the
political situation in France either at that time or after the war. The
United States considered the Free French organization to be purely
military. Any political functions that might necessarily arise in New
Caledonia, Central Africa, or other areas occupied by military







a sharp distinction between incidental political functions performed in
widely separated areas of the French Empire and political rule over
metropolitan France.
Since the British Foreign Office had direct contact with General
de Gaulle, and because of the desire to coordinate British and American
policy, an aide memoire stating the position of the United States was
delivered to Halifax on June 11. Even though this was a preliminary
draft, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was authorized to show it to
General de Gaulle.
The British Government did not pass on this aide inemoire partly
from fear of a leak or other unauthorized disclosure, and partly, as
Winant reported from London, because of the belief that it would need-
lessly irritate General de Gaulle if the United States said it would deal
only with "local Free French officials wherever they are in control" in
French territories. Such a caveat would have no practical value, since
such officials could invariably be expected to refer matters under dis-
cussion to the General and to the National Committee.
Taking account of British views, the State Department revised
the aide memoire. A new version was delivered to the British Embassy
on June 23. The most significant change in it concerned the appoint-
ment of United States representatives. In the earlier memorandum of





French National Committee in regard to appropriate naval and military-
matters through representatives of the United States armed services in
8
London. " (Emphasis added. ) In the next draft of June 23, and indeed
in the final version as released to the press on July 9, the United
States promised more vaguely "to appoint representatives in London
qfor purposes of consultation. " 7
Eden delivered a copy of this final draft to General de Gaulle on
June 29. This version was the one released to the press, after a few
relatively minor changes submitted by General de Gaulle had been
made. Eden gave the General a French translation to obviate the
necessity of showing the text to the less discreet members of his
10
entourage.
The memorandum of July 9, 1942, embodied the official policy
of the United States. It was released to the press on July 11. It
deserves close analysis and examination not only because it was a
formal statement of policy, but also because it illustrated the assump-
tions upon which that policy was based. To say United States policy
was based on a misconception would be an overstatement, but the mis-







11. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 7, July 11, 1942, p. 613.
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of General de Gaulle produced needless friction and in the end was
counter-productive.
Any analysis of the United States position must take into account
two salient factors. First, the United States maintained diplomatic
relations with Vichy and was therefore constrained to afford no political
recognition to the Free French. Second, the President desired to
make no political commitments for the post-war period at that time.
Thus, even if Washington had not misperceived the motives and
character of General de Gaulle's movement, it probably would have
made no difference in American policy.
The memorandum opened with a declaration that the United
States was subordinating all other questions to the "one supreme
purpose" of winning the war. This was indeed the cornerstone of
American wartime diplomacy. The next sentence declared the French
National Committee "has the same objective. " It was true the French
National Committee ardently sought the defeat of the. Axis, but only as
a means to resurrect France and to restore her to the position of
greatness from which she had so precipitously fallen. The United
States could not publicly accept this goal, even if it were desired.
Contacts with and aid to the French National Committee could only
be justified on the basis of military necessity so long as diplomatic
relations with Vichy were retained.
The United States recognized the contribution of General de
Gaulle and the work of the French National Committee in keeping
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alive the spirit of French traditions and institutions. The United
States equated the military aims necessary for victory with the
realization of the combined aims of the National Committee and the
United States. This was only partly true, but it proceeded logically
from the initial assumption in the first paragraph. The common aims
could be best advanced by lending all possible military assistance and
support to the French National Committee as a "symbol of French
resistance in general against the Axis powers. "
The United States agreed with the British view which was "known"
(General de Gaulle suggested "known" as a substitute for the original
verb "understood") to be the view of the French National Committee
that the destiny and political organization of France must be determined
freely by the French people . This statement on its face implied that
Washington, despite possible suspicions in the White House and in the
State Department, did not consider, at least officially, General de
Gaulle as a potential dictator, whatever his own political aspirations
might have been.
The policy of dealing with local Free French officials in their
respective overseas territories was re-affirmed. But the United
States perceived the advantages of centralizing the discussion of matters
relating to the conduct of the war with the French National Committee
in London. While the United States did not abandon the local authorities
doctrine in its entirety, this was at least an admission of the efficacy
of Gaullist control of certain overseas territories. At least this
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interpretation can be inferred from the juxtaposition of the two
sentences containing the two statements. But the third and final
sentence of the same paragraph stated that an essential part of United
States policy for war collaboration was the extension of lend-lease
assistance under the terms of the President's statement of November
11, 1941.
It is not clear from the text whether this coordination was intended
to cover relations with the French territories, or aid and assistance
matters under lend-lease, or both. It appears that clarity was lost by
design, but at least difficult issues were passed over with a maximum
amount of grace. Agreement on principles was impossible, but
accommodation was possible. The end result was a gain for the United
States by providing for a more effective prosecution of the war and a
gain for General de Gaulle by receiving an official United States
acknowledgement of the existence of the French National Committee
and representatives designated to consult with it.
The press release announced that Admiral Harold R. Stark and
Brigadier General Charles L. Bolte had been appointed to consult with
the French National Committee "on all matters relating to the conduct
12
of the war. " The press release left it unclear whether the two
officers were to represent their respective services or the United
States Government.
12. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 7, July 11, 1942, p. 613.

25
interpretation can be inferred from the juxtaposition of the two
sentences containing the two statements. But the third and final
sentence of the same paragraph stated that an essential part of United
States policy for war collaboration was the extension of lend-lease
assistance under the terms of the President's statement of November
11, 1941.
It is not clear from the text whether this coordination was intended
to cover relations with the French territories, or aid and assistance
matters under lend-lease, or both. It appears that clarity was lost by
design, but at least difficult issues were passed over with a maximum
amount of grace. Agreement on principles was impossible, but
accommodation was possible. The end result was a gain for the United
States by providing for a more effective prosecution of the war and a
gain for General de Gaulle by receiving an official United States
acknowledgement of the existence of the French National Committee
and representatives designated to consult with it.
The press release announced that Admiral Harold R. Stark and
Brigadier General Charles L». Bolte had been appointed to consult with
the French National Committee "on all matters relating to the conduct
12
of the war. " The press release left it unclear whether the two
officers were to represent their respective services or the United
States Government.
12. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 7, July 11, 1942, p. 613.

26
Whatever the ambiguities in the designation of the representatives
or in the precise meaning of the document, there was no clarification
by way of instructions to Admiral Stark or to General Bolte. Admiral
Stark received his information from the press release of July 11. In
his Bastille Day greeting to General de Gaulle, he referred to himself
as the "naval representative" designated by the United States Govern-
13
ment. J When Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United
States Fleet, visited London in July of 1942, he gave Admiral Stark a
verbal "okay" that what had appeared in the press was correct.
Leaning on this slender reed, Admiral Stark called on General de
Gaulle under the impression that he was solely a naval representative.
He was still in doubt on July 29 as to the character of his re-
presentative capacity. In identical informal letters to the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations and to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, he
observed that from the State Department's memorandum of July 9 it
would appear that he and General Bolte were representatives of the
United States Government, rather than delegates of the War and Navy
Departments. He requested some formal statement as to the nature of
the designation and instructions as to his responsibilities and functions. -*
13. Stark to de Gaulle, July 14, 1942, in "Selected Documents
from Correspondence of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. Navy,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, " (hereinafter
referred to as COMNAVEU Documents), 4 vols. , vol. 1, p. 14.
14. Stark to Admiral Home, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, July




The nub of the matter was that many of the questions already
discussed with the French related to the conduct of the war, but went
beyond specific questions of direct military cooperation. Admiral
Stark wanted instructions to avoid crossing wires. No general instruc-
tions were given, or even directions to discuss specific questions. In
future contacts with the French, the Admiral had to exercise his own
judgment.
Whatever ambiguities may have existed from the American stand-
point, there was none from the French standpoint. General de Gaulle
in a telegram to Secretary Hull "welcomed the distinguished represent-
atives of the United States. "^
Groundwork for an initial conference between Admiral Stark and
General de Gaulle was prepared by Lieutenant- Commander Tracy B.
Kittredge of Admiral Stark's staff in advance talks with Rene Pleven
of the French National Committee and later with Freeman Matthews,
Counsellor of the American Embassy in London. In these talks the
French attempted to raise the consultations to a quasi-diplomatic level.
Pleven told Kittredge that the French assumed Admiral Stark and
General Bolte were representatives of the United States Government.
He said routine procedures would have to be established to preclude the
necessity of referring every question to Admiral Stark and General
Bolte. The designation of American technical assistance to deal
16. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, p. 534.
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directly with their French counterparts would involve the setting up
of something like an embassy.
Kittredge evaded the question on practical grounds. Though
saying that he could envisage a simplified procedure making it un-
necessary to consult General de Gaulle, Admiral Stark and General
Bolte on every question he expressed doubt about establishing a
complicated system of diplomatic relations.
The initial American position was formulated in the talk between
Kittredge and Matthews. It was agreed that no quasi-diplomatic arrange-
ments should be considered for consultations with the French. Further,
Admiral Stark and General Bolte had such broad terms of reference
that they could discuss with the French any question related in any way
to the conduct of the war. However, decisions on French requests or
action taken on matters discussed could be effected by the appropriate
agencies of the United States Government. Finally, informal advice,
if needed, could be sunDlied bv Frnbassv officials or from government
x x " J J O
1 o
services attached to the Embassy.
The meeting between Admiral Stark and General de Gaulle took
place on August 3. General de Gaulle agreed to the proposed procedures
17. Kittredge memorandum, July 30, 1942, Box 207, File: Agree-
ment, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, files (here-
inafter referred to as COMNAVEU files), Naval History




by which consultations with the French National Committee would be
conducted. The procedures on the American side envisaged a joint
Army-Navy secretariat with common files under the aides of Admiral
Stark and General Bolte with assistance supplied by the respective
staffs. The American representatives suggested that all communi-
cations from the French on subjects either directly or indirectly
related to the conduct of the war be addressed to them. Advice would
be solicited from the Embassy or from other United States missions
on all questions not specifically military or naval in character.
Admiral Stark and General Bolte proposed to discuss with French
authorities any questions submitted by the State Department, Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army or the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. Reports
of such consultations would be made to Army and Navy authorities on
military and naval questions respectively and to the State Department
via the Embassy on all other questions.
The procedures General de Gaulle proposed for the participation
of the National Committee in consultations were in the same spirit as
the quasi-embassy concept advanced by Pleven five days earlier. First;
he suggested that communications on purely military or naval subjects
should be addressed to the chief of his personal military staff.
Second, all communications relating to the conduct of the war with
economic or political implications should be addressed to the Commis-
sioner for Foreign Affairs. Third, technical questions should be dis-
cussed by experts designated by Admiral Stark and General Bolte on
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the American side, and by the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs on
the other side.
Finally, he proposed eventual direct consultations with Embassy
officers on non-military and non-naval subjects. In response to this
last suggestion, he was informed that only the designated military
representatives were authorized to participate in such consultations
and that any Embassy or other officials advising on specific questions
would be acting merely as expert advisors to the military representa-
tives .
These proposals, along with a query by the military representa-
tives as to whether they were acceptable, were cabled to the State
1 9Department by Ambassador John G. Winant on August 7, 1942.
Winant reported that he, Admiral Stark and General Bolte had noticed
a Fighting French attempt to put emphasis on the political aspects of
the movement and to approach the Embassy directly on such matters.
He observed that the State Department was, of course, well aware of
the Fighting French feeling of the impossibility of divorcing the move-
ment from its political significance and of French aspirations of
obtaining some further political recognition. Winant saw Admiral
Stark and General Bolte as representatives of the United States
Government, and in view of this designation he felt that all approaches
to the National Committee should be made through them.
19. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1942, p. 536.
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Hull approved the procedures suggested By Admiral Stark and
20General Bolte. He strictly interpreted the memorandum of July 9,
which General dc Gaulle had approved, to mean that all communications
directly or indirectly related to the conduct of the war would be addressed
to the National Committee or to the chief of General de Gaulle's per-
sonal military staff, as he preferred. No communications were to be
addressed to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, as such. Hull
made no assertion that the military representatives were delegates of
the War and Navy Departments. Rather, he referred to them as
"officers designated by this Government" and as such they were the
only persons authorized to consult with the National Committee on the
prosecution of the war, even to the specific exclusion of Embassy-
personnel. He directed Winant to make it abundantly clear to the
French that in consultations in which officers of the Embassy might
take part, they would be acting in a purely technical and advisory
capacity under the direct orders of the military representatives.
The approval by Hull of the procedures established for consul-
tations with the French National Committee placed American-Fighting
French relations on a more or less regular basis. Hull tacitly ad-
mitted that the military representatives were appointees of the United
States Government, rather than purely military delegates. Because





understandable that Hull chose a circuitous and indirect method of
designating representatives of the Government, rather than a more
direct and unambiguous approach.
It must have been obvious to the French that the United States
was reluctantly designating governmental, rather than departmental
representatives. Nevertheless, with considerable tenacity General de
Gaulle continued to insist that communications concerning questions
other than of a purely military nature should be addressed to the
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The French National Committee
was very insistent upon being treated as if it had governmental status,
although it was not recognized as even a de facto government.
Admiral Stark and General Dahlquist, who had replaced General
Bolte as the Army representative, suggested that American communi-
cations which would originate from the joint secretariat should normally
be addressed to General de Gaulle in his dual capacity as President of
the French National Committee and Commander of the Fighting French
2
1
Forces. The effect of this suggestion would have been to leave it
up to General de Gaulle or his liaison officer to determine the appropri-
ate French official for action.
General de Gaulle did not accept this suggestion, presumably
because he did not wish to concede the political point involved. Osten-
sibly his reason for doing so was based on the nature of the internal
21. Stark and Dahlquist to de Gaulle, September 22, 1942,
Box 207, File: Agreement, COMNAVEU files.
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organization of the National Committee. In discussions conducted by
the Army liaison officer, concerning arrangements at Point Noire,
Pleven asked that correspondence be addressed to Maurice Dejean as
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. However, the principal letter
was addressed to General de. Gaulle as President of the French National
Committee. The reply was signed by Dejean as spokesman for the
National Committee. The final American letter accepted this apparent
compromise and was addressed to M. Dejean as a member of the
22French National Committee.
Subsequent correspondence and other communications were
addressed to General de Gaulle or personally to his action officer.
No American communications were addressed to French Commission-
ers as such. In this sense the United States held firm in its refusal to
treat the French National Committee as if it had government status.
But General de Gaulle, even if he did not win the point, did not
concede it. This procedure was generally followed in the consultations
with the French National Committee until it metamorphosed into the
French Committee of National Liberation in 1943.
The meeting on August 3 of General de Gaulle with Admiral Stark
and General Bolte was significant not only because it established the
procedures by which consultations were conducted, but also because it
signified coordination between Army and Navy representatives and it




also gave General dc Gaulle an opportunity to expound his views on a
number of topics.
The potential danger of lack of coordination between the American
epresentatives was illustrated by General Bolte's July 23 call on
General de Gaulle. His original intention was only to establish rela-
tions with General de Gaulle. However, the Secretary of State had
directed General Bolte through the London Embassy to inform General
de Gaulle of the instructions transinitted to the American consul at
Brazzaville regarding the improvement and operation by the U.S. Army
of the airport at Pointe Noire. The negotiations concerning that air
base were conducted by the Army as an adjunct to the establishment
of a strategically necessary air base. But the Secretary of State's
instructions to General Bolte made it difficult for him to maintain he
was representing only the War Department, in close association with
the Navy representative. Even though the French told him they con-
sidered him as a representative of the United States Government,
General Bolte maintained his instructions came from the War Depart-
ment. "
Admiral Stark was in a less awkward position when he suggested
that he and General Bolte meet with General de Gaulle to discuss
general problems common to the French and to the Americans in
conducting the war. This conversation was to be held pending more




complete information as to the specific functions which might be
assigned to the United States representatives. 24
Prior to the meeting on August 3, General Bolte and Admiral
Stark had agreed to establish joint procedures for consultations with
the French. A memorandum embodying these procedures was pre-
sented to General de Gaulle. It formed the basis of Winant's subse-
quent cable to the War Department. In this way they avoided the
potential danger of crossing wires in subsequent consultations.
The conversation with General de Gaulle and Rene'' Pleven on
August 3 lasted nearly two hours and was cordial in tone, but frank in
content. Frankness and cordiality generally characterized the
personal meetings of Admiral Stark and General de Gaulle. The
greater part of the meeting was taken up by General de Gaulle's
review of several general questions, partly because the General
desired to state his position and partly because Admiral Stark and
General Bolte had little information, beyond specific questions as to
what their government expected of them.
First, General de Gaulle inquired as to United States policy in
relation to local Fighting French authorities. He referred to previous
misunderstandings and difficulties with American authorities. He asked
24. Stark to de Gaulle, July 31, 1942, Box 207, File: Agreement,
COMNAVEU files.




specifically whether the United States Government was now disposed to
deal with the French National Committee rather than with the local
authorities in Africa and in the Pacific, as had been the case pre-
viously under the local authorities doctrine. In reply, Admiral Stark
and General Bolte indicated that they had been instructed to reach
general agreements with the French National Committee which could
then be the basis for more specific and detailed arrangements made
with the local authorities to impleinent the general agreements.
It was necessary, General de Gaulle said, to discuss many
questions not of an exclusively military or naval character. The
conduct of the war necessarily involved cooperation and agreement on
many non-military subjects. The American representatives agreed
and indicated they had received instructions through the State Depart-
ment to discuss such subjects. Although copies of such instructions
could not be found in either Navy or State Department archives, it is
not unreasonable to suppose that Hull maintained the distinction he
made to Halifax on May 21 between political questions ancillary to the
conduct of the war and the post-war political organization of France.
It was obviously necessary to discuss the former category with the
National Committee.
Admiral Stark and General Bolte stated they were not qualified
to discuss the political aspect of how to give practical aid in the mobili-
zation of a maximum of French participation in winning the war.
General de Gaulle did not press the point.
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The real French contribution to victory, the General said,
would not come from a handful of Fighting French outside France,
but from the action of millions of Frenchmen in the metropole. He
suggested the desirability of direct exchange of intelligence between
American and French services on the situation in France, the disposi-
tion of German troops and other developments in France. The American
representatives demurred by saying that such matters must be dis-
cussed by British as well as American authorities, but they assured
the General that full consideration would be given to his suggestion.
Since the United States and Fighting France were in the war, the
General said, he and his collaborators desired a maximum of effective
cooperation in the common war effort. He referred to the promptness
with which the National Committee had responded to American requests.
As illustrations he gave French acquiescence and assistance to the
landing of American troops in New Caledonia and in the Wallis Islands,
and the arrangements for American use of the port and air field
facilities at Point Noire. He would appreciate American aid to the
Fighting French efforts to reconstitute their own forces and to the
eventual restoration of their own country to its rightful place among
the United Nations. He was particularly appreciative of Admiral
Stark's friendly and sympathetic attitude, of the U.S. Navy's agree-
ment to aid Fighting French naval forces and to train naval aviators,
and of the authorization of direct consultations on matters relating to
the conduct of the war.
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At the end of the meeting, General de Gaulle inquired as to
whether the British were being kept informed of American discussions
with the National Committee. Admiral Stark and General Bolte ex-
pressed the need for complete frankness in discussions with Allies.
But, they also explained, the British had been and would continue to be
informed only of negotiations on matters in which they were directly
concerned. This attitude satisfied General de Gaulle.
In reporting to Admiral King on his consultations with the French
National Committee, Admiral Stark commented that General de Gaulle
and his collaborators had been uniformly cooperative and had taken
affirmative action on practically all requests froin the American
services. He requested to be kept informed of negotiations with the
Fighting French delegation in Washington and of decisions of the
United States Government. This request was understandable in
the light of his recent experience with a lack of instructions.
The initial phase of official United States relations with the
French National Committee ended in a spirit of cooperation and good
will among the participants in London. Whatever the doubts, sus-
picions or latent antagonisms may have been in the State Department,
and in the White House, they did not cross the Atlantic. Admiral Stark
and his Army colleagues, at first General Bolte and then later General
John E. Dahlquist and Colonel Sumner Waite, approached their
26. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (Stark) to
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet (King), letter serial
00796, September 9, 1942. '

39
delicate task with good motives and with the intention of doing their
best to help consolidate diverse elements into the common war effort.
Subsequently, Admiral Stark was in fact a representative of the
United States Government to General de Gaulle and to the French
National Committee. He was concerned with political and diplomatic
problems, as well as with consultations on purely- technical military
and naval matters relative to the conduct of the war. The history of
Ainerican contact with the French National Committee from July 1942
to the limited recognition given to the French Committee of National
Liberation in August 1943 is one of an evolution from, consultations on
an ad hoc basis to a continuous and rather intimate contact towards
the end of the period.
The continual French insistence upon greater political recog-
nition was seen for what it was. It was submerged for a time in the
greater spirit of wartime cooperation. To be sure many frustrations
lay ahead for General de Gaulle. But for the moment a high tide of
good feeling was reached, which was no mean achievement considering
the very different outlooks, positions and objectives of the two parties.
These differences would emerge in the next few months to frustrate
General de Gaulle, to try severely the patience of the President, to
test the diplomatic skill of Admiral Stark and to confirm the opinion
of the State Department. Admiral Stark's patience, skill and above
all, his good personal relations with General de Gaulle would do much




Early on Sunday morning, November 8, 1942, Allied Forces
under the command of General Eisenhower landed in North and North-
west Africa. Operation TORCH had been executed. It was the first
major offensive action by the Americans against the Germans in World
War II. It was the first time an American general had commanded
Allied troops in Europe. It produced the first major change since the
1940 Armistice in the position of France in relation to the United States,
By breaking diplomatic relations with the United States later that same
day, Vichy eliminated the vestigal remains of the Third Republic from
the active consideration of the United States.
The Allies, and Darticula rly the Americans as the dominant
partner in the invading force, needed someone to rally the North
African French, if not specifically to active opposition to the Germans
at first, at least to not opposing the Allied landings. Prior to the
invasion, such arrangements had been made with key French leaders
in North Africa. Asa practical matter, General de Gaulle would have
beenof little , if any, assistance to the Allies because he was in open
rebellion against Marshal Petain, who held the loyalties, or at least





For these reasons, the United States put General Henri Giraud
forward as "Commander-in-Chief, French Army of North Africa, " to be
a rallying point for opposition to the Axis and hopefully the leader of a
new force. As an escaped prisoner of war, Giraud's anti-German
credentials were unimpeachable. The morning of the landings, Giraud
appealed for French support for the American operations, saying there
was but one passion, France, and one goal, victory. The presence of
Admiral Jean Darlan in Algiers was to be a complicating factor, the
extent of which would be apparent within the week.
The immediate and practical problem facing General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa, was to
secure the area at a minimum cost. This objective involved not only
the initial landings, but also obtaining the active cooperation of the
civil authorities for local administration as well as inducing the
military authorities not to resist the Allied landings. Obviously
General de Gaulle was not the man for this task. If the French forces
in North Africa, which amounted to a substantial French force on
French territory, could be added to the United Nations forces, that
Army would constitute a major factor in future operations.
Such an army would also constitute a major political development,
since it would be a large non-Gaullist force on the Allied side. The
problem facing the Allies would be to encourage a fusion of the Fight-
ing French and North African French forces for a more effective
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prosecution of the war. General de Gaulle was also interested in a
fusion of the French forces, but for other reasons. He saw a rival in
the creation of another French force within the Allied camp.
Whether Admiral Stark was aware of General de Gaulle's per-
ception of a rival in General Giraud and the forces he might rally is
not clear. But Lieutenant- Commander Kittredge, of Admiral Stark's
staff, reported that he had received a visit on November 8 from a
member of General de Gaulle's staff. This unidentified individual
asked whether the United States command would help to bring about a
fusion between the Fighting French and the North African French
forces. He said that if an armored corps of French troops were to be
created, General de Gaulle might well be invited to organize, train
and command it. It was indicated that the General would probably
accept. Kittredge saw the possibility of influential American mediatory
action accelerating the fusion of all French forces for military action
against the Axis.
The supposition that General de Gaulle would accept a field
command subordinate to a higher French authority was not as prepos-
terous in November of 1942 as it now appears with the advantage of
hindsight. The General had stated on several occasions that he was
prepared to place himself under the orders of any higher officers or
1. Kittredge memorandum, November 9, 1942, Document 1,
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, (Stark) to Director,.
Office of Naval Intelligence, letter serial 01449 of December
10, 1942. (Hereinafter referred to as COMNAVEU letter,
December 10, 1942. )
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of any group better qualified to bring a united French nation back into
the war. He apparently repeated this offer to Prime Minister Churchill
2
on November 8. That he did not do so can be attributed to the lack of
any persons outside of France with the requisite qualifications, at
least in General de Gaulle's view.
The General felt General Giraud lacked these qualifications
because of a Vichy taint and because he did not hold his command
independently, but from a foreign authority. General Giraud had
written to Marshal Petain agreeing to accept his guidance and as a
3man of honor would never go back on his word. Whether General de
Gaulle was justified in applying these criteria is a matter of judgment,
but it is a matter of historical record that General Giraud's subse-
quent demonstrated political ineptitude would have been a serious
handicap to his leadership of any movement for the liberation of France,
to say nothing of the restoration of France to a place of importance
among the United Nations.
Even though General de Gaulle and the Fighting French had been
excluded from the planning and execution of Operation TORCH at the
express wish of President Roosevelt, General de Gaulle wholeheartedly
2. Colonel Sumner Waite memorandum to General Eisenhower,
November 10, 1942, in "Selected Documents from Correspon-
dence of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Commander,
U. S. Naval Forces in Europe, " (hereinafter referred to as
COMNAVEU Documents), 4 vols., vol. 2, p. 7.
3. Kammerer, Albert, Du Debarquement Africain an Meurtre
de Darlan, (Paris: Flammarion, 1949), p. 106.
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approved of the landing. Rumors had been circulating in London for
some time, but he received unofficial word of the landings only the
evening before from a tip received by Soustelle at the Soviet Ambassa-
dor's reception commemo rating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
4
Bolshevik revolution. He was officially informed at noon the follow-
ing day, November 8, by Prime Minister Churchill at a luncheon at
5
10 Downing Street.
At lunch General de Gaulle was enthusiastic about the landings,
although regretful he had not been informed in advance. He understood
and expressed no resentment when Churchill explained the President
wished only those who were actively participating to be informed.
General de Gaulle stated the first objective was to achieve a cease-
fire, and the important thing was to establish unity of the French
forces. The Vichy regime must be expelled from Algiers, he said,
n
because the resistance movement would not tolerate it.
4. Soustelle, Jacques, Envers et centre tout, (2 vols., Paris:
Robert Laffont, 1950), vol. 2, p. 108.
5. De Gaulle, Charles, Unity, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1959), p. 45. General de Gaulle's recollection confirms
contemporary documents to establish indisputably that he was
informed of the landings only after they had commenced, and
not the evening before as Macmillan maintains. Harold
Macmillan, The Blast of War, (New York: Harper &; Row,
1968, p. 159~
6. Kittredge memorandum, November 10, 1942, Document 3,
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
7. De Gaulle, Unity, p. 47.
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Later that day General de Gaulle broadcast a stirring speech to
North Africa in which he exhorted Frenchmen there to rise up and to
elp the Allies without reserve. Frenchmen were urged to disregard
ames and slogans, since the only thing that counted was the salvation
o
of their country.
The next day, November 9, Admiral Stark and the Army repre-
sentative, Colonel Sumner Waite, called on General de Gaulle to ex-
press appreciation for the broadcast. General de Gaulle assured them
of his approval of the landings, confirmed the statements made in his
broadcast the previous evening, and stated his only purpose was the
salvation of France. He would support any action that would contribute
q
to bringing a united France into the war. General de Gaulle in his
Memoires says Admiral Stark at this time agreed to the sending of a
mission to North Africa. However, there is no American record of
such an agreement at that time. Later that day Colonels Billotte and
Lombard, of General de Gaulle's staff, called on Kittredge and sug-
gested such a mission to obtain the fusion of all the French in support
of Allied operations.
8. The Speeches of General de Gaulle, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1942), p. 173.
9. Kittredge memorandum, November 10, 1942, Document 3,
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
10. De Gaulle, Unity, p. 50.
11. Tracy B. Kittredge, MSS Diary, November 9, 1942, Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, files (hereinafter referred to as
COMNAVEU files), Naval History Division, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations.
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The next morning, November 10, Major Desmond Morton
personal assistant to the Prime Minister, told Kittredge that he
approved of the sending of a Fighting French mission to North Africa
and that the best approach would be for General de Gaulle to write a
letter to Churchill formally proposing it and asking American concur-
rence. After talking to Ambassador John G. Winant, Admiral Stark
and Colonel Waite agreed that all communications concerning the
North African situation and operations there should be conveyed by
the Prime Minister or by the Ambassador to the President. Within
the hour, Kittredge called on Rene Pleven, Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs, and Colonel Billotte to transmit this suggestion,. By late after-
noon General de Gaulle had sent such a letter to the Prime Minister
with a copy to Admiral Stark. American military and Embassy
officials agreed that the final decisions on all matters affecting North
African operations must be made by the field commander, General
Eisenhower, in agreement with the President and the Combined Chiefs
1 2
of Staff. In expressing Admiral Stark's thanks to General de Gaulle
for the copy of the letter he sent to Churchill, Kittredge informed the
General that Admiral Darlan had agreed to the cessation of all hostili-
ties in North Africa.
Major Morton assured Commander Kittredge and Colonel Waite
12. Ibid .
13. Kittredge to de Gaulle, COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 2, p. 2,
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on November 11 that the British Government had proposed to the
President a mission by General de Gaulle personally or by his dele-
gates to North Africa to discuss unification
-of French forces. Indeed,
Churchill sent a personal message that day to the President endorsing
this proposal and warning of the dangers of rival emigre^factions.
By the next morning, Noveinber 12, the President had replied to
the Prime Minister's dispatches. He agreed that a Fighting French
mission be authorized to visit North Africa on two conditions. First,
instructions to the members of the mission must be communicated to
the American and British Governments before their departure. Second,
any agreements reached in North Africa which would affect the situation
there in any way should receive General Eisenhower's approval. Major
Morton confirmed that General de Gaulle had been informed of the
President's reply.
Following receipt of the President's reply, General de Gaulle
requested Admiral Stark call on him later that day to discuss the
1 7
current situation in North Africa. He inquired as to future United
States policy and he discussed objectively and, as Kittredge noted,
14. Kittredge memorandum, Noveinber 10, 1942, Document 5,
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
15. Churchill, Winston S. The Hinge of Fate
,
(Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 630.
16. Kittredge Diary, November 12, 1942.
17. Kittredge memorandum, November 12, 1942, Document 12,
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
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philosophically, the future role of the French in collaborating with the
Allies in the conduct of operations from North Africa.
General de Gaulle observed that reports of military operations
and incidental developments had been confused and contradictory. He
understood the necessity confronting the American commanders for
reducing local opposition inspired by Vichy orders and for supervising
local administration. However, he did not understand the appointment
of a French General by American authorities to command French
troops and the American attitude towards Admiral Darlan's broadcast.
This speech by the Vichy-designated Commander-in-Chief in North
Africa implied the French there would enjoy neutral status. Despite
the strategic soundness of the invasion, military considerations formed
only part of the total picture, which included the impact of American
acts in North Africa on French opinion. General de Gaulle's most
recent information indicated that French opinion was greatly troubled.
The General distinguished two phases in the Allies' acts. The
first phase concerned the appointment of General Giraud as military
and civil head of the North African forces and administration. In
the second phase, General Giraud was not mentioned and some sort of
a deal of a provisional nature seemed to have been made with Admiral
Darlan.
Admiral Stark regretted he had no detailed information on the
current conversations in North Africa. Originally the American
authorities had counted on gaining many advantages from the presence
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of General Giraud in North Africa. He had learned with surprise from
the press that the Americans were negotiating with Admiral Darlan,
but he felt there was no intention to recognize his authority for any
extended period of time.
General de Gaulle explained he felt General Giraud was a great
force that had been wasted, if only because he held command from a
foreign military authority. He reminded Admiral Stark that the French
National Committee was supported by French public opinion and held
authority only from France. He paid homage to the perfection with
which Operation TORCH had been planned and executed.
This conversation marked the end of the period in which General
de Gaulle and the Fighting French envisaged an immediate agreement
with General Giraud to unify French forces. General de Gaulle was
aware that something was going on in regard to Admiral Darlan in
Algiers. He would have to wait until the next day to find out what
it was.
November 13 came on Friday in 1942 and to the Fighting French
in London it must have seemed that everything turned sour that day.
At nine o'clock in the morning Admiral Darlan made a second broad-
cast from Algiers. In the first broadcast two days before, he called
on all French forces in North Africa to cease fighting the Allies. But
in his second broadcast he stated that he, as French High Commissioner,
had assumed responsibility for French interests in Africa, with the
approval of the American authorities with whom he was collaborating.
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He called on Governors and residents to remain at their posts to ensure
the administration of their territories. He stated he was acting in
accordance with the Marshal's wishes. He concluded with "Vive le
Marechal. "
This broadcast signified that the invading Allies, represented by
General Mark Clark, had reached an agreement at least in principle
with the local French officials who held their offices by virtue of prior
Vichy appointments and who would continue to remain in power. The
Allies particularly the United States had made a deal with an odious
regime headed by the almost universally despised and distrusted
Admiral Darlan whose reputation was that of an opportunist and whose
loyalties ran more to the French Navy than to France or to the Allied
cause. Kittredge noted that the announcement of the Clark- Darlan
agreement created consternation and evoked violent criticism in
19Fighting French and Allied circles in London. 7
At lunch that day Rene Cassin, National Commissioner of Justice
and legal advisor to General de Gaulle, told Kittredge the General sus-
pected the Americans of intending a partial or de facto recognition in
North Africa of the Vichy Government, with Darlan as the Marshal's
representative. Cassin said the French in London were painfully
18. Kittredge memorandum, November 17, 1942, Document 23
(a) in COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
19- Kittredge memorandum, November 17, 1942, Document 23
(a)
, COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
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impressed by the names of the French in North Africa with whom, the
Americans were in contact, particularly Temple, the Prefect of Algiers
This man was one of Laval's most ardent disciples who had been sent
to North Africa in 1941 to place all liberals and democratic leaders in
prison or in concentration camps. Many hundreds were still locked up.
The French were amazed that the Americans should give their approval
to the acts of the past year or so, and should keep the person respon-
20
sible head of civil administration in Algiers.
This deeply felt, but well-articulated and somewhat restrained
reproach by Cassin, typified the grounds upop which the Darlan deal
was attacked in London and in the United States. It is true that Darlan
and his Vichy gang were incompatible on ideological and general
political grounds with the United States. But the inescapable fact,
ignored by the critics in the ensuing uproar, was that Darlan and
company controlled North Africa. It was true the Allies had the
capability of ousting them, which would have required the institution
of a military government and quite probably extensive mopping up
operations. Faced with the choice of setting up a military government,
or coming to terms with Darlan, so he could prosecute the war against
the Axis, General Eisenhower chose to pursue the military objective:
2 1the expulsion of the Axis from North Africa.
20. Kittredge memorandum, November 14, 1942, Document 18,
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
21. Eisenhower, Dwight D. , Crusade in Europe, (Garden City:
Doubleday & Company, Inc. , 1948), p. 131.

52
There has been little dispute that the alternative choice would
have been costly in time, casualties and loss of equipment. The
criticism grew from outrage and indignation that the Americans
should come to terms with the likes of Darlan and the Vichy gang in
North Africa. This criticism was voiced by persons, including the
Fighting French, v/ho bore no responsibility for the prosecution of
action against the Axis in North Africa.
The criticism of the Fighting French was not that of an irrespon-
sible group of men who realized they had been frustrated in an attempt
to participate in civil and military arrangements in North Africa. It
was based upon fundamental grounds of political legitimacy. The
Gaullist position since the 1940 Armistice had been consistently that
their movement represented the real France, the true France which
had been betrayed by Marshal Pe'tain and his associates. They
claimed the support of the French people, in addition to drawing on
a mystique of France. Certainly the purported transfers of authority
from Darlan to Nogues and back to Darlan and the comical but really
pitiful claims that Darlan and others were carrying out the real wishes
of the Marshal, who was unable to express them, created a cloud, to
22. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to Stark, November 18,
1942, in COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 2, p. 33. Secretary of
War Henry L. Stimson told Knox that General Patton was
alarmed at the possibility of an uprising of tribes in Morocco,
which was apparently forestalled by the cooperation of Darlan
and others. Had it occurred, Patton estimated that 60, 0C0
troops would have been required to quell it.
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say the least, upon their claims to legitimacy. The issue that arose
between the Fighting French ^lnd the United States had its origin in two
unrelated concepts and sets of considerations which clashed under the
circumstances in North Africa in November, 1942.
This emotional atmosphere was further charged by the decision
of the French National Committee on November 14 to postpone indef-
initely the sending of the mission to North Africa and to issue a com-
munique dissociating Fighting France from the arrangements made in
North Africa. Charles Peake, Head of the British Mission to Fighting
France, persuaded the National Committee to delay issuing their com-
munique pending receipt of important information Churchill expected
23from Washington, to prevent at least a public display of dissension.
Later that afternoon General de Gaulle sent two resistance
leaders to see Admiral Stark. They were known by their assumed
names as M. Bernard (Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vige-rie) and M.
Chevret (Francois de Menthon). The purpose of their visit was to ask
advice on going to North Africa and to discuss the general situation
there. They did not agree with the decision to postpone the mission to
North Africa and if Admiral Stark could assure them the United States
did not intend to maintain the Vichy regime permanently, and favored
the unification of French war efforts, thev would discuss with General
24de Gaulle the possibility of proceeding independently to North Africa.
23. Soustelle, Envers et contre tout, vol. 1., p. 19.
24. Kittredge Diary, November 14, 1942.
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Admiral Stark made it plain to Bernard and Chevret, as he had
to General de Gaulle, that any field commander had of necessity to
deal with the people on the spot. Any officer in General Eisenhower's
position would welcome Darlan's action in ordering the cease fire and
in collaborating with the invaders, regardless of his past political
acts and former status. Kittredge reported that Bernard and Chevret
heartily agreed. • ...
They inquired as to the attitude of the United States Government
towards Darlan, who claimed authority both from Vichy and the Allied
Commander. The situation was not clear to Admiral Stark, and it was
equally unclear to the Frenchmen. Although they would welcome an
opportunity to meet Giraud, they could only insult Darlan if they were
to meet him. The Admiral observed there were enough troubles with-
out going out of the way to create new ones. He pointed out that the
task of defeating Hitler was the important task to which all others
should be subordinated. Bernard and Chevret saw the Admiral's
point and he asked them to convey it to General de Gaulle.
Following this conversation, which he found very satisfactory
from every standpoint, Admiral Stark wrote to General de Gaulle for
the record. He reiterated the point that military considerations had
made it necessary and inevitable that the Allies had to deal with the.
people "found on the spot and to deal with them quickly in order to
25. Ibid.

avoid all unnecessary shedding of blood. That, as I view it, is what
has happened to date. " Before delivery to General de Gaulle, the
text was shown to Ambassador Winant, and to Charles Peake of the
Foreign Office. General de Gaulle received the letter before an inter-
view with Peake, at which time he agreed to a 24 hour delay in the
issuance of the National Committee's communique
.
In London, Sunday, November 15, was devoted to many comings
and goings in and between the American and British offices. British
leaders met at Chequers that afternoon with the Prime Minister and
27General Walter B. Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff.
Elsewhere, Admiral Darlan broadcast from Algiers that Marshal
Petain was no longer a free agent. He appealed to all those who had
sworn loyalty to the Marshal to consider their oath could be discharged
by following the Admiral's orders. General Clark in another broad-
cast spoke of the pleasure of concluding an agreement with Admiral .
Darlan to help drive the enemies of France out of Africa. Another
appeal was made by General Giraud for support of the North African
operations. Finally, a broadcast from the United States to France
used the Gaullist motto "Honneur et Patrie" and quoted messages
from Admiral Darlan and Admiral Auboyneau, head of the Free French
Navy, urging the French fleet at Toulon to come over to the Allies.
The tenor of the broadcast made it seem to have been originated or at
26. Stark to de Gaulle, November 14, 1942, COMNAVEU
Documents, vol. 2, p. 18.
27. Kittredge Diary, November 15, 1942.

56
least inspired by the Fighting French. General de Gaulle felt this
broadcast, which was rebroadcast by the BBC was a "moral swindle.'
^
These broadcasts only confirmed the worst fears of the French
National Committee and of General de Gaulle in particular. Not only
had they been unable to enter into any position of political power in
North Africa, but, as the Gaullists saw it, the Americans had given
their support in French territory to those men who had betrayed France
since 1940 by continued support of the illegitimate Vichy regime.
Officially, the French National Committee reacted by dispatching
Pleven to Adiniral Stark with a formal protest against the agreements
with Darlan. The letter contained the text of a note sent to the Allied
governments dissociating the National Committee from the negotiations
under way in North Africa. The Fighting French could not accept any
arrangements which would in effect consecrate the Vichy regime in
30North Africa. Pleven requested the transmission of his note to the
United States Government. Admiral Stark forwarded it to Winant for
3 1transmittal to the State Department, if he thought it advisable.
28. Kittredge memorandum, November 17, 1942, Document 23
(a), COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
29. De Gaulle, Charles, Unity- Documents, (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1959), p. 91.
30. Soustelle, Envers et contre tout, vol. 2, pp. 18-19.
31. Stark to Winant, November 16, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 22.
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In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, General de Gaulle said,
"I understand the United States buys the treachery of traitors, if this
appears profitable, but payment must not be made out of the honor of
32France. " The Admiral's immediate reaction was to return the
letter and therefore to ignore it. Kittredge discussed the matter
informally with Winant who agreed with him. Immediately following
a meeting of Winant and Admiral Stark the next day, Kittredge and the
Army liaison officer, Major Richard Walker, returned General de
Gaulle's letter to him personally. They explained verbally that it
must have been sent in error, unless it was the intention of the General
to render impossible further conversations with representatives of the
United States Government and armed forces. Within hours, General
de Gaulle sent a member of his staff, Gaston Palewski, to Admiral
Stark personally to convey regrets that the letter had been sent and to
express appreciation that the Admiral had been charitable enough to
return it without comment.
It is unfortunate that this letter was ever published, because it
did no one any good and served only the mischievous purpose of
heightening a tense series of events already charged with too much
emotional content as it was. Soustelle published it first and since
then it has been included in the standard works on the period.
32. Soustelle, Envers et contre tout, vol. 2, p. 19.
33. Soustelle, Envers et contre tout; Funk, Arthur Layton,
Charles de Gaulle : The "CruciaT Years 1943-1944
,
(Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1959).

Admiral Stark felt it was not typical of General de Gaulle's usual
gentlemanly demeanor and it was out of character with their usually
cordial and frank relationship. He supposed members of the General's
staff were able to talk him into sending it as a result of his understand-
able frustration, disappointment and even bitterness at the turn of
events in North Africa. Credence for this view is found in the leak of
the substance of the letter to the press, which Adiniral Stark felt was
the act of some unauthorized individual.
Meanwhile, General de Gaulle lunched again with Churchill and
Eden on November 16. He remained firm in his refusal to be a party
to any arrangement, however, temporary, which gave authority to
Darlan. He said not even the military advantage immediately gained
could justify dealings with a traitor. Churchill urged the General to
delay issuing a public statement for at least a day or two, which he
declined to do on grounds that he had already withheld his communique.
The General did not blame Churchill and Eden, but he remained firm
and they did not insist further. A communique was then issued which
summarized the Fighting French position.
Churchill was disturbed by the deal with Darlan and said so in a
34. Stark to de Gaulle, November 23, 1942, COMNAVEU Docu-
ments, vol. 2, p. 24.
35. The Earl of Avon, (Anthony Eden), The Reckoning, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 430.
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personal message to ihc President. Rather than attack it in principle
as General de Gaulle had done, he urged that "it be only a temporary
expedient justifiable by the stress of battle. " He reminded the
President of the possible serious political injury that could be done to
the common cause by the feeling the Allies were ready to deal with
local Quislings. The Foreign Office parallelled Churchill's message
with a cable in a similar vein to the Embassy in Washington and asked
37
that their views be conveyed to the American Government.
President Roosevelt clarified the position of the United States
with a cogent explanation of the deal with Darlan. His statement was
transmitted first to Churchill and then released to the press on November
•JO
17. He accepted only temporarily the political arrangements made
in North Africa. No permanent arrangements should be made with
Admiral Darlan and the Vichy Government should not be reconstituted
anywhere. Future political arrangements for the French people would
be made by them, freely after their liberation. The President justified
this temporary expedient solely by the stress of battle. It had not only
prevented bloodshed, but it had also allowed the time that would have
been spent in mopping up operations to be spent in pursuing the Axis.
36. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, (6 vols. , Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964) vol. 2, p. 445.
37. Ibid.
, pp. 446-447.




He noted that French troops under General Giraud were already in
action in Tunisia. Finally, he requested the liberation of all political
prisoners and the abrogation of Nazi-inspired Vichy legislation.
One immediate effect of the President's statement was General
de Gaulle's cancellation of a press conference scheduled for Wednesday,
Noveinber 18, at which time Admiral Stark understood the General
39
would have been "rough - to put it mildy." 7 This was a successful' •
culmination of American efforts to contain or at least to limit the effects
of the understandably vehement Fighting French objections to the arrange
ments made with Admiral Darlan. Winant felt that prior to the Presi-
dent's statement, Admiral Stark had successfully acted as a buffer to
keep General de Gaulle more or less in line at least publicly,
Admiral Stark pointed out to General de Gaulle that the President's
statement confirmed certain interpretations of events the Admiral had
given hiin recently, when he sent an official copy to the General, and
that the prime objective was still to drive the Germans and Italians out
of North Africa as quickly as possible. It was apparent that the only
guide to the future course of events was the fixed policy and intentions
of those holding the power of decision in Washington and in London.
Admiral Stark tactfully did not make this necessary reminder to General
39. Stark to Knox, November 18, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 32.
40. Stark to Knox, November J6, 1942, COMNAVEU documents,
vol. 2, p. 20.
41. Stark to de Gaulle, November 18, 1942, COMNAVEU Docu-




le Gaulle but rather to Rene Pleven, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.
-ie added that it was fortunate such a power of final decision rested in
;he hands of the President and Prime Minister.
Even after a crisis had passed the boiling point and was seemingly-
resolved, General de Gaulle usually tried to have the last word. This
pattern was apparent in this instance and would appear again later on.
A telegram apparently from all resistance organizations, as well as
statements from labor syndicates and political parties in France, was
addressed to the American and British Governments. It protested
vehemently the Allied association with Admiral Darlan. General of
the Air Force Francois d'Astier de la Vigerie, and the trade union
delegate, Le'on Moranda, who had left France on the night of November
17-18, and who had wide contacts there, brought personal testimony
to Admiral Stark of the opposition of French public opinion to the Clark-
Darlan agreement. While the object of these communications was
probably to have the last word, they also tended to establish a claim
for a base of popular metropolitan French support for General de
Gaulle's position, if not for his movement.
A second and more significant effect of the President's statement
42. Stark to Pleven, November 18, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 27.
43. De Gaulle, Unity-Documents, p. 94.
44. Kittredge Diary, November 20, 1942.
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on General de Gaulle was the inquiry made by Pleven and Palewski to
Kittredge early on Wednesday, November 18, as to whether President
Roosevelt would receive Andre Philip, National Commissioner for the
Interior, who was then in Ottawa. So far the President had not received
the Fighting French delegate in Washington, Adrien Tixier. This
inquiry was referred to Admiral Stark, who informed Winant and sug-
gested he cable Washington. Winant, however, advised Admiral Stark
to cable Secretary of the Navy Knox concerning the possibility of a visit
AC.
by Philip to the President. Admiral Stark did so.
Within six hours Knox replied that the President would see Philip
the next day, Thursday, November 19 or the following day. Using
the U.S. Naval Communications facilities, General de Gaulle directed
Philip to go to Washington immediately and to inform Knox of the time
of his arrival to permit arrangements for an interview with the Presi-
dent. Admiral Stark reported to Knox General de Gaulle's apprecia-
48tion of the prompt action taken on his request.
While Philip was enroute from Ottawa to Washington, General de
Gaulle on November 19 requested an interview with Admiral Stark for
45. COMNAVEU message 18170 1Z November 1942, COMNAVEU
Files, London No. 1, Top Drawer, HI COM Dispatches.
46. Secretary of the Navy message 1901 15Z November 1942.





an important communication. The General refused an invitation to call
at the Admiral's office and insisted the Admiral call at Carlton Gardens,
the Fighting French headquarters. Cancelling a number of other appoint-
ments, Admiral Stark arrived at General de Gaulle's office late in the
afternoon, only to be read a statement on a trivial lnatter which of
itself did not seem to warrant a personal meeting. Admiral Stark felt
the purpose of the meeting was not its substance, but rather that
General de Gaulle wanted to see whether Admiral Stark would call on
49him in view of what had transpired between them in the past few days.
Andre Philip met the President on Friday, November 20. The
interview was not a success. Philip and Tixier bluntly told the Presi-
dent that his policy of deciding what, if any, Frenchmen would govern
liberated territory until the liberation of metropolitan France was
unacceptable to the National Committee. The President and Under-
Secretary of State Sumner Welles were exasperated that after 50
minutes of conversation, neither Frenchman had expressed the
Slightest gratitude or recognition of the American liberation of
North Africa, but rather insisted that its administration be turned
over to the National Committee within two or three weeks. The
only positive note of the conversation was an expression by the
President of the usefulness of talks with General de Gaulle and that
49. Kittredge Diary, November 19, 1942.
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he would be glad to talk with the General if he could come to
50Washington.
The third and final immediate effect of the President's statement
of November 17 was what Admiral Stark perceived to be a reversal of
the attitude of the National Committee within 24 hours of the statement.
When Kittredge spoke with Pleven and Palewski on the morning of
50. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, vol. 2, pp.
546-547.
An interesting sidelight to this first meeting of the
President with a representative of the French National
Coinmittee is that it was the second time one was scheduled.
Welles had arranged a meeting of the President with
Tixier, at his request, for November 7. This meeting
was the result of the transmittal of a letter from General
de Gaulle to the President via Tixier and Welles. The
letter contained a long, but eloquent and moving statement
by the General of his position and that of the French
National Committee. The President returned the letter
to Welles and agreed to meet Tixier. The meeting never
took place, because, as Welles pointed out, Tixier never
showed up. No other reference to this meeting has been
found, not even an indication of its cancellation. There
is no known explanation of why it never took place. Welles
to Roosevelt, October 27, 1942, and Roosevelt to Welles,
October 29, 1942, U.S. National Archives, Department
of States, 851.01/400-3/6. Also, Welles memorandum
of November 6, 1942, 851.01/400-5/6.
In referring to General de Gaulle's letter, the desk
officer commented to Welles that "it is two years too late
and takes ten pages of introduction to get down to the very
little meat there is in it. " This comment must rank as one
of the most pedestrian comments ever made by a State
Department officer. It is comparable to calling Cyrano
de Bergerac's panache a feather. The State Department
was at least consistent in its view, because it did not
publish the first ten pages. For the full text see de Gaulle,




November 18, Palewski also inquired as to whether the United States
Government and military command would approve of the French Nation-
al Committee designating General Giraud as the Free French High
51Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in North Africa. Admiral
Stark saw this as an indication the French were ready "to start playing
52
ball again. " He noted to Knox that it had not come to him officially,
53
so no action was necessary. Apparently the suggestion was never
made officially, but its unofficial mention was cause for optimism.
This inquiry may have been a good omen. But any optimism
Admiral Stark may have felt was diluted by his sober reflections on
relations with General de Gaulle. It was important that General de
Gaulle realize the necessity for the utmost speed of the Allied advance
into Tunisia and for assuring a square deal for all Frenchmen in North
Africa. General de Gaulle should be told in no uncertain terms of the
situation in North Africa, he wrote Winant on November 20. Since any
statements to the General should have the approval of the Prime Minis-
ter, Churchill or Eden would be the logical choices. But, he would
54
speak to General de Gaulle with great pleasure, if authorized.
51. Kittredge Diary, November 18, 1942.
52. Stark to Winant, November 18, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol, 2, p. 29.
53. Stark to Knox, November 18, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 32.
54. Stark to Winant, November 20, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 34.
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The substance of what Admiral Stark thought General de Gaulle
should be told was that upon arrival in North Africa, General Giraud
found himself without support and urged General Eisenhower to make
arrangements with Admiral Darlan, whose presence and subsequent
role were as much a surprise to the Americans as to everyone else.
Eisenhower dealt with Darlan out of sheer military necessity. Not
only could and did Darlan terminate French opposition, but he also
assured French support of the Allied mission. Only Darlan could
provide any hope of neutralizing the French fleet and possibly deliver-
ing it to the Allies. General de Gaulle's influence in North Africa
was zero and to use his name would only have inspired opposition.
Finally, General de Gaulle should be told that political prisoners
were being released.
Admiral Stark felt it necessary to enlist the active cooperation
of General de Gaulle in the Allied effort, not only for the practical
reasons of military necessity, but also for the psychological reason
of giving him something positive to do in place of brooding on his so
far very real frustrations.
An example of the type of frustration that may not have been
important by itself, but did little to foster harmony, was a complaint
General de Gaulle made on November 21 to Admiral Stark. He coin-
plained that Radio Algiers had reported concentrations of Fighting
French forces at Tchad. He protested this divulgence of plans of a
French military operation and asked for an explanation. Since Admiral
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Stark was out of town, it was Kittrcdge who referred the matter to the
55
Allied Headquarters Staff, which reported that inasmuch as the French
had not disclosed their plans to the Allied Staff, no security stop had
been placed on information which might be published from sources not
under their control. As a result of this complaint, censors were then
assigned to Radio Algiers and instructed to "exercise the same pre-
cautionary censorship of Fighting French operational moves as is
a ,,56imposed on our own. "
In his Memoires, General de Gaulle complains of the censors in
Washington, and particularly of their influence in preventing his use
of the BBC broadcasting facilities on November 21. He states that
Charles Peake told him that American consent was required for his
broadcast and that it had been requested, but not received, for which
the British Government profoundly apologized. Kittredge, however,
reported that Peake told him that the General's statement in the
evening of November 21 had been referred to the Prime Minister only
that afternoon. Churchill refused authorization, presumably because
CO
the statement was an attack on Allied North African policy.
55. Kittredge to de Gaulle, November 21, 1942, Document 29 (a),
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
56. Stark to de Gaulle, November 23, 1942, Document 31,
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
57. De Gaulle, Unity, p. 60.
58. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 92.
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Although neither documentation nor references were found that
would explain Churchill's reasons, it is not unreasonable to assume
with General de Gaulle that Churchill may have wanted to refer the
substantive question of policy to Washington to avoid embarrassing
the United States. General de Gaulle admitted as much. ' This con-
clusion is more reasonable than the one of censorship, assigned by
General de Gaulle. The United States may have irritated and frustrated
him on several occasions, but these are insufficient grounds for such
an accusation. The prohibition came from Churchill, whatever the
reason he may have had in mind, and not from the United States.
By then, Saturday, November 21, General de Gaulle had some-
thing positive with which to occupy himself. Dispatches had arrived
from Washington and had reported the President's intimation that he
would be willing to see General de Gaulle. Officers of the General's
military staff informed Kittredge of the dispatches from Washington,
which included indications from the French point of view of a satis-
factory interview of Philip with the President. Kittredge was told the
matter was under discussion by General de Gaulle's staff and might
be formally submitted to Admiral Stark on November 23.
Colonel Lombard of General de Gaulle's staff gave Kittredge
advance notice on Sunday, November 22, of the General's plans to visit
59. Ibid.
, p. 104.
60. Kittredge Diary, November 21, 1942,
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Washington. He siiid the General would seek the advice of Admiral
Stark and Colonel Waite on the details of the voyage. Monday evening,
Lombard informed Kittredge that plans were being made for the almost
immediate departure of General de Gaulle. The President had sug-
gested that he visit Washington before December 15 or after January 8.
The earlier period appeared preferable. Lombard discussed details
with Kittredge, such as whether an American officer would be desig-
nated to accompany the General and his party as guide and interpreter.
Meanwhile, Kittredge and Colonel Waite had conferred on Monday
morning with Charles Peake, the British representative to the National
Committee. Peake confirmed the identity of American and British
policy in the matter of General de Gaulle's visit to the United States.
He noted that although final powers rested in Washington, the British
shared responsibility for actions taken in North Africa. He affirmed
that the British would approve of General de Gaulle's visit to Washing-
ton. 62
Following unanimous approval on Tuesday, November 24, by the
French National Committee of his visit to Washington, General de
Gaulle urgently requested Admiral Stark to call on him that afternoon.
No word from Washington had been received in London concerning the
61. Kittredge memorandum, November 24, 1942, Document 32
(a), COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
62. Kittredge Diary, November 23, 1942.
63. Kittredge Diary, November 24, 1942.
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visit of General de Gaulle. All Admiral Stark and Kittredge knew was
what the French had told them. Before going to meet General de Gaulle,
Admiral Stark cabled the Secretary of the Navy and requested informa-
tion as to whether an invitation had been extended and if so what arrange-
ments were suggested.
Later that afternoon General de Gaulle informed Admiral Stark
that the President in his conversation with Andre Philip had invited him
to visit "Washington. Philip reported that in a subsequent conversation
with Sumner Welles he was told the visit should be before December 15
or after January 8. The General felt that recent developments made
an early visit advisable. He would greatly appreciate the Admiral's
advice on the organization and plans of his visit. His tentative plans
were to arrive in Washington between December 8 and 10, and to spend
approximately a week there and then a few days in New York before
returning to London. He planned to take only three or four persons
in his party.
Since he had received neither instructions nor information from
Washington, Admiral Stark could only agree in principle with the
General's suggestions. If the invitation were confirmed, he would be
glad to facilitate arrangements for the trip. He declined to give advice
as to who should accompany the General, but he did suggest visiting
various centers of war activity, after first going to Washington.




Although at their meeting, Admiral Stark declined to make sub-
stantive comments on General de Gaulle's proposed visit and although
he was unable to commit himself to specific arrangements, he comment-
ed to Knox about French affairs in anticipation of General de Gaulle's
visit. He gave full credit to General Eisenhower for conducting a
magnificently successful operation. He states that no responsible
officer would have acted otherwise in regard to Darlan. While not
forgiving Darlan for what he had done before, the. Admiral recognized
that the fact stood out that Darlan had kept the French fleet out of
German hands. Whatever else may be said about him, that fact was
of historical record. Also, Darlan, once he decided to climb on board
the Allied bandwagon, gained the support of the North African French
for the Allies by invoking the fiction that what he was doing was really
the will of Marshal Petain, who, as a prisoner of the Germans, was
unable to give him open support. He wrote, "Any defense of Darlan is
hardly mentioned; I just thought I'd start something. " He stopped to
think what would have happened had there been no Darlan and concluded
the fighting would still be in progress and a military occupation of
North Africa would have been necessary. He also thought that General
de Gaulle as a soldier would have done the same thing had their posi-
tions been reversed. He concluded by urging no hirry in deciding
whom to back for French High Commissioner in North Africa. He felt
65. Stark to Knox, November 16, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 20.
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the French people should decide, but it was a nice question of how they
would decide. He admitted he did not have the answer.
Admiral Stark's uncertainty was ended with a cable dated
November 25 from Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President:
no invitation had been issued to General de Gaulle to visit Washington.
Winant received details by telephone. It was officially clear that
General de Gaulle was going to the United States on his own initiative,
but in response to an expressed willingness of the President to receive
him should he arrive.
Strong impersonal forces and deeply rooted political interests
may underlie historical events, but those same events unfold as a
result of the actions of men whose personalities color events and can
often transform them. To Admiral Stark, General de Gaulle appeared
on November 26 as the right man at the right time, but the Admiral
was unsure how the General would appear the next day or under a
different set of circumstances. ' The Admiral's perplexity was
understandable in light of the several unpleasant and irritating incidents
since the commencement of Operation TORCH.
At General de Gaulle's urgent request, Admiral Stark received
him on November 26 before attending Thanksgiving services at West-
minster Abbey. This was apparently a fence mending visit. The
66. Leahy to Stark, (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet message
252035Z, November, 1942).
67. Stark to Knox, November 27, 1942, in COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 43.
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General first expressed his own good wishes and those of the National
Committee on the occasion of Thanksgiving Day. He said that he and
practically all the French understood the war aims and efforts of the
United States and that unity of purpose should not be diluted by transi-
tory differences over methods and strategy to achieve common aims.
The present disastrous situation, the General continued, was of
tragic significance. It led the French to place particular emphasis on
questions of morale and policy. They may occasionally over emphasize
such considerations, as he had done, and express themselves in a
manner that might irritate or offend their American friends. (Was
this an apology?) But he hoped nothing would weaken the traditional
friendship of the French and American people. He had profound con-
fidence in the intentions and leadership of President Roosevelt. More
than a military victory and a military decision must be sought in the
war. The ultimate outcome of the war must not jeopardize the purpose
and objectives for which the masses were then struggling. This
victory must open a new way for moral as well as political progress.
A new France was corning into existence, and the General
strongly emphasized the necessity of maintaining its essential structure
intact and unified. The Americans must not be misled by the former
leaders who may have represented the France of 1918, but who did
not represent the France of 1942. Officers, officials and colonists
were apt to cling to old traditions, but the new emerging France
would be more liberal and democratic than the old. Here was the
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driving force of the resistance movement in France, and it was the
reason particular importance had to be attached to the moral, political
and social consequences of the Allied war program and effort. It was
also the reason the Americans ought to weigh carefully any actions or
expressions bearing upon France.
Admiral Stark shared the view of the necessity of unity and the
importance of avoiding futile irritations. He noted that American war
aims were not limited to military victory alone, but encompassed the
creation of conditions conducive to human progress and happiness.
With this eloquent and rational statement of the Fighting French
position as a start, Admiral Stark proceeded on a round of official
duties which brought him into contact with King George, King Haakon
of Norway and the Prime Minister. Churchill was delighted at the
prospect of General de Gaulle's trip to Washington. He hoped the
President would like him, at least a little, because it would help.
Knowing both the General and the President personally, Churchill
69hoped General de Gaulle would not antagonize the President.
The Admiral discussed a letter Darlan had written to General
Eisenhower with Churchill, Eden, The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir
Dudley Pound, and General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff. In this letter Darlan said the story was current that
68. Kittredge memorandum of conversation, November 26, 1942,
COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 2. p. 41.
69. Stark to Knox, November 27, 1942.
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he was being used as a lemon and, when squeezed dry, would be dis-
carded. He acted not for personal gain, but only, he said, for the good
of his country when the Germans violated the Armistice. When possible
7 nhe intended to lay down the burdens of office and retire to private life.
Admiral Stark thought General de Gaulle should read the letter.
General Brooke and Admiral Pound agreed. The Prime Minister felt it
would do no good. Admiral Stark replied that, whether it did or not, it
would be a good idea for General de Gaulle "to get the picture" and
besides it would at least acquaint General de Gaulle with Darlan's
point of view. He commented to Knox that he doubted it would be shown
to General de Gaulle at least in London and left open the possibility of
7 1disclosure by the President.
King Haakon of Norway apparently engaged Admiral Stark in some
spirited conversation. The King sympathized with General de Gaulle's
stand and voiced approval of it. What Admiral Stark said was not re-
corded, but presumably he made a strong case for Allied unity, for he
72
felt he made the King "see the light of day before we finished. ..."
Charles Pcake told Admiral Stark on November 27 that he too
was somewhat exasperated by General de Gaulle's recent mood, which
was wholly understandable in the light of his recently disappointed hopes
70. Churchill, The Hing e of Fate, p. 648.




and his frustrations, although Peakc certainly did not see it that way.
Since he had no responsible appropriate activity, the General spent
much of his time making irritable complaints about British and American
policy and he was open to influence by malcontents in his own camp,
73
as well as to mischief by Bogomoloff, the Soviet Ambassador. In this
respect, Peake's insight coincided with Admiral Stark's estimate of how
the treachery letter of November 15 happened to be sent in the first " '
place.
On the basis of his experience with General de Gaulle, Peake
felt the President should discuss several questions with the General.
First, unity of French participation in the war should be established
as soon as possible. Second, a political leader such as Herriot accept-
able to all pro-Allied and patriotic Frenchmen, should be found and
brought out of France to head a new National Committee. Third, a
suitable military command should be found for General de Gaulle.
He felt the General could not and would not decline, and it would re-
direct his energies.
Shortly after Peake left Admiral Stark's office, General Catroux,
Fighting French High Commissioner in Syria, was shown in. Catroux,
although senior in rank to General de Gaulle, had voluntarily placed
himself under the General's command. Admiral Stark liked him
73. Kittredge memorandum, November 27, 1942, Document 36,




immediately. He felt the President would like talking to Catroux and
75
told Knox so.
Catroux agreed that General Eisenhower had taken the only action
possible in dealing with Darlan, but for sound military, naval and
political reasons these arrangements should not endure beyond their
absolute necessity. They should be replaced by measures designed to
assure the security of the military position in North Africa and the
unity of French forces which was necessary for their effective partici-
pation in the war. He felt the revival of France as a nation must start
with an effective French contribution to the liberation of France. Such
a contribution could come about only by an active and unified re-entry
into the war of all Frenchmen in a position to act.
A Darlan regime in North Africa posed certain military dangers,
Catroux continued. Darlan had not actively entered the war on the Allied
side, but he had only adopted a passive neutrality in defense of North
Africa. Darlan was Mme. Catroux's cousin and Catroux had known
him for many years. He thought Darlan was an opportunist who was
motivated by personal ambition. Darlan could not be trusted with the
security of the Allied rear in North Africa. Replacement of Darlan and
and other Vichy appointees by men known to be loyal to the Allies would
result in greater security of the Allied rear and, hence, greater liberty
of military action. It would also foster unity among Frenchmen who
75. Stark to Knox, November 27, 1942, COMNAVEU Documents,
vol. 2, p. 43.
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,\ ore willing to give active support to the Allied cause.
Catroux greatly impressed Admiral Stark with his sound sense and
realistic and ethical outlook. One reason General de Gaulle asked Catroux
to call on Admiral Stark was to get the Admiral's reaction as to whether
Catroux ought to go to Washington with him. Admiral Stark thought most
decidedly it would be a good idea. He also thought General Marshall
nf
would enjoy having a long talk with him. '
Plans for General de Gaulle's transportation to the United States,
along with four members of his staff, were proceeding apace. It was
intended that the Fighting French party leave England about December
1 on one of the Queens. Arrangements were being made in the utmost
secrecy. Admiral Stark placed General de Gaulle on 24 hours notice to
7 7depart. Admiral Stark cabled Knox on November 27 the substance of
arrangements made and indicated General de Gaulle could arrive in the
United States about December 6, and inquired whether that was satisfac-
tory. He also included General de Gaulle's expression the previous
day that the fundamental unity of purpose of the French and Americans
must not be confused by irritations resulting from differences as to
method and strategy. Winant joined in the drafting of that message and
7 8
requested it be shown to the President and to Hull. No reply having
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Stark to Knox message, 27 121 3Z November 1942.
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been received the next day, November 28, Admiral Stark dispatched
another message to Knox and requested to know if the arrangements
as made were satisfactory. 7
A reply was received on Sunday, November 29, from Admiral
Leahy in his capacity as the President's Chief of Staff. He said unfore-
seen developments made it necessary to postpone General de Gaulle's
visit until after January 9, 1943, at which time the President would
reserve the necessary time to see him. Exactly what the unforeseen
events were was not clear, but Leahy indicated elsewhere the President
did not particularly want to see General de Gaulle and that the Joint
Chiefs had advised the President that if he saw General de Gaulle, it
might seriously affect the Tunisian campaign then in progress. This
postponement was made in the face of strong domestic pressure by
8
1
those who feared Darlan's allegedly fascist attitude.
Upon receipt of Admiral Leahy's message, Admiral Stark by
telephone directed his staff to inform the Foreign Office and General de
Gaulle. Kittredge informed the General Sunday morning, November 29.
The General accepted the postponement graciously, indeed he could not
do otherwise, but surprisingly enough, he also expressed full agree-
79. Stark to Knox message, 281446Z November 1942.
80. Leahy to Stark message , November 29, 1942, in COMNAVEU
Documents, vol. 2, p. 51.





mcnt. A message report was made to Washington, along with an
o o
indication that plans were being made for a January visit.
The real reason General de Gaulle agreed so readily to a post-
ponement of his visit to Washington was revealed in a telegram to
Tixier. The Americans were unaware of its contents. The General
felt the British were giving him weak support, which meant Roosevelt
and Churchill were more or less in agreement. He feared the Presi-
dent would flourish a plan for a "Committee for Co-ordination of
French Affairs" with headquarters in Washington. Thus the General
would be placed in the awkward position where refusal would make him
appear to obstruct the war effort and acceptance would cause the French
to lose their best opinion of him. It was better, he said, to gain time
84
and allow things to take their course.
Events were also moving forward in North Africa. Darlan
announced on December 1 the creation of a French Imperial Council
under his direction. It was composed of the civil and military com-
manders of Algiers, Morocco and French West Africa. Darlan
clearly intimated this body was to act as a de facto government to
85
represent France and French interests with the Allies. In a
82. Kittredge Diary, November 29, 1942.
83. COMNAVEU message 29 1 1 1 1Z November 1942.
84. De Gaulle, Unity-Documents, p. 109-
85. Kittredge memorandum, December 7, 1942, COMNAVEU
Documents, vol. 2, p. 59.
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dispatch to the War Department, General Eisenhower had referred to
the "French Imperial Federation. " A reply was drafted under the
direction of Admiral Leahy and cautioned Eisenhower against using
that term in any written agreements or communi cations with the
French. The United States was consistent in refusing to recognize
the North African regime as anything more than provisional.
By the first week of December 1942, the political situation in
North Africa had been fairly well resolved. Admiral Darlan was in
power and was demonstrating his capacity to exercise authority
effectively. The United States accepted North African political
realities and acknowledged Darlan had an important continuing part
to play, only so long as his efforts were directed towards resistance
to the Axis. While recognizing the military contribution of Darlan
and other French groups, the United States would have no part in
attempting to pre-determine the ultimate political choice of the French
87people and, indeed, hinted opposition to any such attempts. Darlan
was safe, at least temporarily, so long as he played the United States 1
game. The problem confronting General de Gaulle was how to convince
the United States to dispense with Darlan and then how to bring about a
fusion of French forces on terms acceptable to the Fighting French.
With the General's departure for Washington postponed at least to the





end of the month, the next step was to see what could be done about
North Africa.
Meanwhile, on Friday, November 27, the French Fleet had been
scuttled at Toulon. At least events had proven Darlan right in his
previous assertions that the fleet would never fall into German hands.
Aside from this sorry end to a fleet that once had been second only to
the Royal Navy, the scuttling deprived the Allies of the possibility of
acquiring needed warships and it deprived Darlan of a significant
bargaining point, since it was he who nominally controlled it. The
evidence is unclear as to what if any connection existed between the
scuttling of the fleet and the reversal of the November 14 decision of
the National Committee not to send a mission to Algiers. General de
Gaulle hinted, however, that this event led many people to feel the
continuation of Darlan in office was more of a liability than that of an
o o
asset. This perception may have underlain the Fighting French
change in attitude.
At any rate, the question of sending a mission to North Africa
was discussed at dinner on November 30 by Admiral Stark and General
de Gaulle. The French National Committee wanted to send General
Francois d'Astier immediately to North Africa to discuss with French
leaders and with the Allied Command staff the unification of French
participation in the war against the Axis. In further talks the next day
88. De Gaulle, Unity Documents, p. 71.

83
with the French staff, Kittredge referred to previous procedure whereby
general de Gaulle sent a letter to the Priine Minister for submission
89
to the United States. Generiil de Gaulle wrote to the Prime Minister
on December 2 asking that General d'Astier head a mission of inquiry
to North Africa. This proposal was transmitted to the President. ° At
dinner they also discussed the General's forthcoming January visit to
the United States and possible methods to increase French support of.
Allied operations and the coordination of Fighting French action with
that of the territories and other French forces.
The first real contact between the Fighting French and North
African French was at Gibraltar on December 21, when General Catroux
met General Francois Bethouart in an apparently inconclusive meeting.
Catroux intimated that General de Gaulle should go at once to North
Africa and, with Allied support and approval, replace Darlan as head
of the North African administration and assume responsibility for it.
Bethouart pointed out such a step would provoke widespread internal
conflict in North Africa, including a virtual secession of French West
91Africa. However, General d'Astier's visit to Algiers was the first
time a Gaullist representative went to North Africa, even if it was in
89. Kittredge memorandum, December 2, 1942, Document 38,
COMNAVEU letter, December 10, 1942.
90. Kittredge memorandum, December 7, 1942, COMNAVEU
Documents, vol. 2, p. 59.
91. Murphy to Leahy, December 17, 1942, Box 204, File:
February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
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the capacity of a personal representative of the General rather than as
an exploratory mission of the French National Committee.
General Eisenhower had previously consented to a visit by
d'Astier, whose task was to seek information and to pass it on to
General de Gaulle. To accomplish this task it was essential that he
have every possible contact. ' ^ He arrived in Algiers on December 20
and was asked to leave three days later.
While the d'Astier visit to North Africa had undoubted potential
advantages for General de Gaulle, General Eisenhower approved it
because he hoped it would make for greater tranquility in the area.
He was worried about subversive activities, a fifth column and untrust-
worthy officials to the extent that they could not be dismissed from his
military calculations. ~ At that time the Allies under General
Eisenhower were engaged in the Tunisian campaign, which finally
bogged down at the end of December and was suspended until spring.
General d'Astier, unfortunately, arrived in Algiers unannounced
on December 19. There was some temporary difficulty in soothing
his wounded feelings at the lack of a proper reception. There was
also difficulty in assuring the local French that he did not mean to
attempt a coup d'etat. D'Astier's apparent intention was to survey
92. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 116.
93. Eisenhower to Marshall (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army), December
21, 1942, Box 204, File: February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
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political sentiments and to observe local conditions. He also wanted to
discuss the transfer of Fighting French troops from the Middle East
and strategy for a future invasion of Europe. These latter questions
appeared to General Giraud to be academic at the moment and not the
real purpose of his visit. General Giraud advised General Eisenhower
not to permit the visit to be prolonged. '
The Tunisian campaign was the over-riding concern of General.
Eisenhower, and for this reason he advised a military occupation of
North Africa only as a final and inescapable measure. His primary
concern at that moment was the security of his rear area. Even so, he
was aware of the potential dangers that lurked at his rear.
General de Gaulle stated d'Astier received the impression of
a bitter conflict straining beneath the surface. D'Astier had a stormy
and rather unpleasant meeting with Darlan at which he told Darlan his
95presence was an obstacle to unity and he ought to step down. It is
not difficult to surmise the feeling engendered among the local French
by d'Astier's visit to North Africa where political stability was some-
what precarious. General Eisenhower was apparently sufficiently
worried about the adverse effect of d'Astier's visit that he asked
d'Astier to leave on the official grounds that the basic purpose of his
visit had been accomplished.
94. Ibid.
95. De Gaulle, Unity, pp. 72-74.
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When d'Astier departed Algiers after three days, he left written
instructions for the Gaullists calling upon them to avoid internal friction
until the enemy was removed from North Africa. To that extent,
Gaullists were directed to suspend strictly personal attacks against
their political opponents, while remaining firm on the doctrinal
line." 5 The other tangible result was a demonstration of hostility
towards General de Gaulle which did not fail to impress d'Astier and
which was probably the reason for d'Astier's instructions in the first
place.
In anticipation of General de Gaulle's visit to Washington, Admiral
Stark planned to return home for consultations and presumably to brief
the President in advance of the meeting. On the eve of his departure
from London, Admiral Stark had a long and fruitful conversation with
General de Gaulle. 7 The talk covered a wide range of topics related
to the French in general, Fighting France, General de Gaulle person-
ally and conceptions of how to unify French forces, as well as the
proposed visit to Washington
Admiral Stark opened by asking if the General had any messages
or a memorandum of questions to be transmitted to the President. The
General preferred to place himself entirely at the disposal of the
96. Eisenhower to Adjutant General, War Department (AGWAR),
Algiers message 2831, December 23, 1942, Box 204, File:
February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
97. Kittredge memorandum of conversation, December 17, 1942,
COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 2, p. 65 ff.
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President to furnish such information or to discuss such questions as
the President might wish. He hinted that it would be preferable for
his visit not to coincide with that of General Bethouart, a deputy of
General Giraud, to avoid speculation that he was making a secret deal
with Darlan under American auspices.
Many mistakes had been made by the Allies and others in dealing
with France and with the Empire without recognizing the essential unity
of France, General de Gaulle explained. France as a living entity was
more than a total of the parts composing it. All Frenchmen, he said,
whether in France or in the colonies look to some central authority. For
example, when General Giraud arrived in North Africa, even with the
sponsorship of the Allied military chiefs, he was nothing until he came
under the auspices which seemed to personify France, even the France
of Vichy. Only then was Giraud accepted as a French commander and
obeyed by French officers and men. He understood how Americans
with different traditions and outlook might err in dealing with the French.
For this reason it was unsound to attempt to deal with the various local
authorities in many parts of the world without realizing their powers
and functions flowed from a central authority. Indeed, no French
official, he said, could dissociate himself from symbolic national
authority, whether it be the Marshal at Vichy, de Gaulle in London or
now Darlan in Algiers.
General de Gaulle expressed full agreement with the immediate
decisions and arrangements made by General Eisenhower for the sound
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military reasons of establishing his expeditionary force with a minimum
of local resistance and achieving a maximum of support for the Tunisian
campaign then in progress. The danger the General saw in Darlan was
the possibility of the conversion of temporary arrangements into perma-
nent ones. Allied action had broken the link between North Africa and
Vichy. The next task, he said, was to facilitate the natural and
inevitable evolution from the illegitimate Vichy regime to the real
image of France, a fighting France to which the majority of North
Africans have looked for inspiration. Continued Allied support of
Darlan would only frustrate this evolution. Were it not for American
support, Darlan would quickly disappear.
General de Gaulle quite understood and agreed with the President's
policy of refusing to approve any formal undertakings with Darlan or to
recognize him as a national plenipotentiary. But the local American
officials in North Africa evidenced a different attitude. He cited such
examples as the failure to publicize the President's statement of
November 17 in North Africa; access to Madrid of Darlan's emissaries
to maintain contact with Vichy or possibly German officials; detention
of political prisoners in North Africa; and permission to Darlan to
seek support and adhesion of Vichy officials through the world.
Perhaps the most significant statement the General made was
his willingness to permit Fighting French troops under French officers




98Giraud. Were it not for Darlan's assumption of leadership in
North Africa, General de Gaulle would already have sent Fighting
French forces to serve under Generals Giraud, Juin or Bar re'' in
Tunisia.
The General declined to comment on Admiral Stark's passing
remark that he must be anxious to return to a more active military-
role. Kittredge noted that he intimated his active role was to give
expression to the opinions and resolves of all true patriots and to
preserve the unity of the historical tradition of France.
In conclusion, the General noted that the tragedy of 1940 was
that now what should be essentially French decisions had to be made
by other people. President Roosevelt had a singular responsibility
at that time and the destiny of France depended in large part upon the
President's decisions and the use of Ainerican power. That was why
the General wished to meet him. He hoped the President would be
guided not only by American interests, but also by a sincere appreciation
and understanding of the desires and interests of France. Wise solu-
tions to current problems could be found only by giving expression to
the spirit of an eternal France. He hoped he might aid the President
to a better understanding of the complexities of the present situation.
Admiral Stark immediately wrote General Eisenhower to tell him
that General de Gaulle for the first time went so far as to say he
98. Stark to Eisenhower, December 16, 1942, COMNAVEU
Documents, vol. 2, p. 63.
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understood Eisenhower's intentions in dealing with Darlan. The Admiral
also told him that General de Gaulle was willing to put his troops under
his or Giraud's command, but not that of Darlan. A few days after
this rather encouraging conversation, Admiral Stark departed London
for Washington. He left affairs in the hands of his Chief of Staff, Rear
Admiral Alan G. Kirk and of his ubiquitous and exceptional staff man,
Lieutenant- Commander Tracy B. Kittredge.
After his conference with Admiral Stark on December 17, General
de Gaulle continued preparations for his visit to Washington. Tixier
informed him on December 18 of a conversation with Welles in which it
was stated the President would be pleased to receive the General on
January 10 for a long conversation. The General replied that he
would be in Washington on January 9 and entirely at the President's
disposal. The General informed the American staff in London of the
President's invitation.
As usual in these matters, London was not kept well informed.
At mid-day on December 21, a dispatch was sent to Washington in which
it was stated that General de Gaulle had been informed of the President's
willingness to receive him and that the General had requested trans-
portation to arrive in Washington not later than January 9- Was this
99. Ibid.





1 02information correct? Late in the afternoon of December 22, Admiral
Leahy cabled Admiral Stark that it would be most convenient for General
de Gaulle to arrive in Washington by January 7, since the President
l no
could see him on January 8 or 9. Admiral Leahy had already clari-
fied the term "invitation" by saying the President had not issued an
invitation to General de Gaulle, but that he would receive the General
if he came to Washington.
Tentative arrangements were made for General de Gaulle to fly
to the United States in a special missions Army transport General
Marshall had sent to England. The plane would depart England not
later than December 27 and arrive at a Florida base via Accra about
December 31. The plane would pick up General Catroux, then in Cairo,
at its Accra stop. General de Gaulle was anxious to avoid any publicity
or speculation on the purposes of his trip until after his meeting with
the President. He was willing to follow the advice of the Americans
as to his itinerary and contacts. Information was requested from
Washington as to whether the travel arrangements were satisfactory.
Suggestions were requested for the employment of General de Gaulle's
time between arrival and January 7. This message was dispatched
102. COMNAVEU message 211226Z December 1942.
103. Leahy to Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
message 221708Z Deceinber 1942.
104. COMNAVEU message 241515Z December 1942.
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almost simultaneously with the assassination of Admiral Darlan in
Algiers.
The murder of Admiral Darlan was one of those fortuitous, un-
expected acts which can suddenly transfonn a political situation. Each
day that he remained in power, Darlan became more and more of a
political liability for the United States. His death meant the end of an
embarrassment, but it also dramatically re-opened the question of
French unity and provided an opportunity for General de Gaulle. While
the General condemned the criminal act, he also felt that Darlan'
s
death eliminated obstacles to practical cooperation of all French forces
in the common war effort. For this reason he was very anxious to
discuss the unification of French forces with the President.
Churchill had some second thoughts on the wisdom of General de
Gaulle's trip after the Darlan assassination. He requested the General
to delay his trip by 24 hours. This message reached General de Gaulle
at the airport shortly before his scheduled departure on December 26.
The General told Kittredge he immediately telephoned the Prime Minister
who asked to see him prior to his departure. The meeting could not
take place until the next day December 27, so departure would have to
be delayed until December 28. Churchill explained to Roosevelt
the reason he asked General de Gaulle to delay his trip was that the
105. COMNAVEU message 251700Z December 1942.
106. Kittredge memorandum, December 28, 1942, Box 204, File:
CDR Clark, COMNAVEU files.
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elimination of Darlan meant it was possible to build a nucleus of a new,
unified French organization, and at least a start should be made before
General de Gaulle went to Washington. '
The White House had also not been idle. The President had made
his decision. Admiral Leahy cabled London that in view of the unsettled
conditions in North Africa caused by the assassination of Admiral Darlan,
the President desired to postpone the visit of General de Gaulle to
108Washington. Kittredge verbally conveyed this message to members
of the General's staff. Four hours later they reported to Kittredge that
General de Gaulle had received the message and agreed with it. '
The next day, December 27, General de Gaulle requested Kittredge
call on him. The General agreed that it was wise to postpone his trip
for the time being. He wanted to await developments in North Africa
and to begin discussions with General Giraud, who had just been selected
to succeed Admiral Darlan. He wanted to wait for a reply to his Christ-
mas message to General Giraud in which he proposed an immediate
meeting. He also wanted time in which tc make tentative arrangements
with the North African French before his arrival in Washington. The
General requested a written confirmation from Admiral Kirk of the
107. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate
, p. 645.
108. Leahy to Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
message 261625 December 1942.
109- Kittredge memorandum, December 28, 1942.
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substance of Admiral Leahy's message about postponing the trip. He
and General d'Astier were to lunch with Churchill and later might have
a communication for Washington. Would Admiral Kirk call on him
later in the afternoon?
One indirect result of the lunch with Churchill was a message that
afternoon from the Prime Minister's secretariat agreeing that the Army-
transport plane could be released for return to the United States without
General de Gaulle and his party. The trip now was obviously post-
poned indefinitely.
The meeting of General de Gaulle with Admiral Kirk and Lieutenant-
Commander Kittredge was not pleasant. The General's attitude was frigid
and sullen, perhaps induced by strong talk from the Prime Minister as to
the necessity for postponement. The General had no message for Admiral
Kirk and he intimated he had expected proposals from Admiral Kirk,
either as to another date for his trip to Washington or in regard to a
meeting with General Giraud.
The General had been informed by his own delegation that the
President could not see him between January 10 and 31. He complained
of the postponement of his visits from November to December and then
to January. He wanted to see the President immediately before a
possible meeting with General Giraud. The General complained of a




ements proposed by Robert Murphy and concluded between the
dlied Commander-in-Chief and local Vichy appointed administrators.
'he General felt he must go to Washington immediately to insure the
resident's approval of the proper kind of agreement for the union of
French forces in the war.
Since Admiral Kirk had called only to confirm Admiral Leahy's
message about the President's desire to postpone the General's visit to
Washington, he declined to comment on these inquiries. The meeting
ended with a promise by General de Gaulle to reply in writing when he
had received the letter with Admiral Leahy's message.
Later that evening Admiral Kirk received General de Gaulle's
letter acknowledging receipt of Admiral Leahy's message. The General
agreed underthe circumstances to the postponement of the visit. Admiral
Kirk cabled a report of the situation to date to Admirals Leahy and Stark
in Washington.
This phase was concluded by a stirring speech of General de Gaulle
and a press conference by the President. The General called for union
of all French forces in the war and expressed approval of the military
leadership of General Giraud on December 28. Despite General de
Gaulle's soft words, the rivalry between the French generals had
begun. The next day the President said he hoped to see General de
Gaulle "very soon. " Me also hoped a complete union could be achieved
111. COMNAVEU message 281034Z December 1942.
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between leaders of all French groups and territories wishing to
participate in the common effort for victory over the Axis. Neither
the President nor the General had changed his mind.

CHAPTER IV
GIRAIJD - VICHY PERIOD
The main event in Allied French relations during the first six
months of 1943 was the often halting, always slow progress Generals
de Gaulle and Giraud made towards unification of the French forces.
The ultimate objective of the Allies as well as the French was the
eventual fusion of the Fighting French and North African French
forces. However, differences over the terms or conditions for
unification prevented its early achievement.
General de Gaulle, for various reasons, sought to dominate any
unified French movement. The British, as sponsors of the Fighting
French, tended to support General de Gaulle, but not to the detriment
of their relations with the United States. The Americans put forward
General Giraud as the leader of the North African French, and, hope-
fully, as the eventual leader of all French forces in the prosecution of
the war.
Despite the great interest the Americans and the British had in
seeing a unification of the two French camps, they were unable to
effect it themselves. Only General de Gaulle and General Giraud
could bring about a unification of the French forces. The failure of




elicit an agreement between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud proved
the point.
There was little American and British officials could do directly
to bring about unification, other than by encouraging it and by placing
no obstacles in its way. The primary function of Admiral Stark as
the United States representative to the French National Committee
during the. period leading up to the formation of the French Committee
of National Liberation in June of 1943, consisted of reporting and
observing developments within the two French camps, more than
conducting actual negotiations, although there were some exceptions.
Admiral Stark remained in Washington during the first few
weeks following Adiniral Darlan's assassination and the subsequent
elevation of General Giraud to civil and military leadership in North
Africa. During his absence from London, Commander Kittredge
recorded and analyzed the status of negotiations between the two
French groups and among the British, French and Americans. This
invaluable staff work constituted much of the sum and substance of
United States consultations with the Fighting French during this
period.
Since the French held the initiative as far as unification of their
forces was concerned, some emphasis must, therefore, be placed
upon the vicissitudes of the political fortunes of Generals de Gaulle
and Giraud. Intra-French negotiations and politics thus became
important and must be described in sufficient detail so the specific
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issues in which the United States became involved can be seen in the
propel- perspective. This process of recording and description was
one in which Kittredgc excelled. As a result, Admiral Stark was
always kept well-informed and such information was in turn passed on
to the Embassy and directly to the Navy Department in Washington.
At this time, the American authorities in London had no specific
directives for discussions with the Fighting French of any plans for
the unification of French forces. The absence of instructions was not
due to neglect in Washington, but rather to the intention of Roosevelt
and Churchill to deal with the problem themselves when they met at
Casablanca in the latter part of January. This meeting was kept
secret until its conclusion when its full effect on the French problem
was felt in London on the return of General de Gaulle from his well-
publicized meeting with the President, the Prime Minister and
General Giraud.
The sudden and unexpected removal of Admiral Darlan on
Christmas Eve 1942 created a political vacuum in North Africa. An
immediate result was uncertainty as to the maintenance of political
stability. Fortunately, the worst possibilities did not materialize.
Generally things were quiet. In London, General de Gaulle realized
his opportunity. Even before his trip to Washington was cancelled,
he sent a telegram to General Giraud on Christinas Day, in which he
deprecated the murder and said it was more necessary then ever to
establish a national authority. He proposed to meet with General
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Giraud in Algeria or in Tchad to study the means of unifying all French
forces, both overseas and in the metropole.
General de Gaulle knew both General Eisenhower and General
Giraud were in Algiers. His impatience to receive a reply turned into
suspicion that his message had not been delivered. He demanded to
know on December 27 from Admiral Kirk, who had temporarily assumed
Admiral Stark's duties, why this was so. While the General was im-
pugning the U. S, Army, the message was delivered. This was a:iother
example of how small matters unduly rankled and irritated the General
when he was under stress froin other quarters, in this instance the
cancellation of his visit to Washington and his unsuccessful attempts to
replace Giraud.
In reporting the delivery of General de Gaulle's message, General
Eisenhower noted that General Giraud seemed earnestly desirous of an
understanding with the Fighting French, but felt a meeting at that time
would be premature. Eisenhower predicted a reply along those lines,
2
and he expected Giraud to make suggestions for future discussions.
This message and all subsequent communications between
Generals de Gaulle and Giraud were transmitted by means of the U. S a
1. De Gaulle, Charles, Unity- Documents
,
(New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1959), p. 117.
2. Eisenhower to Hartle (in London) message 271259Z December
1942, Box 204, File: February 1943, Commander U.S. Naval
Forces in Europe (hereinafter referred to as COMNAVEU




irmy communications facilities in London and in Algiers. The texts
>f the messages were delivered by letters signed by American staff
officers. Both Admiral Stark in London and General Eisenhower in
Mgiers were fully aware of the substance of these messages.
Meanwhile, the Imperial Council met in Algiers on December 26
and unanimously elected General Giraud to succeed Admiral Darlan as
civil and military head of North Africa. The Secretary of State en-
dorsed Giraud in glowing terins and maintained that greater unity of
all groups under his military leadership (emphasis added) would
result. The selection of Giraud was accomplished without consulta-
tions with the British or with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It could
only seem to General dc Gaulle to be an indication of American
opposition or hostility to him. To an extent he was right. The Presi-
dent looked on North Africa as subject to military occupation, which
the French ought not to forget for a moment. If the local French
4
authorities would not play ball, he felt they would have to be replaced.
General de Gaulle still harbored some fragile hopes of a meeting
with the President. Adrien Tixier, Fighting French delegate in Wash-
ington, called on Under Secretary of State Welles on December 28 to
ask for information about the General's visit to Washington. Tixier
3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, (7 vols. , Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), vol. 2, p. 493,
4. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, (6 vols. , Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. 2, p. 23.
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felt that with the selection of Giraud, the General's visit should no
longer be postponed. Indeed, he said, an agreement to unify the French
forces could be obtained easily were it not for the influence of the
former Vichy officials in North Africa, such as Generals Auguste
v 5Nogues and Pierre Boisson. Nothing came of this last attempt to
arrange a meeting between General de Gaulle and the President.
General de Gaulle would now have to deal directly with General Giraud.
General Giraud 1 s reply to General de Gaulle on December 29
expressed agreement for the necessity of a union of French forces, but
because of an unfavorable atmosphere at that time, he felt a meeting
such as that proposed by General de Gaulle would be premature. He
suggested instead that their representatives meet to arrange for
French cooperation in battle against the common enemy. General de
Gaulle ignored the counter-proposal and strongly urged a personal
meeting somewhere out of Algeria, for example, at Fort Lamy, Brazza-
ville or Beirut. He was convinced that only a strong central French
provisional authority could ensure the direction of French efforts, the
integral maintenance of French sovereignty and the rightful represen-
tation of French interests.
General de Gaulle and Rene Pleven, Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs, assured Kittredge on January 2 of the intention of the National
Committee to maintain absolute secrecy in regard to the exchange of
5. Ibid.
, p. 555.
6. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents
, pp. 118, 120.
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messages between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud. However, reports
alluding to such messages appeared in the British and American press
and in Axis broadcast sources. As a result, there had been much
speculation about the status of negotiations and the possibility of French
7
unification.
Officials of the National Committee on January 2 referred to the
Foreign Office and to the Prime Minister's office a suggestion that the
French issue a statement to clarify their position. While the matter was
under discussion in the office of the Prime Minister and in the Foreign
Office, the statement, which had already been prepared, was released
to the press that afternoon. It passed the censors because no question
of military security was involved. The BBC broadcast it that same
evening.
Aside from its premature release while it was still under dis-
cussion being a distinct discourtesy and breech of good faith, the
statement only served to complicate matters. Internal confusion was
growing in North Africa, it said, because of a lack of a solid base of
support for the regime there and beca.use of the exclusion of Fighting
France, which had rallied so much of the Empire back into the war.
The results of the confusion were a hampering of military operations,
a virtual crippling of France by a lack of unity among the French
7. Kittredge memorandum, February 10, 1942, in "Selected
Documents from Correspondence of Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, "
4 vols.
,




forces and the "stupefaction" of the French people who were "dumb-
founded" by the "strange fate" that had befallen North Africa. The
way to end this confusion was to establish an enlarged provisional
central authority, which would rule until the country made its wishes
known. Referring to General de Gaulle's proposal to General Giraud
for a meeting to discuss unity, it concluded that the course of the war
o
and France's position brooked of no delay.
The statement was released without the consent or knowledge of
the British, to say nothing of Admiral Stark and his staff. So much is
known of record. Soustelle, the Fighting French publicist, states
that during the afternoon of January 2, in the course of discussions, a
British official telephoned General de Gaulle and asked for a two day
delay on its release. The General refused. Major Desmond Morton,
private secretary to the Prime Minister, telephoned Pleven, Commis-
sioner for Foreign Affairs, to ask for a delay of only a few hours.
Soustelle had by this time given the text to the American news agencies
Q
and it was too late to delay publication.
From these facts it can be concluded that the French intended to
release the statement that day. Given this intention, the reasons for
discussion with the British can only be surmised. The French may
8. Ibid.
, p. 120.
9. Soustelle, Jacques, Envers et contre tout, (2 vols., Paris:
Robert Laffont, 1950), volT^, p. 108.
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have hoped for British approval or at least no objections and when it
was not forthcoming, they released it anyway. Certainly this was a
high-handed act and a breach of good manners, if not good faith. The
formal British protest it drew on January 4 was justified and appropri-
ate. The Americans were disturbed by the unilateral announcement of
secret and delicate negotiations still underway, which were being con-
ducted through American channels. Aside from these real, but also
transitory objections, there apparently was no lasting effect of the
release of the statement, adverse or otherwise.
General Giraud had been absent from Algiers at the Tunisian
front and he did not receive General de Gaulle's second message until
January 3. He discussed it with members of the Allied staff and
finally replied on January 6. General Giraud proposed a meeting of
the two Generals in Algiers at the end of January, since his commit-
ments in regard to organizing the French military effort in North and
West Africa precluded an earlier meeting. In the meantime, he
proposed again a meeting of military experts as soon as possible.
General de Gaulle was anxious enough for this reply to the extent that
members of his staff inquired on January 5 if a reply had been
received.
General de Gaulle's third message to General Giraud was firm,
10. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 121.
11. Kittredge memorandum, February 10, 1943.
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if not strong, in its tone regretting the delay in their meeting. He said
he was taking into consideration the proposal for establishing military
contact and asked for information on the scope of the preliminary
conversations, adding a barbed reminder that General d'Astier had
been in Algiers on December 19. This last barb was a political
non sequitur, since at the time of d'Astier's visit, Darlan was alive
and it was Eisenhower, not Giraud, who asked him to leave. The last
point the General made was a suggestion to send an officer with ciphers
to obviate communicating by foreign agencies.
British circles in London agreed generally with Giraud' s view
of the situation in North and West Africa. They saw little support for
General dc Gaulle and they felt that any precipitate attempt at unity
would be unwise. They still envisaged the possibility of escape to
North Africa of one or more eminent French leaders who would have
the prestige and ability to be the provisional head of a central French
national authority. If Generals Giraud and de Gaulle could accept
some third party, then unification of all French forces would be
possible. The most likely candidates were Albert Lebrun, President
of the Republic: Jules Jeanneny, President of the Senate; and Edouard
13
Herriot, President of the Chamber of Deputies.
12. De Gaulle, Unity Documents, p. 122.




While Roosevelt, Churchill and their staffs assembled at Casa-
blanca late in January, General de Gaulle reiterated to General Giraud
his offer to meet him on French territory among Frenchmen, when and
where ho desired. Also, arrangements were lnade to send two Gaullist
officers with ciphers to Algiers. On January 16, General de Gaulle
asked for written confirmation by the United States Commander- in-
Chief of the plans for liaison and communication between the Fighting
French and the North African French Staffs. The Army and Navy
liaison officers in London, Colonel Sumner Waite and Lieutenant-
Commander Tracy B. Kittredge, informed him that the United States
authorities in London could not question the relations between French
and American authorities in North Africa. But, they said, he could
submit a formal question which would then be transmitted to the appro-
priate authorities. The General withdrew his request, saying that he
1
5
would assume General Giraud 1 s proposals had American approval.
At this time, Churchill was urging General de Gaulle to come to
Casablanca to meet General Giraud. General de Gaulle refused on
January 17, on grounds that a sudden meeting at a high-powered Allied
conference was not the best setting for a successful conclusion to
French problems. It would be better for him to meet Giraud in simple
14. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents
, p. 127.
15. Kittredge memorandum, February 10, 1943.

108
ind direct talks to come to a meaningful understanding.
Churchill's application of considerable pressure on General de
Gaulle may have been the precipitating factor of his bitter denunciation
of the Americans to Charles Peake, British representative to the
National Committee, on January 19. The General complained of
American "plots" to hold up his inessages to General Giraud until
things were arranged to suit the Americans. As proof he cited the
time lag in transmission and delivery of his messages. He claimed
his first message to Giraud was delayed until the Americans had per-
suaded the North African authorities to make several arrests, including
Gaullists (among them the brother of General d'Astier), in a suspected
assassination plot against General Giraud and others. Peake remained
unconvinced, but suggested the General discuss it with Foreign
Secretary Eden. At first, the General said he was too busy, but
1
7
finally agreed to see Eden the following day.
The meeting with Eden the next day, January 20, is not mentioned
in the memoires of either man. However, a second message from
Churchill was delivered to the General probably at that time. The
invitation to Casablanca was from both the President and the Prime
Minister, and, Churchill pointed out, arrangements had to be made for
16. DeGaulle, Unity- Documents
, p. 126.
17. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, vol. 2, p. 43.




North Africa. Aside from knowing the President had also invited
him, General de Gaulle undoubtedly realized that if he were to have
any influence upon arrangements in North Africa, he had better be
there. Besides, he had already demonstrated his independence. He
departed England on January 21.
While General de Gaulle was at Casablanca, no information was
received in London about developments there. The General returned on
January 26 and began an intensive series of conferences with his
associates. In an apparent about face, he told Charles Peake that he
was greatly impressed by the President's personality, statesmanship
and sympathetic understanding of French problems. He was unable to
reach agreement with General Giraud on anything but the need for




A communique issued in Algiers on January 27 implied that
General Giraud had been recognized by the President and Prime Minis-
ter as the representative of French interests. This implication was
strengthened by the President's agreement to a memorandum presented
him by Giraud on the last day of the conference. This memorandum,
hastily agreed to by the President, came to be known as the Anfa
Agreement. It was essentially a commitment by the United States to
18. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 127.
19- Kittredge memorandum, February 10, 1943.
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arm Giraud* s North African French Army, but it was also a great
deal more. The President, without consulting the Prime Minister,
agreed that he and the Prime Minister would give "every facility"
20
to General Giraud to bring about a union of the French. The impli-
cation was clear: General Giraud was favored over General de Gaulle.
The Anfa Agreement was seen by the Fighting French as an expression
of American hostility.
The French National Committee understandably objected to this
implication. They broadcast a counter statement from Brazzaville in
which the purely military role of General Giraud was emphasized and
the claims of Fighting France to direct the united French war effort
were reasserted. Kittredge felt this incident resulted in a delay by
21
the National Committee to send a liaison mission to Algiers.
Following a call on the Foreign Secretary on January 29, General
Georges Catroux told Kittredge the National Committee had agreed in
principle that he should head a liaison mission to North Africa., and
also negotiate with General Giraud. Press reports received in London
that evening indicated that new repressive measures had been taken
against Allied supporters, including the Gaullist, Henri d'Astier.
Civilian members of the National Committee were reported to be
20. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 8, January 30, 1943, p. 94.
Foreign Relations of the United State s , 1943, vol. 2, p. 45.
21. Kittredge Memorandum, February 10, 1943.
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opposed to sending any kind of mission to North Africa until General
Giraud gave suitable guarantees as to the liberalization of his post-
Vichy regime and as to a suitable central political authority to direct
a united French effort, which would be acceptable to General de
22
Gaulle.
In London discussions among the American and British officials
on the one hand, and in the French National Committee, on the other
hand, continued apace. On January 30, Peake reported the National
Committee had decided to send a mission under General Catroux
without limiting instructions to Algiers to unify the French war effort.
Announcement was made public on January 31. General de Gaulle
cabled General Giraud on February 2 that General Catroux would go to
Algiers. To prevent premature or exaggerated public comment, he
asked that no comments be made publicly except those mutually agreed
23
upon. General Giraud welcomed an immediate visit by General
Catroux.
While General de Gaulle and the National Committee in London
discussed the implications of the Casablanca meeting, General Giraud
made soine far reaching changes in the composition of the North
African regime. On February 6 at the conclusion of the regular
monthly meeting of the Imperial Council, General Giraud announced
22. Ibid.
23. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 141
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its dissolution. The Imperial Council had been formed by Admiral
Darlan at the beginning of December and its dissolution signified a
decided break from Vichy-directed authority. A War Committee
succeeded it. The purpose of the War Cominittee was to unify French
action for the liberation of France. The composition of the War
Committee included former members of the Imperial Council, but
additional members were to be designated later by General Giraud,
who had assumed complete military and civil power in North and West
Africa. Other steps General Giraud took to liberalize the North-
African regime included release of political prisoners, abolition of
fascist and Vichy organizations, and the creation of new administrative
councils to advise and to assist the Governors of each colony and
territory and to give effect to the decisions of the War Council. He
also announced the abrogation of the Vichy anti-Jewish legislation.
In coordination with the British, General Giraud took steps to
convince or possibly to compel Admiral Rene Godfroy to bring the
French squadron at Alexandria into the war against the Axis in the
Mediterranean. Reports were received that Admiral Robert Battet
had arrived in Martinique to discuss with Admiral Georges Robert
the re-entry into the war of the French West Indies. Unofficial
information indicated the new War Committee might include such
prominent Gaullists as General Georges Catroux, Admiral Thierry
d'Argenlieu, General Francois d'Astier, General Paul- Louis
Legentilhomme, as well as General dc Gaulle. The possibility was
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also bruited about that other new members might include prominent
Gaullists and pro- Allied North Africans.
It is difficult to say exactly what were the precipitating factors
of these changes wrought by General Giraud, which only presaged
his forthcoming major einbrace of liberalism on March 14. There
were many forces at work in North Africa at this time. Ainong them
was an awakening from the awful humiliation and stupor of the Armistice
followed by a Vichy regime. The American, Robert Murphy; the
British Resident Minister, Harold Macmillan, and the energetic,
brilliant and skillful Frenchman, Jean Monnet, were all in North
Africa and exerted not a little influence on the course of events.
There was general agreement as to the desirability and necessity for
unity of the French forces. For various reasons, peculiar to each of
the participating individuals, sides and factions, there was no agree-
ment for several months on the terms and specifics of union. The
situation was fluid and if agreement on unity could not be reached,
perhaps cooperation could be derived from the recent agreement to
send General Catroux to Algiers. Under these circumstances General
Catroux departed England on February 6.
In early February 1943, Admiral Stark was still in Washington,
because the President wanted him there when General de Gaulle
arrived. It can be implied from this fact that the White House at this
24. Kittredge memorandum, February 10, 1943.
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late, date had not definitively dismissed the possibility of such a visit,
even though Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had been non-
committal in his interview with the Fighting French delegate, Adrien
25
Tixicr, on December 28. However, Admiral Stark felt that since
General de Gaulle's arrival had been delayed, the President would
soon release him. Such was the case. He returned to London by
February 1 1
.
The French National Committee received a notable addition in
the person of Rene Massigli, who had left France only on January 27.
Massigli was a diplomat of considerable experience. His last post
had been that of Ambassador to Turkey. Refusing to accept the Armis-
tice or to collaborate with Vichy, he resigned his position and returned
to the French Riviera where he lived quietly until November 1942, when
he went into hiding to avoid arrest by the Gestapo when the Germans
occupied all of France. Massigli was a man of character and no mean
ability. But most important, the many British and American diplomats
27
who knew him, thought highly of him. Almost immediately upon his
arrival in London, he was made a member of the National Committee
and on February 8 he replaced Pleven as Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs. Events were to show this was a wise choice, because he not
25. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 555.
26. Stark to Kirk, COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, p. 1.
27. COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, p. 17.
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only exerted a restraining or moderating influence on some of the more
extreme elements in the National Committee, but also because he
established a good working relationship with Admiral Stark and mem-
bers of his staff. This working relationship or rapport was based on
mutual confidence and respect.
Massigli conferred with Churchill on February 10 and was told
the Prime Minister was "fed up" with General de Gaulle and would not
see him personally in the future. Churchill stated His Majesty's
Government was not disposed to tolerate future obstruction by General
de Gaulle or by the National Committee of effective unification of
French forces. Churchill told Massigli the British and Americans
were agreed on the necessity of establishing immediately effective
cooperation between the Fighting French and the North African French
forces. After agreeing with Churchill's views, Massigli explained he
had accepted his position as Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to
28
achieve, an effective union of French forces.
Similar statements were made by Massigli to Admiral Stark on
February 12. After explaining he had only recently come to England,
Massigli emphasized that his only purpose was to achieve as quickly as
possible an effective union of all French forces in the war against the
Axis. He said he would not retain his position if opposition from





and the North African French. '
Massigli made a good impression on Admiral Stark. The Admiral
told Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, that Mas sigli's
attitude could not have been better. In reference to Massigli's state-
ment that if he could not succeed in uniting the different French
elements, he would quit, Admiral Stark surmised that if such a situa-
tion did come to pass, other men around General de Gaulle would also
quit and go to North Africa to get into the fighting. These hypothesized
30
defections might occur under the leadership of General Catroux.
Negotiations between Generals Catroux and Giraud took place
between February 8 and 12 in Algiers. The immediate result was an
3 1agreement to exchange missions between London and Algiers.
General Catroux reported to General de Gaulle that Giraud's partisans
in North Africa were bitter and disgruntled because they had expected
a revolutionary and got a conciliator instead. Even so, it was neces-
sary, he said, to work with Giraud, which Catroux felt he could do,
32
given the time and patience, if he were at Giraud's side.
The immediate upshot of General Catroux' s mission and
29. Ibid .
30. Stark to King, COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, p. 26.
31. Tracy B. Kittredge, MSS Diary, February 14, 1943, Box
207, COMNAVEU files.
32. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 133.
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subsequent report was approval by the French National Committee on
February 19 of a mission to Algiers. Both sides hoped that eventual
union would grow out of this first step at practical cooperation.
While Admiral Stark and his staff did not play a central role in
these events, which were intra-French affairs, they and their British
colleagues were close observers and were conversant with the details
of events as they unfolded. In discharging his duty to keep his seniors
in Washington informed, Admiral Stark sent them an analysis on
February 20 of the current situation, which was prepared by his
Liaison Officer, Commander Kittredge. This analysis was based on
personal knowledge and observation and close daily contact with
33Fighting French officials.
Despite the exchange of missions, the first practical step towards
cooperation, Kittredge noted there still remained differences of ulti-
mate political objectives. They involved not only differing policies,
but also opposing views as to methods to be used and personnel to
administer those policies. In other words, differences still remained
between the French and London and in Algiers as to the resolution of
the political problem separating them.
Even so, Kittredge expressed a certain amount of optimism in
regard to the possibility of immediate agreement for: cooperation in
33. Kittredge memorandum, Enclosure (a) to COMNAVEU (Stark)




certain areas, such as the integration of French land, sea and air
forces into a single, unified French command; joint arrangements
with the British and Americans for re-equipment and training of
French forces; joint maintenance of close contact with resistance
forces in France with other French groups, such as Admiral Robert
in Martinique and Admiral Cjodfroy in Alexandria; establishment of
joint representation in Washington, London and Moscow; and the
working out of joint economic and financial programs.
These steps were certainly the next logical steps to be taken to
achieve union. They might have been possible under different circum-
stances. But they were clearly impossible so long as General de
Gaulle and the French National Committee approached the problem of
union from the standpoint of resolving politics! problems first before
proceeding to questions of practical cooperation. Kittredge's optimism
here was based on the American view of holding in abeyance funda-
mental political questions while proceeding to attack first the practi-
cal problem of waging the war. If Kittredge and Admiral Stark did
attach any real hopes to these possibilities, they were to suffer dis-
appointment until Generals dc Gaulle and Giraud could resolve the
political problem inherent in the union of their respective camps.
Kittredge was well aware that no complete or satisfactory
union of the French in the war would be possible without the partici-
pation of General de Gaulle and the Fighting French. For this reason
responsible British and American officials endeavored to use their
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influence to bring about an agreement between Generals Giraud and
Catroux which would be the basis of real unity for all French forces-
engaged in the war against the Axis. Kittredge apparently saw little
chance of Generals de Gaulle and Giraud resolving their differences,
because he indicated a better chance for a central provisional authority
might be for one of the responsible leaders of the Third Republic to
assume the direction of the political representation of France. He
understood steps were underway which might produce such a solution
within the next few months. Meanwhile
,
practical cooperation of the
existing French leaders could at least lay the foundations for future
united French action.
The conclusion that could be inferred from the analysis Kittredge
made was that things were moving, even if slowly, to a more satisfac-
tory basis. Indeed, Admiral Stark echoed this feeling to Admiral
King. The President's contacts with General de Gaulle helped, he
said. Also, the arrival in London of Professor Rene Capitant, a
leader of the North African Gaullists, gave General de Gaulle and the
National Committee a less distorted and more realistic picture of
North Africa from a first hand account. Admiral Stark was parti-
cularly pleased with the clarification by Capitant of Robert Murphy's
role in North Africa. Capitant told the Fighting French that Murphy,
rather than having used his influence to establish and to maintain the
34. Stark to King, COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, p. 26.
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Vichy regime in North Africa, was chiefly responsible for influencing
every constructive modification in conditions there, first with Darlan
and then with Giraud. He also mentioned to Admiral King that Churchill
at least for the moment was no longer dealing with General de Gaulle
3 5but with Massigli exclusively.
Capitant and Admiral Stark had a long conversation on February
17 in which Capitant described in detail his interpretation and opinion of
political events in North Africa. The observations he made are sig-
nificant and merit elaboration at some length not only because they
were made by a keen observer, who was also a Gaullist leader, but
also because they deeply impressed Admiral Stark and Commander
Kittredge, as well as clearing up many doubts, fears and suspicions
of General de Gaulle. Capitant 1 s observations were lucid, thorough
and reasonably objective. A summary is set forth below.
Capitant first explained how General Giraud came to send him to
London. He had been one of the chief Gaullist leaders in North Africa,
and editor of Combat, a clandestine anti-German and anti-Vichy news-
paper. General Jean Marie Bergeret, General Giraud's subordinate
in charge of civil affairs, ordered his arrest along with other Gaullists
on December 29 for complicity in the so-called Darlan murder plot.
He escaped. Later, when it became apparent that the charges were
35. Ibid.
, p. 27.
36. COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, p. 18.
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based on forgeries and other fabricated evidence, he was cleared.
General Giraud sent for him and apologized. After the ensuing conver-
sation, in which they discussed North African politics, General Giraud
asked him to go to London to give General de Gaulle a first hand report.
Developments, according to Capitant, could be characterized as
falling in three phases since the Allied landings in North Africa on
November 8:
(a) The Darlan Period - November 8 - December 24.
(b) The Royalist Plot Period - December 25 - January 15.
(c) The Peyrouton Period - January 15 -
He anticipated two more periods:
(d) The Giraud - dc Gaulle - Catroux Period.
(e) A union of the French war effort.
Many of the pro- Allied French in this period were Royalists,
although the vast majority were Gaullists and Republicans. At first
the French believed the Allies had deliberately planned to impose
Darlan on North Africa, but now they generally realized that his
presence was a surprise and that the Allies used him only as a tem-
porary expedient. Even though Darlan kept all the Vichy officials in
m
office, it scon became apparent that because of Murphy's influence,
he agreed to a gradual dismantling of the Vichy regime by the abroga-
tion of Vichy decrees, release of political prisoners and the gradual
replacement of Vichy officials.
Darlan was unj^opular with all groups in North Africa. His Vichy
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past prevented the Gaullists and Republicans from supporting him, even
when he tried to liberalize the North African regime. The fanatical
Royalists who occupied most of the high positions in the Darlan High
Commissariat became increasingly disaffected with Darlan' s opportunism
in cooperating with the Allies and with his refusal to agree to their pro-
grains. Darlan thus found himself without any effective following. This
period ended abruptly with his assassination by the young Royalist,
Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle on Christinas Eve 1942.
Capitant was convinced that a small group of Royalists had long
planned to seize power in North Africa. Adherents of the Comte de
Paris, the Bourbon-Orleans pretender to the French throne, had been
appointed to various positions of importance in North Africa, at the
instigation and by the influence of Royalists at Vichy and in North Africa.
The Royalists were able to enlist the assistance of the Gaullist resistance
organizations in the plots and schemes anticipatory of the Allied inva-
sion. These groups were instrumental in paralyzing much Vichy
resistance to the landings.
The Royalists hoped to win over Admiral Darlan to the extent that
he would transfer control over North Africa to a group of Royalists
under the leadership of the Comte de Paris. When Darlan became
increasingly subservient to the Allies, the Royalists began their
conspiracy. They had two objectives. First, they wished to eliminate
Darlan. Second, they sought to place the blame for his death on
Gaullists and thereby to discredit the republican and liberal groups
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in North Africa. To further their plot, they sought accomplices from
among the Gaullists who had been pushed into the background by Vichy
officials whom Darlan had kept in office. Although the Gaullists were
nearly all in violent opposition to Darlan' s control of North Africa,
their suspicions were aroused and a period of intrigue with plots
and counter-plots followed.
The Royalists found an irresponsible fanatical young Royalist,
Bonnier de la Chapelle, who was willing to kill Darlan. He was per-
suaded that following the assassination, the Cointe de Paris would
seize power and would protect hiin. Thus, the assassination would be
with impunity. The arrival in Algiers of General d'Astier, on a
personal mission for General de Gaulle, provided an opportune
moment for action. Rumors were spread that when Darlan disappeared,
the Comte de Paris would take over. General d'Astier's brother,
Henri, was a Royalist leader in North Africa and was in close touch
with the Gaullists. This fact lent credence to the rumors. It was
well known that the Comte de Paris arrived in Algiers on December 22.
The assassination was the only part of the plot that proceeded
according to plan. The Royalists' attempt to have the Comte de Paris
elected High Commissioner or even in an ad interim capacity failed.
Capitant thought it was chiefly because of Murphy's influence. Murphy
told Capitant in a brief conversation on December 26 that the Imperial
Council could not possibly elect the Comte de Paris, because such a
choice would be absurd and in complete contradiction to United States
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and Allied policy. The assassin was summarily tried and executed.
Capitant said he did not take his trial seriously because of his belief
in powerful intervention to save him. Only when he actually faced the
firing squad did the realization of his end come to him.
Giraud was then elected High Commissioner. A majority of his
immediate subordinates were Royalists and believed his sympathies
lay with them. They redoubled their efforts to discredit the Gaullists
by fabricating evidence tending to show the complicity of the Gaullists
in the assassination and their promise of immunity, rather than that of
the Royalists, to Bonnier de la Chapelle. The upshot was the wave of
arrests during the night of December 29-30, 1942.
Capitant believed it was the influence of the Allied Staff, and
particularly that of Robert Murphy, that convinced General Giraud to
have an impartial magistrate examine the evidence. The magistrate's
report convinced Giraud the evidence was made up mostly of forgeries
and fabrications. This report led to the release of those arrested with
the exception of three men, one of whom was Henri d'Astier. The
abortive attempt to blame unjustly the Gaullists for Darlan's assassina-
tion largely discredited the Royalists and caused General Giraud to lose
confidence in them.
A new phase commenced with the appointment of Marcel Peyrouton
as Governor-General of Algeria on January 16. Peyrouton had been the
Vichy ambassador to Argentina, but he was also a capable administrator,
experienced in North African affairs. Capitant saw this period as one
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of diminishing tension and increasing conciliation among pro-Allied
and republican leaders. The failure of the Royalist plot convinced
Giraud that he had been deceived by his principal advisors. There-
fore, he decided upon a program of complete reform of the North
African administration and he sought a genuine understanding with
General de Gaulle and the Fighting French.
These decisions were made only a few days before the Casablanca
conference, Capitant noted. They were confirmed and extended by
conversations with Allied leaders, as well as with Generals de Gaulle
and Catroux. On his return to Algiers, General Giraud prepared a
whole series of measures which were promulgated at the end of the
Imperial Council meeting on February 6. These measures included
dissolution of the Imperial Council, creation of the War Committee,
abrogation of the anti-Jewish laws, release of political prisoners,
official recognition of the Gaullist movement and official authorization
for the publication of Combat, which had been published secretly up
until February 1.
Capitant was convinced that the situation would rapidly improve
with the active collaboration of General Giraud with the Gaullist and
republican elements. Despite his Vichy past, Peyrouton was seriously
intent upon executing Giraud's reforms and was honestly anti-Royalist.
Capitant hoped that with the exchange of missions between London
and Algiers closer cooperation would result with the end effect being
eventual union of the French forces in the common war effort. He
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realized that cooperation would only be superficial until resolution of
the underlying political problem. General de Gaulle refused to accept
the Armistice of 1940 and, hence, rejected recognition of the legitimacy
of any measures, domestic or foreign, taken by the Vichy government.
He contended that France never ceased to fight, that it was bound by
its pre-war alliance and that the French National Committee, as the
representative of French participation in the war, was alone competent
to lead and to direct French action in the war.
On the other hand, Capitant noted the North African regime
recognized the validity of the Armistice and the ensuing French
political developments. While General Giraud did not necessarily
accept this view, he bad not repudiated it. Capitant felt that Giraud
must accept the essential position of Fighting France before real union
could be achieved. Even so, the creation of procedures for joint
action would bring the two groups closer together. Such cooperation
could be expected to lead to personnel changes in North Africa which
would make closer union inevitable.
Capitant believed firmly that cooperation between the two French
groups must result in complete fusion. They would be prepared
practically and psychologically by agreements being made through
the Catroux mission to Algiers. He hoped that within the next few
months republican institutions could be re-established in North
Africa. He also hoped that union could be established under some
responsible French political leader, such as Jules Jeanneny, President
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of the French Senate, since he felt that neither General cle Gaulle nor
General Giraud was qualified or sufficiently experienced to lead and
direct a united French effort in the war.
Eventual union, Capitant believed, could be achieved by close
cooperation of the French in London and Paris, continued modifi cations
of the North African regime, reorganization of the French army in
North Africa with the assistance of General de Gaulle, and, finally,
elaboration of a plan for a fusion of the National Committee in London
and the War Committee in Algiers into a new provisional authority to
administer the French Empire, to represent the interests of France
in the war and to prepare for the liberation and reconstruction of
France.
The effect of Professor Capitant' s observations on Fighting
French and American officials was two-fold. First, they helped to
dispel some of the fog of suspicion and mistrust among the Fighting
French. These dedicated men were absent from North Africa, which
was the center of activity at this time, and they lacked a first hand
view from a source they could trust. Admiral Stark noticed a decided
lessening of critical hostility in Fighting French circles as a result
of Capitant's visit. The second effect was a bolstering of the credibility
of Admiral Stark and the American staff, because much of what Capitant
told the Fighting French coincided closely with what Admiral Stark
and other American representatives had already told them. After
General de Gaulle had experienced a series of failures to achieve
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various objectives, such as the visit to Washington and inclusion in
the North African regime, which he generally attributed to hostile
American influence, a fairly objective account and analysis of events
was helpful in clearing the atmosphere.
This relatively optimistic view, shared by Admiral Stark, was
echoed to the State Department by Freeman Matthews, the charge'
d'affaires in London. He reported that the President's address of
February 12 in which he stated that the Lavals and Quislings would
37
not be maintained in power and Professor Capitant's visit helped
clear the air among the Fighting French in London. In particular,
Capitant laid to rest a rumor started by some of the Fighting French
that Robert Murphy was supporting the Comte de Paris. Matthews
reported the optimists were saying General de Gaulle had been
convinced that General Giraud agreed the French Army needed a
thorough-going reorganization. Finally, Churchill's threat not to
renew financial support, of the Fighting French in the absence of sub-
stantial progress along the road to conciliation reduced significantly
anti-Giraud propaganda and stories about "the Americans. " Matthews
concluded, "Massigli himself has confirmed my impression that the
prospect of penury has chilled hearts (and tongues) of many of those
38
at Fighting French headquarters."
37. Department of State Bulletin , vol. 8, February 12, 1943, p. 145.
38. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 57.
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While Admiral Stark and Freeman Matthews may have been some-
what optimistic over the possibilities for greater French cooperation,
if not actual union, a crisis was developing in Fighting French-British
relations, which Soustelle described as one of the most serious he
39had seen in several years. 7
On February 17, General de Gaulle submitted a request to Charles
Peake, the Foreign Office representative to the National Committee, to
put an airplane at his disposal between March 1 and March 8 for a
month-long inspection tour of the African and Middle East areas under
Fighting French control. This proposed odyssey included visits to
Cairo, Beirut, Tobruk, Tripoli, Tchad, Brazzaville, Madagascar
40
and back to Cairo.
The Prime Minister initially objected, presumably because he
feared General de Gaulle would only cause trouble in those areas if he
ever got there. The Foreign Office inquired whether Admiral Stark
and General Eisenhower would agree to such a tour, and particularly
to an Eisenhower-de Gaulle meeting. *** Admiral Stark transmitted
this inquiry to General Eisenhower. Meanwhile, General de Gaulle
had made a similar inquiry in a message to General Eisenhower on
39. Soustelle, Envcrs et contre tout, vol. 2, p. 197.
40. Foreign Relations of the Unite d States, 1943, p. 58.
41. Kittredgc memorandum, March 5, 1943, Box 202, File:
de Gaulle-Churchill Correspondence, COMNAVEU files.

130
February 15. On the same day that Admiral Stark sent his inquiry to
General Eisenhower, General Eisenhower replied to General de Gaulle,
saying he was looking forward to seeing General de Gaulle.
General Eisenhower thought that personal contact by General
de Gaulle with his troops at that time would be helpful and would con-
tribute to the unification of the French war effort. General Giraud
43
also favored a visit by General de Gaulle. Admiral Stark informed
Peake of General Eisenhower's lack of objections, but cautiously added
that he understood the decision to provide facilities for such a tour
44
rested with the British.
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden commented to Freeman Matthews
on February 22 that he was faced with the choice of permitting General
de Gaulle to make an extended tour and quite possibly stir up a great
deal of trouble, or of vetoing the trip which might do more harm than
good. Apparently he had no objection to General de Gaulle going to
North Africa to review troops there and to confer .with Generals
Eisenhower and Giraud. But Churchill was opposed to the whole idea
of any trip by General de Gaulle anywhere and sent instructions to Sir
Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign
42. Eisenhower to de Gaulle, February 18, 1943, Box 204, File;
February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
43. Eisenhower to Stark, February 21, 1943, Box 204, File:
February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
44. Stark to Peake, February 22, 1943, letter serial 0055,
Box 204, File: February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
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Affairs, to tell General de Gaulle he could not leave. Because Cadogan
was ill for a few days with influenza, the message was not delivered
and the question remained open.
The American staff was aware of British objections and delayed
informing General de Gaulle of General Eisenhower's reply until the
British indicated Churchill's objections might be withdrawn. Admiral
Stark suggested General de Gaulle consult with Generals Eisenhower
and Giraud to arrange the time and place of the meeting.
Gaston Palewski, of General de Gaulle's personal staff, told
Kittredge the General did not want to go to Algiers until the Catroux
mission had finished its preliminary work in laying the foundation for
47
ultimate cooperation with the Giraud forces. Palewski also said
that General de Gaulle planned to visit his troops in Tripoli and that
he feared embarrassment if action were taken to place Fighting French
troops under the command not only of General Eisenhower, but also of
General Giraud.
Churchill and Eden orally expressed unwillingness on February 25
49
to provide a plane for General de Gaulle. The British refusal was
45. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, vol. 2, p. 64.
46. Stark to Peake, February 22, 1943, letter serial 0056,
Box 204, File: February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
47. Kittredge memorandum, February 23, 1943, Box 204,
File: February 1943, COMNAVEU files.
48. Kittredge Diary, February 23, 1943.
49. Kittredge memorandum, March 5, 1943.
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made official in a letter on March 3, from Charles Peake to Rene
Massigli as Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. This letter was in
response to a specific request from General de Gaulle the previous day
for a written reply to his initial request of February 17. General de
Gaulle asked Peake for a written reply by 6 p. in. on March 3. Peake
inquired if this were an ultimatum, to which the General replied,
50
"Take it as you wish. "
His Majesty's Government, Peake wrote, felt the present moment
was not well chosen for an extended visit of the kind contemplated. No
such visit should be undertaken so long as French affairs were in their
unsettled state and until General Catroux's mission to Algiers bore
fruit. For similar reasons, the British deprecated a visit to the
Levant states. Peake's letter was a skillfully wordeddocument in
which "No" was phrased to sound almost like "Yes. " The gist of the
letter was that the British felt a visit by General de Gaulle would be
inopportune until more progress had been made towards an accommo-
dation with General Giraud. The clear implication was that the British
were using the trip to North Africa as insurance for the success of the
Catroux mission to Algiers.
Upon reading Peake's letter, Massigli asked whether he had to
give it to General de Gaulle. Peake pointed out that since General de
50. Soustelle, Envers et contre tout, vol. 2, p. 198.
51. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 139.
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Gaulle had requested a written reply, the British could only comply.
Massigli was so concerned with the possible effects of the letter on
General de Gaulle that he called on Eden immediately and described
them as "incalculable. " Eden's reply was similar to that given by
Peakc. He said it was the decision of the British Government and he
could only comply with General de Gaulle's request to put it in writing.
52
Massigli then delivered the letter to General de Gaulle.
Even before Peake wrote to Massigli, General de Gaulle had
lowered his sights and told Admiral Stark and General Andrews of
General Eisenhower's staff on March 3, that he emphatically wanted
to see General Eisenhower without meeting at the same time either
General Giraud or British Generals in North Africa. General de Gaulle
apparently felt that as the "real representative leader of France" he
should discuss a number of problems affecting his country with the
53American Commander-in-Chief in North Africa.
Matthews cabled Secretary of State Hull from London that
General de Gaulle proposed to suggest to General Eisenhower that
General Giraud remove, most of his senior officers. Many of his
senior officers were certainly Vichy sympathizers and were by no
means supporters of General de Gaulle. Matthews did not think
52. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1585, March 4, 1943, U.S.
National Archives, Department of State , 851.01/1040.
53. Kittredgc memorandum, March 5, 1943.
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General de Gaulle was anxious to see General Giraucl personally at that
time and to that extent he agreed with the British that perhaps Catroux
should prepare the ground first. Since the British refused transporta-
tion, he would like the Americans to provide it. Matthews noted that
General de Gaulle was apparently indifferent to a possible widening of
the breach between himself and General Giraud if he were to go to
Algiers and see only General Eisenhower, thereby snubbing General-
54
Giraud.
Charles Pcake was informed of this request and the matter was
55
neatly dropped into the lap of the British.
Met with British refusal to provide transportation for any kind of
trip, General de Gaulle asked Kittredge to call upon him in the evening
of March 4 to receive a message he wished to send to General Eisen-
hower. After some discussion, the substance of which Kittredge
apparently did not record, General de Gaulle decided to withhold the
56
message. Embassy and Foreign Office officials were informed and
Peake wrote to Admiral Stark setting forth the British position. To
preclude the possibility of American transportation to North Africa
for General de Gaulle, Eden asked Matthews not to provide it without
agreement with the British. Eden was following Churchill's express
54. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1557, March 3, 1943, U.S.
National Archives, Department of State , 851.01/1039.
55. Kittredge memorandum, March 5, 1943.
56. Kittredge Diary, March 4, 1943.
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wish that General de Gaulle be given no facilities to go to North Africa,
"Whatever the reasons he might allege for wanting to see General
57Eisenhower. "
The British refusal to provide air transport for General de Gaulle
precipitated a minor crisis in two senses. First, it made the British
say for the record what everyone knew anyway. The British were no
longer able to stall or to equivocate on their refusal to provide trans-
portation. Second, General de Gaulle was furious and retired to the
country for the weekend on Friday, March 5, without even going to
his headquarters that day.
The danger presented by General de Gaulle's frustration and
anger was that he might act precipitately, as he did with his "treachery
letter" to Admiral Stark in November 1942, and thereby make the
situation worse than it was already. On Saturday, March 6, while
still in the country, the General threatened to take "drastic action, "
although no one seemed to know exactly what kind of action he had in
mind. In reporting these events to Hull, Matthews referred to them
as "one of the usual Carlton Garden crises, " indicating that General de
Gaulle's reaction presented more of an annoyance than a threat.
57. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1586, March 4, 1943, U.S.
National Archives, Department of State 851.01/1041.
Also, Kittredgc memorandum, March 5, 1943.
58. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1800, March 13, 1943, U.S.
National Archives, Department of State, 851. 01/1054.
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There was more to the crisis than simply General de Gaulle's
pique at being thwarted. One reason he wanted to see General Eisen-
hower was to obtain a commitment that the Americans would not
furnish arms to any underground movement in metropolitan France
59
that might be organized by General Giraud. The underground move-
ment or "Secret Army" was of particular importance to General de
Gaulle, not so much for what it could do at that particular moment,
but for the promise of its future ability to lead a resistance against
the Germans and for what it symbolized.
One of General de Gaulle's claims to legitimacy in representing
"the real France" was that most of the people in France supported him.
This claim was backed up by evidence that the "Secret Army" was
essentially Gaullist. Thus any potential rival underground movement
that might be established by General Giraud would tend to pose an
extremely serious threat to Gaullist claims. General de Gaulle wanted
no competition in France. The fact that the British successfully
prevented him from visiting not only his own troops in the field and
Fighting French territories, but also from even having the opportunity
to talk to General Eisenhower to forestall a rival movement in metro-
politan France goes far to explain his outrage. Given the rather
volatile temperament the General had displayed on more than one
occasion in the past, the wonder is that he only stormed off into the
59. Matthews to Hull, March 4, 1943, Telegram 1585.
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English countryside for a weekend.
Massigli was properly concerned about the possible dangerous
consequences of the breach with the British over the issue of General
de Gaulle's trip to Africa. Since General de Gaulle was absent, he
presided over a meeting of the National Committee on Monday, March
8. In an effort to reach a compromise acceptable both to General de
Gaulle and to the Prime Minister, Massigli persuaded the National
Committee to request the British to provide an aircraft for General
de Gaulle on a written pledge that he would visit only the Fighting
French headquarters in Tripoli and on condition that they agree to
resign in a body if the General violated the pledge.
That same day the compromise was brought informally to the
attention of the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Office. Churchill
refused to allow any concession which would permit General de Gaulle
to go to Africa. Upon learning of the compromise, General de Gaulle
also rejected it. He indignantly refused to give any pledge to the
effect that if he went to Africa he would not visit any places where he
felt his duty called him.
General de Gaulle returned to London on Tuesday, March 9> as
A?Kittredge noted, in a much more philosophical frame of mind. He
60. Matthews to Hull, March 13, 1943, Telegram 1800.
61. Kittredge memorandum, March 12, 1943, Box 202, File:




presided at a meeting of the National Committee the following day at
which time he outlined his personal position and his reasons for
insisting upon an immediate visit to Africa, even though it would
involve a final break with the British. He also mentioned the possi-
bility of resigning from the movement and disbanding the National
Committee.
Andre Philip demurred, declaring that the great "Gaullist
majority" in France would not understand or forgive a breach with
England on the part of the Fighting French or a failure to reach agree-
ment with General Giraud. The ensuing discussion apparently changed
General de Gaulle's mind, because at the end of the meeting he made
conciliatory remarks and agreed with Philip that nothing should be
done by Fighting France that would not be acceptable to French public
opinion and to the French resistance groups. The General also agreed
to postpone indefinitely his plans for a visit to Africa.
Kittredge reported another controversy between General de Gaulle
and the British. It arose on March 11 when the General in mid-
afternoon sent to the Foreign Office the text of a broadcast he wished
to make at 9:15 that evening. The Prime Minister had ruled that he
must personally approve the text of any broadcast General de Gaulle
might wish to make. Since Churchill was out of town, it was impossible
63. Matthews to Hull, March 13, 1943, Telegram 1800.
64. Ibid. Also Kittredge Diary, March 10, 1943.
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to obtain his approval. The British considered the text to be "relatively
moderate" and, indeed, it contained an appeal to Giraud and to French-
men throughout the world to unify their action in the war, as expected
by 90 percent of the population of France. The broadcast also insisted
that such a union could only be achieved by adopting the principles of
Fighting France which had the enthusiastic support and approval of
metropolitan French public opinion. The text was sent at once to
Churchill who approved it. The delay in the broadcast was only four
hours. 65
While General de Gaulle was deeply involved with the British
over their refusal to provide him air transportation, the National
Committee was jockeying for an advantageous position in regard to
General Giraud. On February 23, the National Committee had
addressed a memorandum to General Giraud on the occasion of the
sending of the Gaullist mission to Algiers. This memorandum was
not made public until March 13, at which time Admiral Stark received
a copy. Indeed, the only reason it was made public at that time was
to upstage an important policy statement General Giraud was scheduled
to make on March 14.
The memorandum was a statement of the conditions under which
the French war effort could be unified. The terms were essentially
Gaullist. It demanded a repudiation of the 1940 Armistice on grounds
65. Matthews to Hull, March 13, 1943, Telegram 1800.
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that it was unrepresentative of the nation. As a corollary, it called for
the dismissal from office of men in key positions who were personally
responsible for the capitulation and subsequent collaboration with the
enemy. These terms were the distinguishing features of Fighting
France and served to separate that movement from any others that
were essentially anti-German and sought the liberation of France.
Other conditions called for the restoration of fundamental liberties
and republican institutions as they existed on June 16, 1940, under
the laws of the Third Republic. 66
Since the memorandum was fairly long, summaries were
circulated. Matthews noticed the summary the Foreign Office cabled
to the British Embassy in Washington omitted a number of political
implications. (Similar omissions occur in the edited version General
de Gaulle published in his Me'moires. ) For example, the memorandum
asserted that the "natural procedure for unification" insofar as French
North and West Africa were concerned was their incorporation into
Fighting France and a corresponding enlargement of the National
Committee. The National Committee felt that this was "the most
efficacious and most justifiable solution. " Although somewhat
modest, the conditions put forth by the National Committee were con-
sistent with their position that they were the representatives of the
66. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 136.
67. Matthews to Hull, March 14, 1943, Telegram 1805, U.S.
National Archives, Department of State, 851.01/1055.
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real France and therefore "real" Frenchmen ought to join Fighting
France. This position was not susceptible either to compromise or to
accommodation with sincerely anti-German Frenchmen who had never-
theless felt it their duty to obey the commands of Vichy as successor
to the last regularly constituted government of the Third Republic. As
could be expected, this attitude proved to be a. bone of contention and
delayed unification of the French war effort for some time.
A fillip, interesting because it revealed an attitude of the National
Committee, was another French comment Matthews noted. The Allies
were given credit for having facilitated the re-entry into the war of
certain French forces in North Africa. It was implied that such re-
entry broke the unity of the French forces. The result in North Africa
was confusion, anxiety, "unquestionable discontent" in the French
nation and "some degree of uncertainty" in domestic public opinion in
the democracies.
The firmness exhibited by General de Gaulle and the National
Committee depressed Massigli. Contrary to his advice, General de
Gaulle sent instructions to General Catroux to the effect that any union
of Fighting France and the North African regime would be contingent
on General Giraud's public proclamation of adherence to General de
Gaulle and to Fighting France. By way of concession General de Gaulle




view of reports of his growing strength in metropolitan France as
supplied by people who had recently left France, General de Gaulle
felt his prestige required a form of public submission by General
69Giraud to his authority.
Kittredge agreed with Matthews that the visits of emmissaries
from. France were behind the notable stiffening of the Fighting French
attitude towards agreement with General Giraud. During the first week
in March 1943, the National Committee reiterated on several occasions
that "Gaullism" was identified in France with resistance to the Germans
and that General de Gaulle alone was qualified to direct and to command
70French action in the war against the Axis.
As to negotiations with General Giraud, Matthews reported they
were at a standstill until General Catroux returned to Algiers. Even
if the clear statements of principle in the National Committee 's
memorandum of February 23 were not enough to stall negotiations,
relatively minor annoyances did not help matters. For example,
General Giraud objected to the inclusion in the de Gaulle mission to
Algiers of men such as Pompcj and Pelabon because they were mem-
bers of Colonel Passy's secret organization. Passy was involved in
clandestine cloak and dagger operations in France which he directed
from Duke Street in London. Despite any contributions this organization
69. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1557, March 3, 1943.
70. Kittredge memorandum, March 5, 1943.

143
may have made to the Allied war effort, it had also earned a certain
degree of notoriety for its strong arm methods. In short, many con-
sidered it a Gaullist gestapo. Giraud's objections caused resentment
at Carlton Gardens, where the Gaullists suspected Giraud of harboring
71designs to establish his own, rival "Secret Army" in France. This
may very well have been behind General de Gaulle's earnest desire to
talk to General Eisenhower in an attempt to obtain a commitment that
the Americans would not equip a "Secret Army" for General Giraud.
All was not well within the Gaullist camp. In addition to Massigli's
depression at being unable to exert influence over General de Gaulle,
General Catroux had warned General de Gaulle that unless an early
agreement was reached with General Giraud, he would be compelled
7?
to "re-examine his personal position. " This comment supported
Admiral Stark's hunch that Massigli and Catroux might quit if Generals
73de Gaulle and Giraud failed to come to agreement.
Despite these fissures in the Gaullist camp, General de Gaulle
was growing confident that the "ripe fruit of North Africa" would soon
drop into his hands. Apparently General de Gaulle felt that Giraud's
steps toward "liberalization" of his regime would somehow produce in
North Africa an irresistible demand for General de Gaulle, and on his
71. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1800, March 13, 1943.
72. Ibid.





His own terms were set forth in his instructions to General
7 SCatroux. He sincerely wished to establish unity as soon as possible
Unity was necessary to defeat the enemy and to protect the position
and interests of France vis a vis the Allies. Unity could only be
achieved under conditions which would preserve the conception of
Fighting France held by the French population. For this reason,
Darlan and other Vichy sympathizers were unacceptable in unifying
the French war Effort. Unity required a basis and that basis was the
one expounded in the memorandum of the French National Committee.
Until unity could be established, Fighting France would remain
organized as it was. He believed more than ever that he had been
right since the first day. With such firm conviction in his cause it is
quite understandable how he was convinced of the ultimate triumph
of Fighting France, even in the face of great obstacles.
74. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1800, March 13, 1943.
75. De Gaulle, Unity-Documents, p. 140.

-• CHAPTER V
GIRAUD - REPUBLICAN PERIOD
In the spring of 1943, unity of the French forces for the prosecu-
tion of the war was as important to the Allies as ever, particularly
since the end of the Tunisian campaign was near. With the expulsion
of the Axis from North Africa, the next major step was to be an
invasion of Sicily and then Europe itself. All possible assistance
would be required to perform such prodigous military feats. The
French Army had already distinguished itself in North Africa. A
unification of all French forces was necessary for the most effective
use of those forces.
Despite the continuing necessity for unification, the American
and British officials were in no better oosition to effect unification
than they were before. Only an agreement between Generals de Gaulle
and Giraud could bring about the desired end. Even so, Robert
Murphy and Harold Macmillan in Algiers and Admiral Stark and the
Foreign Office in London offerred their good offices and exercized
their persuasive capabilities to facilitate such a unification. But
misunderstandings, disappointments and sheer human orncriness
still slowed progress towards unification.




nature. While Murphy reported to Washington from Algiers, Admiral
Stark and his staff assistant, Commander Kittredge, observed and
reported from London. It would be misleading to attempt to chronicle
events in the one place without regard to the other. Thus, the focus
of the narrative must move at times from London to Algiers.
In mid-March 1943 the impression of Admiral Stark and his
staff in London was that Giraud was marking time in North Africa
by making under Allied influence some liberal changes in his adminis-
tration, but that he was reluctant to commit himself in advance to
the re-establishment of republican institutions as they had existed
under the Third Republic. Since the French National Committee's
memorandum of February 23 held the re-establishment of such
institutions to be an indispensable condition to any general agreement,
Commander Kittredge of Admiral Stark's staff saw relations between
the two groups as deadlocked.
The truth of the matter was that General Giraud was essentially
apolitical in outlook rather than that he harbored any fundamental
opposition to the Republic. He was a soldier first and he readily
2
admitted he always had a horror of politics. His primary interest
1. Kittredge memorandum, March 12, 1943, Box 204, File:
March 1943, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, files
(hereinafter referred to as COMNAVEU files), Naval History
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Giraud, Henri, Un seul but, la victoire, (Paris: Rene
Juillard, 1949), p. 121.
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s in prosecuting the war. He had one passion, France, and but one
goal, victory.
However, the exigencies of high politics would not be satisfied
with only such a laudable objective. It was necessary for the North
African regime under Giraud to embrace liberal and republican principles
to justify their war effort. The President sought to make Giraud the
leader of the French war effort, which would have to have a political
cause in addition to a very real military objective.
At Casablanca, President Roosevelt had agreed to equip General
Giraud' s forces. If General Giraud were to embrace liberal and
republican principles, equipping his forces would be more easily
accomplished from the political standpoint and General de Gaulle might
possibly be upstaged. The President realized Giraud lacked administra-
tive capacity. At the suggestion of his personal assistant, Harry Hopkins,
he authorized the sending of Jean Monnct to Algiers to work with Giraud
on hardliner the substantial lend-lease arms aid.
While in Algiers, Monnet became a close advisor of Giraud and
convinced him of the necessity of publicly embracing liberalism and
republicanism. Giraud frankly admitted the importance of Monnet'
s
advice. The result of Monnet' s advice was Giraud' s epochal speech
of March 14, 1943. This advice was probably based on the proposition
3. Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 679.
4. Giraud, Un seul but, la victoire, Chapter 6.
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that arms aid would be facilitated by a public embrace of the appropriate
principles, among other things. Giraud's good intentions cannot be
discounted either.
The speech General Giraud made to the Alsace-Lorraine Society
of Algiers was a milestone in his administration in North Africa. He
roundly condemned Vichy by pointing out that not one voice in France
had been raised in opposition to the incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine
into the Reich. Since June 1940, France had been gagged and silent.
He noted that an heroic France had risen against the indignity of serfdom.
He repudiated the armistice because the people of France had not
accepted it. The French people would remain true to themselves. They
had never given up. The French Army of victory would join with the
Allies to liberate the mother country.
Giraud repudiated the legality of any acts taken since the
armistice on grounds that the German occupation prohibited the French
people from voicing their opinion. The expression of French sovereignty
proceeded from the freely expressed will of the French people. Thus,
a provisional government could only be established when France was
liberated. In regard to measures that had already been taken, Giraud
announced that municipal assemblies and the General Councils would
resume their traditional roles; that Nazi-inspired laws of racial
5. Documents on American Foreign Relations, (13 vols. , Boston:
World Peace Foundation, 1944), vol. 5, p. 560.
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discrimination were abrogated; and that the French tradition of human
liberty and equality before the law had been restored.
Giraud wished for a union of all Frenchmen which would be whole-
hearted and effective. Such a union would embrace not only Frenchmen
in France, but. Frenchmen outside of France. He placed strong emphasis
on union by saying it was indisjiensable and a question of life or death
for his country. Disunity was the evidence of defeat, unity the mark of
victory. He was ready to cooperate with all those who accepted the
basic and traditional principles of which he had spoken.
Reaction to General Giraud 1 s speech was prompt and favorable.
From Algiers, Robert Murphy told the President the speech set forth
with "crystal clarity" Giraud' s purpose of identifying himself with those
traditional principles which had governed France and which were at the
core of current American political philosophy. Murphy significantly
noted the status of Giraud' s organization was that of an administrative
body concerned only with the prosecution of the war. The liberty of
action of the French people: was preserved. He urged the President to
applaud publicly "this spontaneous French gesture which outlines a
charter of French freedom. "
In Washington, Secretary of State Hull commended Giraud'
s
speech. He said Giraud had confirmed the American hopes that his
6. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, (6 vols. ,




selection as Commander-in-Chief of French forces in North Africa
would make possible a greater unification of all groups behind his
military leadership (emphasis added. ) Hull noted that Giraud had made
it possible for all elements desiring the defeat of the Axis and the
liberation of France to unite. Although he did not say under what
conditions union would come to pass, he clearly implied there were no
major obstacles to unification of the French war effort.
Speaking in the House of Commons, Churchill warmly welcomed
Giraud 1 s speech. He noted that the liberation of France through victory
required the unity of Frenchmen everywhere, and, above all, that all
Frenchmen outside the power of the. Nazis should act loyally against
the common enemy without a day's needless delay. Referring to Giraud 1 s
speech and the memorandum of the National Committee, Churchill saw
o
no question of principle dividing those two bodies of Frenchmen.
Hull delivered an amen to Churchill's statement by saying the United
States was "in the heartiest accord" with it and found satisfaction in
9Churchill strongly commending thi s further step towards French unity.
General de Gaulle simply noted in his Memoires that General Giraud
"read out" a speech condemning Vichy and paying homage to the Republic.
7. Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. 5, p. 565.
8. Jbid.
, p. 565.
9. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 8, March 20, 1943, p. 229.
10. De Gaulle, Charles, Unity 1942- 1944, (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1959), p. 104.
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In an official communique from the French National Committee,
General de Gaulle noted with satisfaction that General Giraud's
declarations showed "great progress" towards the doctrine of Fighting
France, which had been defined in June, 1940, upheld ever since and
restated in the memorandum of February 23. In this respect he was
undoubtedly correct because the issue of the legitimacy of Vichy's
authority had been a major bone of contention between the Fighting
French and North African French since the Allied landings the previous
November. Repudiation of this legitimacy by General Giraud was a
definite move towards the position of the Fighting French. Although
Soustellc thought Giraud's speech was mediocre because it only partially
answered the questions posed in the February 23 memorandum, he
12
enthusiastically endorsed the call for a union of the French war effort.
An unofficial observer, George Bernard Shaw, described the Giraud
speech most aptly as a "staggering performance. " He was convinced
Giraud was not the author, because if he v/ere he would have made his
mark as an orator long before. Shaw said, "No soldier, short of
another Caesar, Cromwell or Wellington could have achieved such a
1
3
feat. " The identity of the ghost writer is obscure, but the influence
11. De Gaulle, Charles, Unity- Documents, (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1959), p. 143.
12. Soustelle, Envers et contre tout, (2 vols., Paris: Robert
Laffont, 1950), vol. 2, p. 207.
13. Shaw, George Bernard, New Leader, April 6, 1943, quoted in
Arthur Layton Funk, Charles de Gaulle: The Crucia l Years
1943-1944, (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1951), p. F08.
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of Monnet cannot be denied. Kittrcdge believed he was the author. In
a second cable to the President on March 14, Murphy continued in the
euphoric vein of the previous cable and concluded with the observation
14
that Jean Monnet had done a "grand job. "
While comments were still coming forth from Washington and
London on his speech, Gerieral Giraud through General Catroux invited
General de Gaulle on March 15 to visit Algiers. The next day the
National Committee accepted General Giraud' s invitation, which they
viewed as a means of speeding up the unification of the French war
effort. Two days later, on March 18, Genera] Catroux informed
General Giraud that General de Gaulle had accepted the invitation.
Details of the visit still had to be worked out. This was the job of
General Catroux.
The members of the de Gaulle mission in Algiers were open and
candid to Robert Murphy about their position. It was abundantly clear
to them that the purpose of General de Gaulle's visit was to establish
his leadership of the united French movement. The Gaullists reasoned
to Murphy that since General Giraud had set forth the principles on
which unity could be based and had no desire to retain political leader-
ship, there was no reason for General de Gaulle not to assume the
leadership. General Giraud would retain the position of military
14. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 2, p. 74.
15. Tracy B. Kittredge, MSS Diary, March 18, 1943, Box 207,
COMNAVEU files.




commander of French forces.
Murphy noted significantly that the basis of General de Gaulle's
leadership would be the establishment of a provisional government of
France, even though General Giraud had publicly committed himself
to the forbearance of creating such a body until the liberation of France
and the French people were able to make their own, free choice. The
Gaullists were either overlooking or deliberately discounting this
essential condition from General Giraud's standpoint. Rather, they
saw in General Giraud's embrace of liberalism and republicanism an
acceptance of Gaullist principles to the extent that real differences no
longer existed, but only those of personalities.
Murphy recognized that the Gaullist proposals would conflict
with the basic principles Giraud recognized; that no government
provisional or otherwise, would be established until France was
liberated and the people had a chance to exercise their right to choose
their own government. It was clear that General de Gaulle would spare
no effort to create a provisional government in his talks with General
Giraud. Murphy assumed that Washington would want him to support
unification of French forces on the only basis that could insure lasting
unity and preservation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. That
basis was that until the liberation French interests could only be group-
ed under temporary trusteeships exercising jurisdiction in the name of




Murphy's impression found "considerable corroboration" by
Freeman Matthews, the American Charge d'affaires in London. Conver
sations with members of the National Committee revealed that they
thought Giraud had been "worn down" to the point where he would be
willing to turn the political administration in Algiers over to General
Catroux, if not to General de Gaulle. The Fighting French in the
relative isolation of London had convinced themselves that suffering
France demanded the "leadership of de Gaulle the man, not merely
de Gaulle the symbol. " Their public and private speech showed an
awareness that American policy was the chief obstacle to their
de facto recognition as the government of France. However, thanks
to National Commissioners Andre Philip and Rene Massigli, they
also realized that the French people would never understand a break
with the American and British Governments. Since General de Gaulle
was apparently impressed with this advice, Matthews noted, it would
1 pbe well for Washington to remember it. °
Giraud's invitation to General de Gaulle and the almost truculent
or at least supremely confident attitude of the National Committee took
place while Foreign Secretary Eden was in Washington for several days
late in March 1943, where he discussed the whole gamut of world
political affairs with the President and the Secretary of State. In re-
gard to French affairs, the American and British governments were




the President had made a commitment to General Giraud to equip his
army. This was a unilateral American commitment, made without
consultation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It could only be ex-
pected that such a commitment would cause difficulty between Wash-
ington and London, which had not really come to a common policy
in French affairs. The situation was further complicated by an almost
unreasonable hostility in the State Department toward the Fighting'
French, and General de Gaulle in particular.
Undoubtedly as a result of the President's commitment to arm
General Giraud, the Gaullists mounted rather critical propaganda
attacks against the United States. Hull complained to Eden not so much
of these propaganda attacks, but of a lack of any British statement
expressing concurrence with the Americans. ' Neither Eden nor Lord
Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, who was also present,
was impressed with the advisability of such a statement, particularly
since there was a sharp division in the French camp. Even though
these attacks only exacerbated Hull's hostility towards General de
Gaulle, which was not ameliorated by Eden's position, it could only be
expected that the Gaullists would take umbrage with the American
policy.
Eden attempted to approach the French problem logically. First,
he asked if the United States would object to the setting up of some kind
19. Ibid.
, p. 77 f.
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of central authority among the French to deal witli French questions.
Hull had no objection. Eden then asked if the French got together and
agreed on some kind of unified authority, would such an arrangement
be satisfactory to the United States? Hull replied, in essence, that
such an arrangement would be satisfactory. Both Hull and Eden agreed
that any such French authority should not have governmental functions
and powers, even of a provisional nature, but should consist merely of
"place holders" dealing temporarily with French questions.
From this conversation it would seem that the Americans and
British saw eye to eye on French affairs. Actually, any identity of
British and American policy was superficial. The difference between
the American and British positions was rooted in differing conceptions
of an international order. One astute student of the period has pointed
out that British policy required a strong, well-armed and independent
France, which in harmony with Britain would act as a counter- weight
to any possible Russian hegemony on the continent. American
policy, on the other hand, conceived of a collective security arrange-
ment by which the major powers would deal with potential trouble spots
as they arose. In such a situation it was relatively unimportant whether
or not France was one of the great powers. Besides, an enlarged
National Committee as envisaged by General de Gaulle would tend to
promote the Anglo-Gaullist scheme which the Americans were disposed
20. Funk, Charles de Gaulle, p. 112.
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to thwart. These reasons give a compelling rationale for American
support for Giraud, in addition to the genuine dislike and suspicion of
General de Gaulle that was prevalent in Washington.
The President was aware that Eden and Hull were really unable to
get together on the French question and admitted as much at his press
conference on March 30, f611owing Eden's departure from Washington.
Part of the difference was based on practical considerations, at least
froin the American standpoint. As long as American forces were in
North Africa and received the cooperation of the French regime there,
the United States had every intention of continuing aid to the North
21
African French.
Meanwhile, General de Gaulle was in London and was eager to go
to Algiers to complete the union of the French war effort. As his
emissary, General Catroux had arrived in Algiers on March 25 to
continue the discussions with General Giraud, now that the latter had
publicly embraced liberalism and republicanism. General Catroux
insisted upon two things: first, that General Giraud reply to the
National Committee ' s memorandum of February 23 other than by a
speech; second, that upon arrival of General de Gaulle in North Africa,
he would have a completely free hand in all his speeches, actions and
gestures. Finally, General de Gaulle also instructed General Catroux
to obtain an explicit account from General Giraud as to how he envisaged
21. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 2, p. 83.
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a union of the French forces. The date of General de Gaulle's depar-
ture for North Africa would be set upon receipt of a satisfactory response
22from General Giraud on these points.
Although General de Gaulle was willing to wait for a reply from
Algiers before proceeding there, other Fighting French leaders were
considerably more impatient for the General to be off to Algiers. Leon
Marchal, provisional leader of the Fighting French mission in Algiers,
reported as early as March 13 that the political complexion had changed
in Algiers since Professor Capitant had reported on it in London six
weeks before, and later he reported that conditions were ripe for a
de Gaulle visit. Soustelle noted considerable sentiment at Carlton
Gardens for an immediate departure, which was accompanied by a
sobering realization that General de Gaulle would either succeed in
unification in Algiers or he would retire, perhaps forcibly for the
23duration of the war. " Catroux urged a delay of at least two or three
weeks to allow the reaction in North Africa from Giraud' s speech to
settle. He felt a precipitous or early arrival of General de Gaulle
might have a de- stabilizing effect on North Africa.
Catroux presented General de Gaulle's questions to General
Giraud. Pending a more complete reply to the memorandum of the
National Committee, Catroux reported Giraud was still attached to the
idea of a central provisional power, of which he would be the leader.
22. De Gaulle, Unity-Documents, pp. 144, 146.
23. Ibid.
, p. 142. Soustelle, Envcrs et contre tout, vol. 2, p. 220.
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Catroux understood Giraud's insistence upon being leader was a means
of keeping up appearances. He, therefore, suggested to Giraud an
arrangement whereby Giraud would be a constitutional chief of Fighting
France with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Republic. General
de Gaulle would preside over an executive and legislative organization,
the choice of members of which would be made by Generals de Gaulle
and Giraud.
Giraud underlined his objections to the position of the National
Committee. The nub of the matter was that the National Committee
had taken a political position, while Giraud felt any authority established
must be strictly a war time one without political complexion and with-
25
out prejudicing in any way the future political institutions of France.
General de Gaulle's reaction was swift, frosty, negative and
scathing. He chided Catroux for making suggestions which had nothing
to do with his instructions to Giraud before mentioning them to hiin.
Even disregarding this and other grounds for objection, General de
Gaulle repudiated Catroux's suggestions to Giraud on grounds that
General Giraud was not qualified to lead the French war effort. General
de Gaulle thought French public opinion distrusted General Giraud at
26least as much as it backed General de Gaulle. This last reason alone




, pp. 148, 149.
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was sufficient to justify chastising General Catroux, at least in
General de Gaulle's own eyes.
Despite the tone of General de Gaulle's response, General
Catroux' intentions were not naive, and his suggestions to General
Giraud were not violations of at least the spirit of his instructions.
Catroux realized that in any organization containing both Generals
Giraud and de Gaulle, the latter would be dominant by force of person-
ality, regardless of any hierarchical arrangements. In the arrangement
he suggested, General Giraud might be the official head, but General de
Gaulle as leader of the organs of government would be able to wield
real power. That position plus the formidable personality of General
71de Gaulle would assure Gaullist domination. ' Good intentions and
subtle maneuvers would not satisfy General de Gaulle who sought sole
leadership of the French movement.
Even if they had not been rejected by General de Gaulle, the
suggestions made by General Catroux became moot on April 1 with
General Giraud's formal reply to the National Committee' s memoran-
dum of February 23. General Catroux was prepared to take it
immediately to London as the basis of establishing unity of the French
forces. While it said nothing as to personalities or individual leader-
ship, this document did go far in reconciling the views of the French
27. General Catroux, Dans la bataille de Mediterranee, (Paris:




in London and with those in Algiers.
Giraud's reply proceeded logically from the premise that unity
could only be achieved on the basis of well-defined principles. The
basic principles of agreement were defined by General Giraud in his
March 14 speech and by the National Committee in the memorandum of
February 23. The key principles were the repudiation of the 1940
Armistice, the assertion that the free expression of French sovereignty
had been suspended by the German occupation and the denunciation of
all legislation since June 22, 1940 as illegal. A "French Council of
Overseas Territories." was proposed, which would exercise French
sovereignty over the Empire until its powers could be delivered to a
provisional government. Unification of the French armed forces was
envisaged and the entry of France into the councils of victors was
anticipated. A provisional government would be established under the
Loi Treveneuc of 1872. This act provided for a convocation of delegates
in metropolitan France which would form a orovisional government.
Naturally, the Loi Treweneuc could not be invoked until after the liber-
ation of France. It was to be made clear to the French people that they
alone would determine the construction of the provisional government.
Even before General Catroux could send the text of Giraud's reply
to London, General de Gaulle informed him on April 1 1 of his intention
to proceed immediately to Algiers. This information visibly disturbed
Catroux. He felt General de Gaulle was dissatisfied, suspicious and
28. Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. 5, pp. 571-579.
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bent on precipitating matters. He explained to Murphy and to Harold
Macmillan, British Resident Minister in Algiers, that he had re coin
-
29
mended a delay in the de Gaulle visit. Apparently General de Gaulle
failed to realize, as Catroux was all too aware, that a sizeable element
of the French Army in North Africa was not favorably disposed towards
him. For this reason, a visit by General de Gaulle to Algiers would
probably precipitate matters with possibly unfortunate results for
French unity. Catroux was simply urging caution until matters were
somewhat more stable.
Both Macmillan and Murphy, who were quietly encouraging
French unification, were in turn upset when Catroux stated an intention
to withdraw from the negotiations if General de Gaulle disregarded his
advice and proceeded to Algiers before the situation could be thoroughly
explored and more deUiiled agreement reached. It appeared to Murphy
at the moment that Catroux was leaning heavily in the direction of
30quitting. u
There was little chance of General de Gaulle being able to leave
England at that time, according to Macmillan, because the British
government did not feel the General had a good political case. Also,
Macmillan felt that the presence of General de Gaulle in Algiers at
that particular time would be a distracting influence on the time and
29. Murphy to President/Secretary of State, Telegram 542, April 2,




attention of the Allied staff at the very moment when the Tunisian
campaign was in a critical stage. Both General Eisenhower, Allied
Commander-in-Chief, and Admiral Cunningham, Allied Naval
Commander in the Mediterranean, concurred.
Almost at the very moment on April 2 when Catroux was confiding
his fears and apprehension's to Murphy and to Macmiilan in Algiers,
General de Gaulle called on Churchill to suggest that he and other
members of the French National Committee proceed at once to Algiers.
The Prime Minister agreed, provided General Eisenhower approved.
The Foreign Office instructed Macmiilan to bring the matter before
20
General Eisenhower. Interestingly enough, this meeting was one of
the first, if not the first, meeting of the Prime Minister and General
de Gaulle since Churchill had refused to see him again more than two
months before. Apparently both participants attempted to keep the
meeting amiable. JJ
Following discussions among the senior Allied Officers in Algiers,
including General Catroux, Macmiilan replied, quoting an opinion of
the Allied High Command in the name of General Eisenhower . The
message requested a delay in General de Gaulle's visit, because with
the approaching crisis of battle, it would be undesirable to have at the
31. Ibid.
32. Kittredge Diary, April 4, 1943.
33. Matthews to Secretary of State, Telegram 2374, April 3, 1943,
U.S. National Archives, Department of State, 851.01/2010.
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Same time a protracted political crisis. This message was trans-
mitted by dispatch to the Foreign Office on April 4 and subsequently-
delivered to General de Gaulle the same day.
The reaction of General de Gaulle and some members of the
French National Committee was immediate and violent. They erro-
neously interpreted the message as an expression of American hostility.
In their anger they issued a communique which only further muddied
the already disturbed waters. It took the next few days for the air
to clear.
The immediate cause of the Gaullist eruption was the message
purportedly from General Eisenhower which Macmillan had cabled to
the Foreign Office. It covered both military and political considera-
tions. General Eisenhower did not wish to place any impediments in the
way of General de Gaulle's proposed visit to Algiers, which he earnestly
hoped would lead to French union. He added a caveat by way of
suggesting that General de Gaulle delay his visit until the groundwork
for an agreement could be established, thereby ensuring its rapid
consumation. As to the military considerations, General Eisenhower
felt it undesirable to be distracted by a prolonged political crisis.
A partial insight into the outrage felt by the Fighting French can
be gained from Soustelle's account. They apparently did not understand
34. Soustelle, Envers et contre tout, vol. 2, p. 224.
35. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 2, p. 89.
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why such a highly desired visit should be postponed after such an
extensive build-up, at least in French minds, in Algiers and in London.
In all fairness to the Fighting French, the political considerations for
a postponement were insufficient reasons in view of the draft plan of
unity Giraud had sent to Carlton Gardens. At this point, it would seem
the Allies committed a tactical error by assigning this less than com-
pletely relevant reason, when they could have rested their position on
strictly military grounds alone.
At that time the Tunisian campaign, which had bogged down just
prior to Admiral Darlan's assassination in December, had been reopened
and General Eisenhower's primary task was the expulsion of the Nazis
from their last positions in North Africa. His main concern was
prosecution of the war, not the resolution of French political problems.
To the extent that a union of the French forces would work to the overall
goal of defeating the Germans, General Eisenhower was ready to indulge
the French generals. However, for the simple reason that first things
must come first, the raging battle in Tunisia absorbed the attention
of the Allied staffs. Politics, including a possible crisis, would have
to wait.
The French National Committee regretted on April 5 the delay
"which caiinot be prolonged without serious disadvantage. " This





British knowledge or consent. It reached the military and naval censors
in the early evening and was accordingly referred to the Army Public
Relations Officer and to Commander Kittredge on Admiral Stark's staff.
The question of its release was discussed with members of the British
Mission to the National Committee before referral to Admiral Stark
and to Ambassador Winant, who had recently returned to London. Since
the communique, although inaccurate and misleading, did not involve
questions of military security, it was decided that it could not be
stopped by the censors. Dispatches were then sent to the State Depart-
ment and to General Eisenhower forewarning them of this unfortunate
37communique.
Winant was correct in viewing the National Committee's state-
ment as not being helpful and he was worried that its publication in the
United States and in Great Britain would give rise to misinterpretations
of the real reason for the postponement of General de Gaulle's visit.
Eden agreed. He admitted that since military security was not involved,
publication could not be prevented. The most Eden could suggest on
April 6 was a Foreign Office statement concurring with the postpone-
38
merit of General de Gaulle's visit.
m
Eden discussed the matter with Churchill, who shortly after
noon the next day, April 7, issued a statement along the lines suggested
37. Kittredge Diary, April 5, 1943.
38. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 2, p. 90.
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by Eden. He wished it to be known that he had been throughout "in the
fullest agreement" with General Eisenhower in deprecating a visit by
General de Gaulle during the battle crisis in Tunisia which required
the "undivided attention" of the Allied High Command. '
While this statement helped to set the record straight, the damage
of misinterpretation had generally been done in the British press which
played on the more sensational aspects of the matter, and at the same
time hinted at darker motives and sinister schemes. Only the London
Times kept its editorial wits and noted that the wrong moment for a visit
of such cardinal importance would hinder rather than help the cause of
French unity. General Giraud was properly with his troops at the
moment and the delay need not be long.
While the French misunderstanding and subsequent outrage had
been taken to the public, General de Gaulle, without publicity, requested
Adiniral Stark on April 6 to transmit a bitter protest to General
Eisenhower for delaying his departure for Algiers. This message was
described as a reply to the one General de Gaulle had received. Since
no message for General de Gaulle from General Eisenhower had been
received by the U. S. Communications Services, Admiral Stark returned
the protest message to General de Gaulle with the suggestion that it be
39. Enclosure (F) to COMNAVEU (Stark) letter to Vice Chief of
Naval Operations (Home), serial 0713, April 10, 1943.
40. Ibid. Also, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 ,
vol. 2, pp. 90-91.
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transmitted by the same channel through which the initial message was
received. Admiral Stark also explained that the message from General
Eisenhower was not a personal opinio:-), but the considered judgment of
the Allied Command in North Africa, including the opinion of French
officers, and that the Foreign Office had received the message from
4
1
the British Resident Minister in Algiers.
The effect of Admiral Stark's polite but firm recapitulation of
these facts was apparently salutary in that it made General de Gaulle
realize the necessity of soothing ruffled British and American feelings,
even if it did not raise doubts in his mind of a possible erroneous
interpretation of the message from Algiers in the first place. Later
on April 6, the same day on which Admiral Stark returned General
de Gaulle's message to General Eisenhower, General de Gaulle called
on Eden and then on Winant to express regret for the statement issued
42by the National Committee the day before.
General de Gaulle apparently did not realize or at least was
unwilling to admit until April 7 that the message from General
Eisenhower was not a personal communication but a statement of Allied
opinion transmitted through Foreign Office channels. He expressed
surprise at learning the real character of the message he received.
41. Stark to de Gaulle, April 6, 1943, enclosure (E) to COMNAVEU
(Stark) letter to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, serial 0713,
April 10, 1943.
42. Kittredge Diary, April 6, 1943.
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Under the circumstances he would prefer not to reply direetly to
43General Eisenhower.
The exact reasons General de Gaulle changed his mind are not
clear. The fact that the initial inessage was delivered to him through
Foreign Office channels should have indicated it was not a personal
message from General Eisenhower, which would normally have been
received by means of the U. S communications services. This subtlety
in the means of transmission could have been overlooked in the heat of
the indignation which flared immediately in the National Committee.
Catroux agreed with Murphy and Macmillan that the situation had been
grossly misinterpreted and insisted to General de Gaulle on an immediate
public clarification. Admiral Stark's explanation was undoubtedly
a contributing factor.
Even though he understood the situation, General dc Gaulle made
no effort to correct the sensational publicity which accompanied the
statement of the National Committee. He made no effort to soften the
harsh implications of the comment that "serious disadvantage" would
result froin a delay of his visit to Algiers. Any palliative effect of the
General's acceptance of the facts as they were was lost on Kittredge,
who commented, "He stands by his rotten communique. "
43. Ibid. , April 7, 1943.
44. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 2, p. 92.




One obvious result of this relatively minor but emotionally-
charged series of events was the bad taste it left all around. General
de Gaulle was once again thwarted in his attempt to go to North Africa,
where he devoutly felt his duty called and where he hoped to unify the
French war effort by bringing North Africa into Fighting France. The
Americans were understandably vexed by the seemingly almost deliber-
ate misinterpretation of General Eisenhower's message. A situation
such as this one was hardly the kind that would inspire confidence or
foster harmonious relations. Coming as it did after several other
situations of a similar nature, it was all the more unfortunate.
General de Gaulle in his Memoires continues to confuse matters
by claiming that on April 2 Churchill announced General Eisenhower had
requested a postponement of the trip. Since Eisenhower's message
was dispatched on April 4, as a response to an inquiry originating from
the meeting of the General and the Prime Minister on April 2, General
de Gaulle's recollection is erroneous. The General is also in error
when he claims he himself ascertained the fact that General Eisenhower
(presumably personally) had not personally requested a delay of his
visit. General de Gaulle never took the initiative to ascertain the
character of General Eisenhower's message, as he claimed. Admiral
Stark, General Catroux and possibly others, endeavored to enlighten
the General on the true interpretation of that message.
46. De Gaulle, Unity, p. 107.
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However, something can be said for General dc Gaulle. Churchill
apparently was still opposed to General dc Gaulle visiting Algiers at
that particular moment, and he sought General Eisenhower's views to
back up the decision already contemplated, to refuse air transport for
General de Gaulle and his party. It was not only a wise step, but
also highly convenient for Churchill to suggest consulting General
Eisenhower before authorizing the trip. Churchill was well aware that
the Tunisian campaign was in full swing and he may very well have
anticipated General Eisenhower's request for a delay. When such a
request was made for undeniably sound military reasons, Churchill
was relieved of the onus of again having to forbid General de Gaulle
from going to Algiers. General de Gaulle may have realized Churchill's
tactic, which would help to explain his indignation and frustration, over
and above simply being thwarted. He was right when he asserted
Churchill opposed his trip. Unfortunately, General de Gaulle presented
only part of the picture.
The final word was from General de Gaulle who sent a glowing
personal message to General Eisenhower onApril 8. He expressed
the "heartfelt wishes" of the French people at the moinent when "a
great and hard battle was taking place. " ° This message, which was
47. Kittredgc memorandum, April 6, 1943, Box 203, File: de
Gaulle - Giraud Relations, COMNAVEU files.
48. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents, p. 152.
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sweetness and light in the essence, is the only document relating to
the Eisenhower message episode that General de Gaulle published in
his Mearioires. Taken by itself, it would give an erroneous impression.
The most reasonable construction to be placed on it is a graceful
conclusion to a frustrating and embarras sing episode.
This affair also exacted a price among the leadership of the French
National Committee. The original draft of General de Gaulle's bitter
protest to General Eisenhower was so harsh that Massigli thought of
resigning when he first saw it. The text was softened before it was
sent to Admiral Stark, who wisely returned it to General de Gaulle. The
struggle within the National Committee apparently continued. Admiral
Stark felt there was a definite possibility that Massigli and Catroux
would quit the National Committee if the Fighting French and North
African French failed to unite. He also had the impression, which was
shared by Kittredge, that in many cases, General de Gaulle's "first, and
better, and even more generous impulses" were sometimes nullified
and reversed by his staff. ' Beyond this it is impossible to describe
the tensions and conflicting views that undoubtedly existed within the
National Committee.
Massigli did his best to pour oil on troubled waters. He apologized
to Admiral Stark on April 8 for unfairly critical articles of the United
49. Stark to Home, April 13, 1943, in "Selected Documents from
Correspondence of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, " vol. 3, p. 44.
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Stales which had appeared in La Marseillaise, an independent French
newspaper in London. This journal usually gave vent to the more
extreme views of the Fighting French. Recently it had been particularly
virulent in its criticism of the United States. Massigli discussed
Ame ri can- Fighting French difficulties with Kittredge. He sent Admiral
Stark the text of General de Gaulle's glowing message to General
Eisenhower, which the Admiral thought to be a "fine message. "
On April 9 Massigli called on Ambassador Winant to express regret
over the Fighting French misinterpretation of American policy.
These gestures were noticed and appreciated. Admiral Stark
responded gracefully in a letter to General de Gaulle in which he
commented favorably upon General de Gaulle's conviction of the desire
of the French for "full and increasingly effective cooperation in the
Allied effort. " He was sure General Eisenhower would be pleased to
receive such a cordial expression of French confidence from General
de Gaulle. 52
The steps taken by Massigli to restore relations to a more pleasant
and acceptable state could only affect the surface. Massigli as a trained
diplomat was undoubtedly aware that some amount of good will, or at
least an absence of ill-will, was necessary for any kind of cooperation
50. Ibid.
51. Kittredge Diary, April 9, 1943.




of the Fighting French with the British and the Americans. Good
intentions could not obliterate basic differences, but they could help to
allay suspicions. Good will was needed more than ever in early April
1943, because of the rapid succession of controversies and incidents
which highlighted the basic differences between American and Fighting
French policies. The Fighting French viewed this series as a deliberate
attempt by the United States to discredit General de Gaulle and the
French National Committee in the eyes of the world.
The French bill of particulars was long and varied. They
attributed to United States pressure the British refusal to allow General
de Gaulle to visit Africa. They saw the American commitment to
extend lend-lease aid to General Giraud as a means of building up him
and his "Vichy supporters" as the future government of France. They
contrasted the courtesies and facilities extended to the Giraud missions
to the United States with American refusal to give material aid to them
or even to recognize them as representatives of French liberal opinion.
They were particularly vexed by the United States transportation of
Colonel Lebel, Giraud 1 s representative, to French Guiana while the
Gaullist representative was stranded, following a Gaullist "revolt" in
that obscure colony. They objected to American pressure to keep
Gaullist seamen on non-Fighting French naval and merchant ships in
United States ports. They viewed the JAMAIQUE incident as an American
53. Kittredgc memorandum, March 30, 1943, Box 204, File
March 1943, COMNAVEU files.
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effort to induce the British into taking repressive measures against the
Fighting French in the British Isles. They suspected United States
sources of inspiring a series of articles in British journals which
stressed the undemocratic features of the Fighting French organization.
They felt these articles reflected Hull's view that General de Gaulle was
an apprentice dictator who must be politically destroyed as soon as
possible
.
Massigli and two other members of the National Committee
generally protested against such interpretations of United States policy,
but they had to agree that many committee members accepted them,
54probably, including General de Gaulle himself.
The bill of particulars was merely symptomatic of the irrecon-
cilable point at issue between the United States and Fighting France on
the political question of recognition. General de Gaulle insisted that he
and his group represented France and French interests. Washington
was determined to leave political questions in abeyance until after
military victory. Hull complained that all General de Gaulle wanted to
talk about was politics and that he had never engaged in a serious military
5 Sconversation. There could be no compromise ononis point. Potential
difficulties were compounded by the incompatibility of the personalities
of the President and the General, whose temperamental nature was
54. Ibid.
55. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, vol. 3, p. 10.
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well known in London. Therefore, it was not surprising that at moments
that might strain even the most compatible personalities and identity
of interests, strong feelings, suspicions and outright animosities
would be aroused. The wonder is that under these circumstances men
such as Massigli, Catroux, Kittredge and Admiral Stark could keep
their wits about them, soften the blows and restore any damage done




The fusion of the Fighting French forces under General de Gaulle
with those of the North African adinini strati on, under General Giraud,
would result in a more concerted and efficient French war effort. But
the existence of two separate French groups produced specific negative
results. The recruiting of merchant seamen by one group from the
other was one negative result. The problem became a matter of
diplomatic concern.
Following the North African campaign, many merchant ships
then in North African ports were chartered by the Allied Commander-
in-Chief from the Giraud North African Administration to carry
supplies to North Africa from United States and United Kingdom ports.
In several instances when the ships were in American or British ports,
members of the crew and at times even officers either left or threaten-
ed to leave their ships to join the Fighting French forces. Such
desertions presented a possible delay in the sailing of the ships
because of a lack of manpower. They were an acute embarassment
for the Allies, but they were a golden opportunity for the Fighting
French. Even if he so desired, General de Gaulle could hardly turn




potential threat such desertions posed for Allied shipping could be
embarassing for him. If the Fighting French could convince the United
States they controlled the crews, then such an act would be tantamount
to a tacit recognition that the French National Committee had a right
to do so. Any amount of recognition at the expense of the Giraud
authorities would be a positive gain for the National Committee.
The situation became so acute that Secretary of State Hull
requested Admiral Stark through the Embassy in London on February 6,
1943 to take up with the French National Committee the question of
recruitment of seamen by the Fighting French Recruiting Office in
New York from two ships then in New York. They were the naval
tanker LOT and the merchant ship WYOMING. About 30 men had been
recruited by the local New York Fighting French Recruiting Office,
thereby taking the services of those men away froin the North African
French ships concerned. It was not clear whether the seamen volun-
tarily left their ships or whether the Fighting French recruiters
actively induced them to do so. The reasons the seamen left their
ships would make a decided difference in the culpability of the Fighting
French and should have made a difference in the reaction of the United
States. In either case, the result was the same. As Hull pointed
out, it severely crippled the operation of the ships.
1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, (6 vols.
,




Admiral Stark was requested to ask General de Gaulle to take
immediate steps to correct the situation and to insure that no further
recruiting of personnel from other services in the United Nations war
effort would take place. The Secretary of State referred to an agree-
ment among the maritime United Nations to forbear from recruiting
each others merchant seamen. Recruiting of naval ratings was
dismissed as impossible. Up to that time, the United States had
tacitly consented to some recruiting of personnel in the United States,
by the Fighting French. Of course, the privilege could be withdrawn
in case of abuse.
On February 8 the matter was first taken up with Admiral
Philippe -Marie Auboyneau, Commander-in-Chief of the Fighting
French Navy. The next day, Admiral Auboyneau said he had discussed
the matter with General de Gaulle and that they did not consider the
recruiting to be wrong. He maintained that the seamen who left LOT
and WYOMING had done so of their own volition. Although he did not
say so specifically, he implied that the Fighting French recruiters in
New York had not induced the desertions but rather that the seamen
had volunteered. As far as the French National Committee was
concerned, the appearance of volunteers was agreeable and besides
there was little they could do about it. These seamen had in the past
been ordered by their officers to fire on Americans, which they did
2. Ibid.

not want to do. For this reason, Admiral Auboyneau said they had
lost faith in their present commanders . The agreement among the
maritime United Nations did not apply, he claimed, because the
sailors were simply changing French ships and France was one nation.
Therefore, how could it apply? The Fighting French would permit
anyone to go over to General Giraud if he desired.
Since informal conversations had been fruitless, Admiral Stark
sent a formal statement of the United States position to General de
Gaulle on February 10 along with a personal letter in which he stressed
the urgency of operational necessity, The United States rested its
case on this point throughout the ensuing negotiations. Admiral Stark
felt strongly that it was not the moment to permit unnecessarily
irritating incidents to complicate efforts being made to unify the
French war effort.
The United States Government had arranged for these vessels to
carry needed supplies to North Africa, Admiral Stark pointed out.
The loss of the services of the 30 seamen severely crippled the
operation of the vessels. The Fighting French Delegation in
3. Oliphant memorandum, February 9, 1943, Box 207, File:
Recruiting, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, files
(hereinafter referred to as COMNAVEU files), Naval History
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
4. Stark to de Gaulle, February 10, 1943, Box 207, File: Recruit-
ing, COMNAVUE files. Admiral Stark referred to an agree-
ment among the maritime United Nations not "to recruit or
to accept sailors from ships of another service participating
in the United Nations war effort without the consent of the
representatives of other services concerned, "
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Washington was requested to take, immediate and appropriate action
to assure the return of the seamen to their ships and to prevent
recruiting in the future of seamen from other services participating
in the common war effort, in accordance with the relevant United
Nations agreement.
The note of urgency was echoed again with the statement that it
was obviously impossible to permit vital war services to be interrupted
or severely embarassed by unauthorized recruiting. Admiral Stark
hoped that General de Gaulle would take such action as to make
unnecessary a direct intervention of the United States Government
which might necessitate a "re-examination" of the conditions under
which the Fighting French were authorized to recruit personnel on
c
American soil. J
General de Gaulle replied formally on February 13. He declared
the seamen had acted spontaneously. Indeed, Adrien Tixier, Chief
of the Fighting French Delegation in Washington, had forbidden the
recruiting service to carry on propaganda among the crews of LOT
and WYOMING or to make contact with them outside of the Fighting
French New York headquarters. However, Fighting France was not
in a position to refuse a welcome to Frenchmen who desired to assume
their national obligations in its ranks. Furthermore it was morally




exposed to serious punishment for their decision to give expression,
in the only manner left to them in the absence of legal French authority,
to the fulfillment of their duty as Frenchmen.
General de Gaulle observed that the sailors did not bind them-
selves to the Fighting French in any military capacity. Even though
inconveniences resulting from such recruiting were regrettable, the
ultimate solution must be arrived at by a direct ariangement between
Fighting France and the French North African authorities.
At this time the positions of the parties were firm. The United
States claimed the exigencies of operational necessity demanded
subordination of all other considerations. The Fighting French, while
regretting any inconvenience to the war effort, took their stand on
political rather than on operational grounds. They denied active
recruiting (the evidence tended to support them), but once the seamen
had volunteered, the Fighting French denied any duty or obligation to
return them to their former ships. In this respect the French probably
were on firm ground, since they were not a party to any agreement not
to recruit from the ranks of other services, whatever the ethics of the
matter might be. On another and more practical ground, the Fighting
French could not very well refuse enlistment to men who had not only
volunteered, but who also had deserted Vichyite officers of doubtful
loyalty. Some Vichyite officers had ordered the seamen to fire on the
6. Foreipn Relations of the United States , 1943, p. 203.
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Americans in November, 1942. Regardless of any subsequent political
embarassment, once the desertions and subsequent enlistments in the
Fighting French forces had been made public, if Fighting France
returned these men to their ships they would obviously tend to forfeit
the confidence and respect of their followers, to say nothing of
compromising their most important claim: unequivocal, total and
unrelenting opposition to everything directly or indirectly associated
with Vichy.
The French National Committee was careful to avoid the onus
of delaying the sailing of any ships because of their recruiting activities.
Their interest was political. But gains could be made, as well as losses
avoided. If the National Committee could induce the United States to
request the National Committee to order the seamen back to their ships,
the National Committee would have achieved at least a tacit recognition
of their right to do so. This specific issue did not arise until the
JAMA1QUE incident at the end of March, 1943. In the meantime
General de Gaulle was content with obtaining concessions from the
United States as to when and in what circumstances the Fighting French
could accept seamen from North African ships, and the United States
continued to insist the ships sail on schedule.
Admiral Stark informed General de Gaulle on February 14 that
he could not subscribe to the action taken by the French National
Committee. He urged positive steps not only to relieve the present
situation, but also to prevent a recurrence. He based his position
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on the non- recruiting agreement among the United Nations and urged
the National Committee to reconsider its position.
That same dixy , Commander Kittredge of Admiral Stark's staff
called on Gaston Palewski, a member of General de Gaulle's staff.
Palewski reiterated the position of the French National Committee.
He rebutted successfully Admiral Stark's argument that the non-
recruiting agrecinent applied, by pointing out that General de Gaulle
had not been consulted as to Allied arrangements in North Africa and
would not be bound to any agreement to which the French National
Committee was not a party. He also pointed out that it would be
impossible to insist that the 30 seamen return to the LOT and WYOMING
in New York because of the punishment to which they would be un-
ci
doubtedly submitted for their choice to serve with Fighting France.
Kittredge explained the United States' position was based on
operational necessity. Domestic issues must yield place to the
military task of defeating the common enemy. He intimated that the
United States might have to take drastic steps to prevent a recurrence
of incidents tending to impede military action and thus to help the
enemy. "
Incidents similar to LOT and WYOMING had occurred in British
7. Stark to de Gaulle, February 14, 1943, Box 207, File:
Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.
8. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 204.
9. Kittredge memorandum, "Recruiting of Seamen, ", Box 207,
File: Recruiting, COMNAVE U files.
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ports. In fact, a Fighting French recruiting officer had been arrested
by the British, but he was subsequently released with a warning to
refrain from such activities. The British agreed upon prompt action
at a meeting at the Admiralty on February 13. Admiral Stark was
informed that the following steps were being taken with respect to ships
already in United Kingdom ports:
(1) Men on shore would be informed that they must remain with
their ships. British authorities would not permit them to join Fighting
France and would deport deserters to North Africa.
(2) Any man refusing to return to his ship in spite of this warning
would be forcibly returned if the ship were in port.
(3) British authorities would impress on masters of ships that
there must be no victimization of men who intended to join General de
Gaulle, but were persuaded to return voluntarily.
(4) Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean, would be asked to arrange to inform crews of all ships
sailing for British ports that they would not be permitted to desert to
Fighting France on arrival. The British authorities were agreed
that the only real, long term solution would be an agreement between
the Fighting French and the North African authorities to refrain from
suborning each other's men.
The British position was important not only because similar
10. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 205.
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problems were faced in United Kingdom ports, but also because the
deserting seamen from LOT and WYOMING had arrived in Halifax.
General de Gaulle had requested transportation for these men to
England where they would join the Fighting French forces. Under
British policy as decided upon on February 13, these men would be
returned forcibly, if need be, to their ships. However, Tixier in
Washington had convinced Lord Halifax of the necessity for some
modification of British policy. Modification was necessary, since
men returned to their ships under such circumstances would in all
probability only cause trouble, which might very well produce conse-
quences worse than the present shortage of man power. Also, the
Fighting French would be in an intolerable position if they were unable
to accept volunteers. Halifax recommended modification of the then
current British policy.
The suggestions made by Lord Halifax bore fruit. Freeman
Matthews, charge d'affaires at the Embassy in London, reported on
February 25 that the British had modified the previous policy to the
extent that authorization was given for the enlistment by Fighting
France and subsequent transportation to England of seamen who
positively refused to serve under their present officers. Admiral
11. Kittredge memorandum, February 28, 1943, Box 207, File:
Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.
12. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 208.
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Stark thought it advisable for both countries to follow the same procedure.
The new policy was undoubtedly wise, since it avoided the possibility of
further trouble, including mutiny. It was also humane, since it prevented
the deserters from being returned to their ships where they would
undoubtedly have been punished as much for their desertion as for their
politics. But, it did not solve the problem of manning ships which were
badly needed to carry supplies to North Africa.
General de Gaulle suggested a possible solution. After disclaiming
any responsibility of the French National Committee for desertions,
which were "entirely spontaneous" and "inspired by profound reasons, "
he declared the French National Committee stood ready to place on
board LOT and WYOMING replacements drawn from units of the French
fleet then in New York and also from a pool at St. Pierre. He hoped
that this proposal would be taken by the United States Government as
new proof of the National Committee's determi:iati on to assure French
1
3
participation in the war effort of the United Nations.
If the United States were to accept this suggestion, the ships no
doubt could be expected to sail on schedule. It would also permit
General de Gaulle to appear cooperative in the war effort, as well as
tacitly concede the right of the French National Committee to man if
not control the ships. Such a concession would not only violate the





authority of the French North African authorities, with whom the
United States at that time was cooperating to a great extent.
While awaiting an answer from Washington as to whether to accept
General de Gaulle's suggestion, Admiral Stark on February 18 suggested
the issuance of orders to the Fighting French agents in the United States
to refuse in the future to enroll men from French ships from. North
Africa. 14
Discussions between British and Fighting French representatives
continued. The French claimed that the masters of certain of the
French ships were anti-Allied and untrustworthy. Hence they insisted
that loyal Frenchmen could not consent to serve under them. Reports
from British security officers tended to corroborate the French claim
as to the doubtful loyalty of some of the officers of vessels from North
Africa. 15
Palewski told Kittredge on February 20 that the North African
mission in Washington had opened recruiting stations and that they were
actively seeking recruits to serve under General Giraud. He claimed
that some men who had already contracted engagements with the
Fighting French forces had been approached by Giraud's recruiters
and had actually volunteered for and had been accepted for service
14. Stark to de Gaulle, February 18, 1943, Box 207, File
Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.
15. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 206.
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under Giraud. For this reason, the French National Committee
hesitated to issue orders to the Fighting French services to refuse
recruits from French North African services.
Kittredge reported this complaint to Matthews. He suggested an
inquiry be made about the arrangements approved and added that it
would be of particular interest to know whether Giraud' s representa-
tives had agreed not to recruit personnel already enrolled for
1
7
de Gaulle's forces. The basis for Kittredge's suggested inquiry was
a dispatch from a French news agency in Washington and published in
London in the French journal France. It reported that so far 200 volun-
teers had enlisted in the Giraud forces and that volunteers from French
Naval units currently in United States ports would be accepted. The
article claimed recruits were being sent to Fort Benning, Georgia.
Kittredge sent Matthews a translation.
Matthews reported this claim to Washington on February 20 and
I o
again on February 22. He said Admiral Stark would like to know
whether any such arrangements stipulated that Giraud' s representatives
should refuse to accept enlistments from persons who have previously
signed enrollments in the Fighting French forces. Hull replied on
16. Ibid. The substance of this telegram was derived from a
Kittredge memorandum of February 20, 1943, Box 207,
File: Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.
17. Kittredge memorandum, February 22, 1943, Box 207, File:
Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.
18. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, pp. 206, 207.
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February 24 that he would be glad to receive information concerning
any specific cases which the French National Committee would like to
19bring to his attention. The American files contain no record of any
complaint by the French National Committee of any specific cases of
recruiting by Giraud's representatives in the United States.
Meanwhile Hull on February 23, refused General de Gaulle's
offer of replacements of seamen for LOT and WYOMING by saying
simply that the Navy Department was not disposed to accept General
de Gaulle's proposal of a Fighting French naval detachment. He
reported the Navy Department had accepted Admiral Stark's recom-
mendation and the United States would follow the same procedures as
the British in dealing with this problem. However, the procedures
referred to by Hull were those agreed upon at the Admiralty on
February 13, before Lord Halifax' suggested modifications were
adopted. Admiral Stark reported the change in British procedures to
21Matthews, who in turn reported it to Hull. Admiral Stark was still
of the opinion that it was advisable that both countries follow the same
procedure. He recommended the United States permit the Fighting
French to enlist seamen who positively refused to return to their ships
The Americans apparently adjusted their procedures to coincide






with British procedures for handling deserters. British and Fighting
French officials remained concerned and sought to ameliorate the
situation without jeopardizing or compromising their basic positions.
nbers of the French National Committee and, in particular, Rene'
Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, expressed appreciation
for the importance of preventing conflict between different French
services participating in the common war effort. To this end, instruc-
tions were given to Guy de Charbonnieres and Colonel Pechkoff, mem-
bers of the Catroux Mission to Algiers, to negotiate immediately, if
possible, an agreement with General Giraud on recruiting. They left




However, Robert Murphy in Algiers reported to Hull on March 8,
that no progress towards an agreement on recruiting could be made
until the arrival of General Georges Catroux, because the members of
the de Gaulle mission in Algiers had no authority even to discuss the
matter. This report is contrary to the impression given by Massigli.
It is unclear whether Admiral Stark and Kittredge knew of Murphy's
report or were informed of possible changes in the instructions to the
delegates. At any rate, no unfortunate consequences resulted, even
22. Kittredge memorandum, February 25, 1943, Box 207, File;
Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.
23. Ibid.
24. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 213
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though a delay in opening negotiations was experienced.
The British thought it would be folly to create a new source of
friction in the de Gaulle - Giraud rivalry and to risk immobilization
of valuable shipping for a few extra recruits to the Fighting French
navy. This position was made known to the Fighting French officials
in London and similar pressure was applied in Algiers. The British
took additional measures to discourage desertions. The Foreign Office
instructed Harold Macmillan, Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters
in Algiers, to urge on General Giraud the importance of an early agree-
ment with General de Gaulle on recruiting and likewise of taking steps
that no vessel sail for British or American ports with officers whose
25
records might provoke the crews to desert.
The problem of rival loyalties obviously could only be solved
definitively by the conclusion of an agreement between the two French
parties. Additional British pressure was brought to bear on the
Fighting French by a warning from Foreign Secretary Eden to Massigli,
and by instructions to Halifax to urge Tixier to stop all soliciting for
recruits by Fighting French agents. Also, Macmillan in Algiers
urged the necessity of an agreement on General Giraud. British port
officials brought all possible pressure to bear on the seamen on board
the North African ships to prevent their desertion. There is no





WYOMING until the JAMAIQUE incident at the end of March. 26
Discussions continued between officials of the French National
Committee and the American staff. On February 27 Admiral Stark
informed Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, of the pro-
cedures adopted by the United States authorities and he again rejected
General de Gaulle's offer of sailors from St. Pierre. He asked whether
instructions had been sent to the Fighting French representatives in the
United States to suspend recruiting of men and acceptance of enlistments
of deserters from North African services, pending negotiation of a
de Gaullc-Giraud agreement.
In referring to steps the United States authorities proposed to
take to prevent delays in shipping by desertions of crew members to
join the Fighting French, Admiral Stark said sternly that the United
States Naval Authorities hoped for and expected the full cooperation of
Fighting France in making the measures effective. The Admiral assured
Massigli the United States Government desired to prevent the recruiting
by any French service of men belonging to any other French service.
He offered to forward information of any specific cases of enlistment
of Fighting French personnel by the Giraud mission. After Matthews
at the Embassy had agreed with the text, Kittredge delivered a letter
? 7
to Massigli from Admiral Stark which stated the American position. '
26, Kittredge memorandum, February 25, 194 3.




Acting in behalf of the National Committee, Massigli formally
replied to Admiral Stark on March 3. They recognized that the
immobilization of merchant ships by virtue of loss of crew members,
could result in serious inconvenience. The Committee was, therefore,
instructing its representatives in the United States as follows:
While abstaining from any propaganda, they may continue
to accept the voluntary enlistment of officers, ratings and
sailors from the crews of these merchant vessels. Such
recruits will receive, however, from our own delegations
the order to return to their ships to which they will
be temporarily assigned. . . . Their cases will be dealt with
later, either individually or by the application of a
general arrangement to be reached on the organization of
French forces.
This letter, which presumably followed discussions in the National
Committee, was a formal statement of policy, which closely followed
what Massigli said to Kittredge on February 27. That conversation
was of more than routine significance because it amplified the formal
position of the National Committee.
Massigli revealed his personal desire to reach a solution to the
recruiting problem with the Giraud authorities, which would be
acceptable as well to the British and Americans. He pointed out that
it was morally difficult, if not impossible, for the French National
Committee to refuse to accept the spontaneous offers of Frenchmen
from North Africa to join Fighting French forces. These forces
28. Massigli to Stark, March 3, 1943, Box 207, File: Recruit-
ment, COMNAVEU files. Substance reported in Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 211.
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represented unconditional resistance to Germany and to the collabora-
tion policy of Vichy. The Fighting French delegates in the United
States had been instructed not to solicit recruits and to urge volunteers
to return temporarily to their services, pending an agreement with
General Giraud on personnel transfers.
The Fighting French had not been informed in detail of the
procedures adopted by the British to prevent desertions of seamen
from North African ships in favor of Fighting France, he said. Only
the previous week, 110 of 140 men in one ship had volunteered for
service with the Fighting French forces, most of whom were persuaded
by the Fighting French services to return to their ships. In regard to
the dispatch of Charbonniere s and Colonel Pechkoff to Algiers, he
said they would propose that about one half of the French merchant
ships in North and West Africa be turned over to the National Committee
to operate. In this way seamen in North Africa who wished to join
29Fighting France could be authorized to do so. 7
The French at this stage were maneuvering rather adroitly.
By forbearing from active recruiting of seamen, the National Committee
appeared to be cooperating with the Allies, at least to the extent of not
suborning seamen. As to bona fide volunteers, it was not only morally
impossible on ethical grounds, which was Lord Halifax 1 point, but also




on political grounds, to return them forcibly to their ships. After all,
these Frenchmen elected to serve under the Cross of Lorraine. For
these reasons, the proscription of solicitation of recruits was the
extent of the concessions the Fighting French could or would make.
Even so, it was not a real concession as events subsequently proved.
The spirit of Gaullism as uncompromising resistance to Germany
was beginning to wax strong, especially among the rank and file of
Frenchmen overseas and in the metropole. The allure of the Cross of
Lorraine was that of Frenchmen who had not lost faith in France or
compromised their honor in the dark days of 1940 and 194T. The
Fighting French had no real need to recruit actively.
The over-riding motive of General de Gaulle in this issue was
the enhancement of the position of the National Committee in two ways:
first, in the physical sense, by attracting adherents, arms and equip-
ment; and second, in the political sense, by achieving recognition by the
United States and Great Britain of his movement as the true representa-
tive of France. Massigli's suggestion to Kittredge to divide the merchant
ships in North Africa between the Giraud and de Gaulle authorities
appeared to be a superficial solution to the problem of the deserting
seamen. It would result in an accretion of physical power to the
National Committee. It would also be a form of implied recognition
of the National Committee. Despite a lack of specific evidence, it can
be concluded that Kittredge and Admiral Stark saw through this
suggestion and they were relieved when it was not pursued. Why the
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French did not pursue it is a matter for conjecture in the absence of
concrete evidence.
Desertion from North African French ships continued apace as
seamen continued to volunteer for service with the Fighting French.
British security officers found that desertions varied directly with the
attitudes and records of the ships 'officers , some of whom were not
only pro-Vichy, but also anti-American and anti-British. Fifty-one
seamen from the battleship RICHELIEU, then in New York for repairs,
had deserted and were currently in Halifax, with about 50 others awaiting
30transportation to England.
The American press reported the increase in desertions and
unconfirmed reports were received in London that a number of seamen
from RICHELIEU and other French naval ships had been arrested and
were being detained by American immigration authorities at Ellis
Island. On March 6 and 8 American newsmen in London asked General
de Gaulle to comment, but he refused. Instead, he requested that no
reports be published on similar developments in United Kingdom
3 1ports.
Against this background, General de Gaulle requested a conference
with Admiral Stark on March 1 1 to discuss the situation. This con-
ference gave rise to what most charitably could be called a
30. Kittredge memorandum, March 11, 1943, Box 207, File:
Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.





Admiral Stark was accompanied by Kittredgc, and General de
Gaulle by his Chief of Staff, Colonel Pierre Billotte. Charles Peake,
the British Foreign Office representative to the French National
3 3Committee, was also present.
General dc Gaulle repeated to Admiral Stark the suggestions
already submitted by Massigli in his letter of March 3 to the effect
that seamen voluntarily joining the Fighting French forces in ports
other than North African ports would receive orders from the Fighting
French delegations to return to their ships to which they would be
temporarily assigned, pending a final agreement on the organization
of French forces.
Admiral Stark countered with the suggestion that instead of
enrolling such men in the Fighting French forces, they should be
persuaded to return to their ships on the understanding that on their
arrival in North Africa they would be permitted to exercise the option
of joining Fighting French forces, if they so desired. He indicated
the seamen could proceed to a Fighting French base for enrollment.
Kittredge specifically noted that on this latter point, General
de Gaulle stated he was prepared to agree that the men should not be
enrolled but returned to their ships, provided that they would be
32. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 214.
33. Kittredge memorandum, March 11, 1943.
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guaranteed that upon arrival in a North African port they could join
Fighting France. If a large number indicated a desire to join Fighting
France, General de Gaulle desired to place a Fighting French represent-
ative on board the ship to make sure the guarantee would be observed.
Admiral Stark was prepared to transmit a recommendation to
the United States authorities for such a procedure with suitable
guarantees. This procedure would permit seamen, on returning to
North Africa, to exercise the option of joining the Fighting French
forces if they so desired. Both men agreed that a dispatch embodying
this oral understanding would be prepared by Admiral Stark and that
it would be submitted to General dc Gaulle before transmission to
Washington.
After Kittredge drafted the dispatch, it was approved by Admiral
Stark and sent to General de Gaulle for his comments and perusal. It
was returned on March 31, with several minor changes, all of which
were incorporated. General de Gaulle concurred with the first
sentence of paragraph 6:
Second, in case of war vessels engaged in active operations
or of merchant or supply ships, required to return imme-
diately with cargoes for North Africa, de Gaulle proposed
to order Fighting French recruits from such vessels to
make the return voyage, with the understanding they be
permitted on arrival in a North African port to leave
their ships to join Fighting French forces. (Emphasis added)
But, in regard to the second sentence which read, "De Gaulle's
agreement is conditional on guarantees being given that these men
may join Fighting France after arrival in North Africa. " General
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de Gaulle suggested it read as follows:
General de Gaulle accepted at my suggestion that instructions
be given that after their enrollment orders should be
given to their sailors by General de Gaulle to return to
their own ships for the voyage to Africa. -*7* (Emphasis added)
Admiral Stark included in the dispatch all the changes suggested
by General de Gaulle, with the exception of this one. The Admiral so
notified General de Gaulle on March 16, saying:
There seems to have been a complete misunderstanding • •
on this one point, both as to the concrete suggestions
to be made to the American authorities and to the in-
structions which you might give to the Fighting French
representatives in the United States.
He sent a memorandum indicating necessary corrections in the minutes
of their conversation of March 11, which Colonel Billotte prepared and
submitted to the American staff. He again asked the General specifically
whether he would be willing to suspend enrollment in American ports of
seamen from North African ships, pending agreement with the North
African authorities. If so, Admiral Stark was willing to recommend
to the United States Government a guarantee that any such seamen
desiring to join Fighting France would be permitted to do so upon
arrival in a North African port.
Kittredge. did not see the incident as a misunderstanding. He
told Matthews that General de Gaulle "welshed" after orally agreeing
34. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p . 214.





with Admiral Stark on March 11. ° On the same day the Admiral
wrote to General de Gaulle, Kittredge asked Colonel Billotte to correct
at least for the record, the minutes of the Stark-de Gaulle conversation
he prepared. The Billotte minutes omitted any reference to Admiral
Stark's suggestion that formal enrollment by the Fighting French
representatives in the United States might be delayed until after the
arrival of these ships in North African ports. Kittredge suggested
that this omission might explain General de Gaulle's letter of March 13.
Kittredge included Admiral Stark's outline of his own comments:
c.
After discussion, General de Gaulle accepted my suggestion
that men from ships be not enrolled in America by
Fighting France, but if possible, be persuaded by Fighting
French representatives to remain on their ships for
the return journey on the understanding that they
be permitted on arrival in North Africa to leave to
join Fighting French forces if they so desire. General
de Gaulle's agreement is conditional on guarantees
being given that this will be permitted. He would wish to
send representatives with such ships to North Africa
to safeguard their interests and insure observation
of guarantees. I urged that the most important objective
was to keep these ships running and that so far as
possible other questions be subordinated to this.
Agreement was expressed by General de Gaulle to my
3 7
statement.
Kittredge requested the record of conversation be corrected.
The American files contain no reply to or rebuttal of Kittredge's
version of the conversation or even any reference to a French response
36. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 214.




From this apparent silence it may be concluded either that the French
acquiesced to the American version and sought to extricate themselves
by ignoring it, or that they considered it so inconsequential as not to
merit a reply. The only evaluation of record is Kittredge's word
"welshed" which implies a certain amount of bad faith. If this is so,
General de Gaulle's action was particularly high-handed and unpraise-
worthy. If he had second thoughts in good faith, he could have communi-
cated these to Admiral Stark with a reference to the desires of the
National Committee. The result could have been the same but hard
feelings and implications of dishonesty would have been avoided. Beyond
these few observations, further conjecture is pointless.
Nothing was heard from General de Gaulle or his staff at 4
Carlton Gardens until March 22. General de Gaulle replied to Admiral
Stark's request that the Fighting French refuse enrollment to sailors by
asking them to remain on their vessels subject "to certain possible
guarantees on their return to the port of departure, " as the General
put it. He curtly observed that he could hardly see how the Fighting
French authorities could give orders to sailors not under their
o o
orders. JO
Admiral Stark's reply on March 26 was dignified, but frosty in
a no-nonsense tone. He rebutted General de Gaulle's snide comment
with the observation that the Fighting French could give advice (not
38. De Gaulle to Stark, March 22, 1943, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1943, vol. 2, pp. 215-216.
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orders) and use their influence to persuade personnel to remain in
their ships, which were required to return immediately to North
Africa with cargoes of vital war material. He repeated his query as
to whether the National Committee would be willing to suspend recruit-
ing in the United States, particularly since the Giraud mission had
already agreed to suspend recruiting of the Fighting French personnel.
Admiral Stark reviewed his conversation with General de Gaulle
at which time he approved appropriate guarantees to seamen wishing
to join Fighting France, in exchange for a suspension of Fighting
French recruiting in the United States. The Admiral had repeated
this suggestion previously on March 16, because General de Gaulle's
letter of March 13 (in which he "welshed" on his agreement with Admiral
Stark) indicated he either had not understood or had not taken into
39account that suggestion. 7
The negotiations appeared to have stalled at this point. Then
the JAMAIQUE incident umnistakably showed the perils of continuing
the issue unresolved. However, before examining that incident, it
would be wise to describe how the British dealt with the recruiting
problem, particularly as to men who wished to transfer from Fighting
French forces to those of General Giraud. Kittredge suggested to
Admiral Stark on March 24 that Matthews might take this question up




with the Foreign Office. The Admiral agreed and Kittredge informed
Matthews of British procedures in this respect.
Action, or tolerance, automatically favoring recruiting by
Fighting French forces characterized British procedures in dealing
with seamen from North African French ships in United Kingdom ports.
Despite the policy decided upon on February 20, after Lord Halifax'
representations, direct or personal solicitation was tolerated, if not
encouraged. Ensign Chauvin, a French officer in charge of the gun
crew on the merchant ship CHAMPOLLION, complained that immigra-
tion, police and British naval officials not only made no effort to
41prevent men from leaving the ship, but even helped them to do so.
Kittredge supplied details. Men were allowed to leave their ships
without leave cards or permits. When men were detained on board
their ships by their officers, the British authorities at times had the
men released and turned over to the Fighting French authorities.
Admiral Auboyneau refused to suspend enrollment of seamen from
French North African ships or to prohibit solicitation or recruiting
propaganda. This refusal was of particular concern to the. Admiralty
and to the RAF, because at that time 200 French officers and men
from North Africa were in England for training. The Admiralty and
40. Kittredge memorandum, March 24, 1943, Box 207, File:
Recruiting, COMNAVEU files.




the RAF were attempting to prevent Fighting French contact with
these men.
Frequent reports were received that men in the Fighting French
forces who wished to join the North African forces had been dealt with
severely by their own officers with the knowledge of the British liaison
officers. Several men who had either been imprisoned themselves or
who had comrades who had been imprisoned, called at Admiral Stark's
Headquarters to report about a dozen cases. The Fighting French
imprisoned men who had expressed a desire to serve under Giraud in
the North African forces and on various other pretexts at Camberly
and at naval detention camps near Dundee and Portsmouth.
Several officers formerly in Fighting French services (Admiral
Emile-Henri Muselier, a Captain Moret, Commander Heron de
Villefosse, and a Commander Bedin) offered their services to General
Giraud, but the British authorities refused to transmit their offers of
service. As a rule the British would not permit the French to leave
England for North Africa to join Giraud's forces, unless specific
requests were made, normally through the American Staffs. Several
aviators in the Fighting French services asked for United States
assistance in transferring to the North African French services. The
requests submitted to their superiors had been torn up and they feared
being sent to Brazzaville for punishment which could not be imposed
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in England without British approval of sentences of courts-martial.
Any Frenchman who joined British or American services with-
out the express permission of General cle Gaulle was looked on by the
Gaullists as a traitor to France. For this reason many French agents
with the British secret, services were in constant danger from the
Fighting French services. Some agents had received British pass-
ports for legal protection.
The attitude of the French National Committee was that the only
legitimate French forces in the war against the Axis were those of
Fighting France. Hence, it was only a patriotic duty to enlist men
from other French services and conversely to punish men who wished
to join other French or Allied services. While the British knew of
this attitude, they may not have approved of it, but at least they





The JAMAIQUE incident may have lasted only five days, from
Saturday, March 27 to shortly after midnight on Thursday, April 1,
1943, but it created quite a stir. Soustelle, the Gaullist chronicler,
compared the sensation it created to that which would be expected by
raising the swastika in Scotland. At root was the issue of who had
the right to control the crew of this North African French ship. The
three elements to this incident were played out in the Clyde, where
JAMAIQUE had put in for repairs before sailing in convoy, and in
London, where American, British and French authorities negotiated
and maneuvered. The first element was an attempt by the Fighting
French to enroll virtually the entire ship's company of JAMAIQUE and
thus present the Allies with a fait accompli. The second element was
firmness and dispatch on the part of Admiral Stark and the third was
British cooperation, or lack of it. The main American worry was that
the ship would not sail in convoy as scheduled.
JAMAIQUE, a French merchant ship, was chartered on February
12, 1943, to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa, under
1. Soustelle, Jacques, Envers et contre tout, (2 vols. Paris




the terms of an agreement concluded with the North African authorities
on December 12, 1942. The agreement provided for the use by Allied
forces of French ships in North and West African ports. According
to the charter party, JAMAIQUE was to remain in the service of the
Allied Powers until six months after cessation of hostilities with
Germany. During this period, it was to be "at the absolute disposal
and under the complete control" of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.'
Provision was made for it to "remain under and fly the flag of France. 1 ^
Since JAMAIQUE was chartered for service in the war to defeat
Germany and Italy, the charterer arranged for the War Shipping Adminis-
tration to operate it in his behalf. Further arrangements were made
with the Director of the French North African Merchant Marine Office
to employ the master, officers and crew named by the French North
African authorities. The WSA as operator reserved authority to make
any necessary personnel changes. If changes were necessary, French
North African authorities would be consulted. Only in an emergency-
would non-French personnel be employed. "No such changes in
personnel will have the effect of modifying the French character of
the vessels. . .all of which. . . will fly the flag of France. " These
reasons were sufficient for the United States to oppose any other
party attempting to exercise control over the merchant ships in question.
2. Enclosure (A) to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
(Stark) (hereinafter referred to as COMNAVEU) letter serial
0098, April 4, 1943, to Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Home).

209
Indeed, the United States' contractual obligations would admit of no
other course of action.
Even before JAMAIQUE left North Africa, Colonel Billotte of
General dc Gaulle's staff told Commander Kittredge the French
National Committee knew there were many Gaullists among the crew.
Both the American and British authorities knew that when Admiral
Auboyneau, Commander of the Free French Navy, learned the ship
was bound for Gourock in the Clyde, he gave orders to Lieutenant-
Commander Langlais, the Commander of the Fighting French Naval
Base at Greenock, to arrange for the enrollment of members of
3JAMAIQUE's crew. The source of this knowledge was not clear, but
there was no reason to doubt that Langlais acted at the instigation of
Admiral Auboyneau. Whether the Admiral directed it or was surprised
by the zeal with which Langlais subsequently acted is also unclear.
JAMAIQUE arrived at Gourock for repairs and refitting on March
18. During the weeks that followed, members of the crew met Fighting
French officials in Glasgow and other places on their own initiative,
according to Admiral Auboyneau. Arrangements were made for their
enrollment in the Fighting French services. However, Mr. Smeyers
and Commandant Vullemin, representatives of the French Merchant
Marine, in their contacts with crew members, urged them to remain




attempts were made to prevent the men from joining the French Sea-
men's Union or from enrolling in the French Merchant Marine. The
master of the ship had no doubt that the ship would sail as scheduled on
March 31. 4
Langlais maintained contact with Gaullist sympathizers in the
JAMAIQUE crew through Francois Kerdoncuff, the First Radio Officer.,
and the ship's doctor, Henri Dumetz. He visited the ship on Friday,
March 26 at the invitation of Second Captain (First Mate) Yves de
Coatpont. At that time he enrolled in the Fighting French forces 142
of the 147 officers and men on board, and urged hoisting the Cross of
Lorraine pennant. After Langlais left the ship, the crew demanded the
hoisting at the main of the Cross of Lorraine. They declared their
intention to obey in future only the orders of the French National
Committee
.
The following morning, Saturday, March 27, at 9:15 the Captain,
Henri Le Boles, reported the incident to Commander Charles Hersum,
USNR, the U.S. Naval Liaison Officer on the Clyde. He was concerned
lest his ship be delayed in sailing as a result of the attempted transfer
of authority over the crew to the French National Committee. Commander
Hersum. telephoned a full report at 9:45 to Admiral Stark's headquarters
in London.




sufficient to alarm Hersum, particularly because it arose against a
background of previous difficulties faced by the British in the Clyde
area. He had more than a reasonable fear that the Fighting French
naval representatives might persuade the crew to leave the ship or to
create other troubles that would prevent the ship from sailing as
scheduled. At this time all the indications were that serious trouble
was brewing. The JAMAIQUE incident had begun.
Langlais delivered a message from General de Gaulle to the crew
of JAMAIQUE. The General thanked them for their patriotism and
insisted the Cross of Lorraine must be hoisted over the ship. He said
5the crew would receive his orders at once.
Captain L-e Boles sent a copy to Commander Hersuin on March 27.
The date of delivery of this letter as well as its contents are sufficient
evidence to show that General de Gaulle deliberately precipitated this
incident and that he had control of its intensity and duration. This
conclusion is consistent with the repeated statements of Admiral
Auboyneau and other Fighting French officials that the ship would sail
as scheduled.
After receiving Hersum's report at 9:45, Admiral Stark decided
to place an armed guard on board JAMAIQUE to prevent the crew from
leaving the ship. However, before actually ordering the armed gang-
way watch to board the ship, he requested an immediate conference
5. Enclosure (B) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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with British officials in an attempt to consolidate support for his position
and contemplated action. Throughout the incident Admiral Stark refused
to acknowledge that the Fighting French had any right whatsoever to
attempt to control or to exercise any authority over the ship, its
officers or crew. At all times he made it clear he was primarily con-
cerned with the operation of the ship and its sailing as scheduled.
»
Hence, the armed guard was necessary to ensure the presence of the
crew on board.
Pursuant to the Admiral's request a conference convened at the
Admiralty at 10:30 that same morning. Persons present included
Commander Kittredge, Charles Peake, a representative of the Ministry
of War Transport and the legal scholar, C. H. M. Waldock, of "M" Branch,
the Admiralty. Kittredge informed the British representatives of the
orders Admiral Stark proposed to issue. The British officials suggested
the WSA reconsider its refusal to request General de Gaulle not to inter-
vene to ask the crew to remain at their posts. This suggestion was
subsequently rejected as inconsistent with the American position, after
it had been communicated to Kerr of the WSA and Matthews at the
Embassy.
At the conclusion of the conference, Kittredge returned to Head-
quarters. Admiral Stark then instructed Commander Her sum by
6. Kittredge memorandum, "Recruiting of Seamen, " Box 207, File:
Recruiting, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, files
(hereinafter referred to as COMNAVEU files), Naval History
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
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telephone at 11:25 to continue discussions with the Master and crew;
to request British assistance in preventing Langlais or others from
inciting the men to make additional demands or to leave the ship; and
finally, to place an armed gangway watch on the ship to prevent
unauthorized entries or departures. In addition, Admiral Stark
directed continuing the discussions with the Foreign Office, Admiralty,
Ministry of War Transport and Fighting French officials so JAMAIQUE
could sail as scheduled. The decision to place an armed gangway
watch on board JAMAIQUE was not communicated to the French in
advance as it was to the British.
Pursuant to Admiral Stark's instructions, Kittredge called on
Colonel Billotte, Chief of Staff to General de Gaulle, and on Admiral
Auboyneau's Flag Lieutciiant at noon to protest formally against the
acts of the Fighting French representatives to exercise authority over
the officers and crew of JAMAIQUE and to request their immediate
cessation. Billotte promised to consult General de Gaulle as to
measures the Fighting French might take to ensure the departure of
the vessel on time with a full complement onboard. He told Kittredge
he thought the National Committee would do everything in its power to
8
assure the sailing of the ship on time.





British stated that at 12:30 their Admiral Hill, Flag Officer in Command,
the Clyde, had been informed by telephone of steps being taken by the
United States authorities. He had been instructed to coordinate measures
of support with local United States representatives, particularly to
prevent Langlais from provoking further trouble. The Foreign Office
had arranged for their diplomatic and naval liaison officers (Charles
Peake and Commander Pinks, RNVR respectively) to the French
National Committee to inform their counterparts, Commissioner for
Foreign Affairs, Massigli, and Admiral Auboyneau, of British support
for Admiral Stark. A request for the removal of Langlais from the
Clyde was anticipated.
Colonel Billotte was requested to insure Langlais would be ordered
to cease his activities with respect to the JAMAIQUE crew. His
removal from the Clyde was suggested. Billotte promised only to
consult General de Gaulle as to measures the Fighting French might
take to insure the sailing of the ship on time with a full complement.
He proinised nothing in regard to Langlais. He claimed that 140 of
147 men on board were Gaullist sympathizers and wished to have the
Cross of Lorraine pennant hoisted as moral satisfaction.
Matthews and Kerr felt it unnecessary to appeal to the crew to
remain on board, since the armed gangway watch ordered by Admiral
Stark would be effective. They also rejected a suggestion that the Cross
of Lorraine be flown as a "house flag" since it might violate the terms
of the; charter. At least the British and French officials promised to
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keep Admiral Stark in London and Commander Hersum in Greenock
Q
informed.
Shortly before this conference was held in London, British naval
security officers, the U.S. Naval Liaison officer, WSA representatives,
Captain Le Boles, and Lieutenant- Commander Langlais met in Greenock.
Apparently agreement was reached that no activities should be continued
that would interfere with the sailing of the ship, and that the Cross of
Lorraine should not be hoisted. Langlais was the only one who subse-
quently denied any agreement. He called Captain Le Boles a liar in his
letter of March 29.
By now the French were specifically committed to the sailing of
JAMAIQUE on schedule. Indeed, much could be lost, politically speaking,
by delaying the ship as a result of a quarrel over the right to control the
crew. Even so, the French still had room to maneuver to demonstrate
they could control the crew. They proved their control by the raising
of the Cross of Lorraine over the ship.
Later that afternoon, Captain Le Boles happened upon a number
of the crew. First Radio Officer Kerdoncuff was in a state of great
agitation and declared he was going to hoist the Cross of Lorraine
pennant. The Captain ordered him not to do so, saying that he was in
agreement with the British and American authorities that only the
9. Enclosure (F) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
10. Enclosure (R) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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Tricolor should be flown on the ship. Kerdoncuff disregarded the Captain's
orders and a few minutes later the Cross of Lorraine was flying over the
ship. The Captain did not haul down this unauthorized pennant because
he wished to avoid the trouble that would surely follow if he attempted
to do so. However, he protested vigorously to Langlais this weakening
of his authority. Furthermore, Kerdoncuff was reported to have declared
the intention of the 142 crew members to obey in future only the orders
of the French National Committee.
The hoisting of the Cross of Lorraine meant that the Fighting
French had established some control over the crew and to that extent
over the ship itself. This control was achieved over the specific objec-
tions and contrary to the specific order of the Captain. It was achieved
at the expense of the United States by showing the inability of the Captain
and of the American authorities to exercise control over the ship.
Kittredge met with Colonel Billotte, Andre Dielthelm, National
Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Finance and the Merchant Marine,
and members of Admiral Auboyneau's staff a few moments after the
Cross of Lorraine was raised on JAMAIQUE, but before the news
reached London. These and other representatives of the French Nation-
al Committee sought to have Admiral Stark request General de Gaulle
and the French National Committee to arrange for the ship's departure
on schedule. They made it clear that such a request would be construed
11. Enclosure (C) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.

217
as a recognition of their right to control the ship and crew. Admiral
k refused to accede to such a request, even after it was repeated at
noon the next day.
The French officials questioned the right of the United States
authorities to operate the ship on grounds that the North African adminis-
tration exceeded its authority by issuing charters illegally and had
conscripted the crews. Thus upon arrival in United States or United
Kingdom ports, they maintained, the crews had exercised their rights
as Free Frenchmen to seek enrollment in Fighting France and to place
themselves under General de Gaulle and the French National Committee.
Fighting France was the only legitimate French authority. The majority
of the French population, the Governments of the European Allied
Nations and the British Government recognized them as the leaders of
the French resistance to Germany. It was the sacred duty of the
French National Committee to protect the national interests and to
intervene in cases such as JAMAIQUE. General de Gaulle and the
National Committee were prepared to accept full responsibility for
officers and crewmen wishing to join Fighting France. Once control of
the ship was established, the National Committee would guarantee no
delay in sailing. They were aware of the potential harm, of a disruption
of shipping.
In the case of JAMAIQUE, they declared the action of the crew
was spontaneous. While they could not refuse volunteers, their
representatives on the Clyde (Smeyers, Vullimin and Langlais) had
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done all they could to persuade the men to remain on the ship. Langlais
had visited the ship only when invited. He did not speak to the crew,
incite them to pose unreasonable conditions or induce them to leave
the ship. They maintained the crew had a right to the respect of their
wishes and French National interests under the Cross of Lorraine and
the control of the French National Committee. They restated their
offer. If competent United States authorities so requested, the National
Committee would order the crew to remain on board as a unit of the
French Merchant Marine, placed at the disposal of the United States
as a part of the French war effort.
Kittredge informed the French representatives, among other
things, that the officers and men appeared willing to continue with their
service. He emphasized that if further disturbances occurred or if the
sailing were to be delayed, it could be only on orders of General de
Gaulle. 12
Early that evening one military police officer and a detail of
six enlisted United States Military Police boarded JAMAIQUE and
established the armed gangway watch. They were cordially received
on board. Subsequently reports from the officer, who was the Assistant
Provost Marshal on the Clyde, referred to harmonious relations with
1
3
the officers and crew, and similar relations among ship's company.
12. Enclosures (A), (B), (L), (M), (N), to COMNAVEU letter,
April 4, 1943.
13. Enclosure (R), to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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In a personal message to General Eisenhower late on March 27,
Admiral Stark noted that early agreement between Generals Catroux
and Giraud on recruiting procedures would prevent a repetition of recent
incidents, and that the British Government had asked Macmillan to
urge upon the Generals the necessity of early agreement. General
Eisenhower was informed that General de Gaulle had agreed to instruct
General Catroux to give first priority to this question. General de Gaulle
also expressed the intention of instructing General Catroux to discuss
the possibility of some transfers between Fighting French and North
African French forces. The JAMAIQUE incident was cited as an illus-
tration of the importance of the earliest possible agreement.
Inspection of JAMAIQUE on Sunday, March 28, showed that the
repairs and refitting work were progressing satisfactorily. They
continued to do so until the ship sailed. The Cross of Lorraine was
flying at the mainmast and the Tricolor was displayed at the tafrail.
Although there were no new developments on Sunday, Hersum
kept in touch with Captain Le Boles and British officials. The Captain
felt that if the Cross of Lorraine were removed either by him or by the
United States authorities, it might lead to such serious consequences
that the ship might be prevented from sailing. He indicated tacit
approval of the display of the. Gaullist insigne, but he felt strongly that
14. COMNAVEU message 271516Z March 1943.
15. Enclosure (B) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.

220
his authority had been challenged, which he resented. He also felt that
if the ship sailed as scheduled, the officers and crew would obey his
orders. He stated that prior to departure the Cross of Lorraine would
be lowered and the Tricolor alone would fly.
Both the Captain and Commander Hersum were apprehensive of a
raid at the last minute on the crew prior to sailing, not only in view of
recent events, but also because of Langlais' past performance in cases
of British controlled ships of similar origin. Indeed, British security
officials thought him a "slippery individual" and recommended keeping
a careful watch on him.
Meanwhile, Captain Le Boles had received a letter from the crew
signed by 16 men, which protested the presence of a foreign armed
guard aboard a French vessel under a French flag in violation of inter-
national law. It was an insult to the French flag and to the honor of
the officers and men aboard. The Captain was reminded he had sufficient
qualified officers and men on board to man his own gangway watch. The
letter contained a profession of obedience to the orders of General de
Gaulle and the French National Committee. l '
The author of the letter was never identified, but it is by no means
unreasonable to suspect that Langlais knew of the letter, if he did not
write it. Certainly, two of the ships officers, Kerdoncuff and Dr. Dumetz,
16. U, S. Naval Liaison Officer, The Clyde (Hersum) to Stark,
March 29, 1943 part of Enclosure (C) to COMNAVEU letter,
April 4, 1943.
17. Enclosure (R) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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were instrumental in its drafting. The point is that this letter was an
admission of mutinous intent, if not mutiny. Following the flag raising
incident, it was indicative of at least a temporary suspension of the
authority of the Captain over his ship. Here, the Fighting French con-
spired to foment mutiny. The problem the mutiny posed for the Captain
and for the American authorities was to make certain it would not
succeed. If it did, the Fighting French would have established at the
very least their ability to control the crew.
Admiral Auboyneau assured Kittredge the next day, March 29,
not only that the ship would sail on schedule, but also that there never
was any question, except in the American minds, of the ship not sailing
on time. For this reason, there was no justification either for taking
any special measures, or for basing Admiralty and Foreign Office
decisions on what he called unverified reports. He claimed to have
written reports from his representatives flatly contradicting Hersum's
1 8telephoned report. He produced no evidence to support his claim,
which can only be viewed as an uncorroborated assertion.
The worst fears of Admiral Stark and of Captain Le Boles that
a last minute raid on the crew or even earlier defections would prevent
JAMAIQUE from, sailing on schedule were in fact groundless. But they
were reasonably justified in the premises. The French National
Committee was playing a subtle game. By demonstrating their ability
18. Enclosure (L) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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to control the crew to the technical point of mutiny, they sought to
induce Admiral Stark to request or to make arrangements with the
French National Committee for future conditions of service of the 140
odd men from JAMAIQUE who had joined or wished to join the Gaullist
forces. Admiral Auboyncau was quite clear on this point in his conver-
sation with Kittredgc.
Admiral Auboyneau pointed out to Kittredgc that the Fighting
French had not urged the crew to leave the ship, but rather they had
endeavored to persuade them to remain on board. There had been no
disturbances on board and, if any developed, he said, it would be. entirely
due to the action of the United States authorities by placing the armed
gangway watch on board. He averred that Admiral Hill did not agree
with Hersum's reports and strongly disapproved of the action taken by
Admiral Stark. "
By way of reply, Kittredgc described the United States position.
JAMAIQUE was operated by a United States Government agency at the
request of the charterer, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Africa.
The crew were prepared to sail unless ordered not to do so by General
de Gaulle or his representatives. It seemed unnecessary for General
de Gaulle to issue any orders at all, and for this reason Admiral Stark
19. No communications were found in the COMNAVEU files to
prove or to disprove this assertion. There was not even
a hint of British disapproval of Admiral Stark's actions.
Admiral Hill may very well have held such opinions, but
if he communicated them to the Admiralty, the Admiralty
did not convey them to COMNAVEU.
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was not disposed to make any request. Hence if the ship did not sail,
20
it would be known that this was due to orders from the Fighting French
Admiral Stark inade it quite clear that he had no intention whatso-
ever of recognizing any right of the French National Committee to
exercise control over anything whatever to do with JAMAIQUE. Since
the National Committee were unwilling to delay the sailing of the ship,
time was on the side of Admiral Stark and Captain Le Boles. Their
best course of action was firmness and restraint, which they pursued
steadfastly and well.
The National Committee formally protested the establishment of
the armed gangway watch on March 29. The protest claimed the armed
gangway watch was a measure which did injury to the personal dignity
and patriotism of French sailors and was of a nature to provoke the
? 1most regrettable incidents.
Admiral Stark rejected it on April 1. He was unable to understand
or to accept a protest against military measures taken in the discharge
of the task confided to authorities of the United States Government by
the Commander-in-Chief of an Allied Force. He pointed out that such
measures were normally applied to all American owned or operated
vessels engaged in the ocean transport of war materials, in order to
assure such transport efficiently and without delay. The action taken
20. Enclosure (L) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
21. Enclosure (O) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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in this instance was in keeping with that routine.
Although General cle Gaulle was unable to maneuver Admiral
Stark into requesting him to order the crew to sail on schedule, he was
able to instigate a military- religious ceremony on board, presumably
for the symbolic purpose of demonstrating patriotic and Gaullist fervor.
Early Tuesday morning, March 30, Hersum telephoned Admiral Stark's
headquarters to say that at 11:00 that saine morning a Fighting French
naval Chaplain would say mass on board JAMAIQUE and would bless
the Cross of Lorraine. A Fighting French naval guard of honor would
be in attendance. He also reported a statement by Langlais that General
de Gaulle had ordered the Cross of Lorraine to be flown over JAMAIQUE,
Both the First Officer and the Captain asked 1st Lt. Van Vechtin,
C. M. P. , officer in charge of the armed gangway watch, if he had any
objection to the presence on board of the chaplain and Guard of Honor.
Van Vechtin replied that his orders were to permit anyone vouched for
by the Captain to board or to leave the ship. The Captain then comment-
ed that there might be trouble if the party came on board, but there
23
would probably be more if an attempt were made to exclude them.
Prior to holding the ceremony, Langlais called on British and
American authorities on the Clyde (Admiral Hill and Commander
Hersum) to obtain their consent, in addition to that of Captain Le Boles.
22. Enclosure (U) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
23. Enclosure (R) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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Even so, shortly before the ceremony, American officials requested
and obtained the assistance of the British Immigration Authorities to
permit none of the crew to leave the ship and also the cooperation of
British Security Officers. They sent a party to the dock to enforce the
24
wishes of the Captain of the ship if he objected to the planned ceremony.
These precautions happily proved to be unnecessary. The
ceremony went off without incident. The ceremonial party consisted of
one Captain of the French Marines, one naval Chaplain, one NCO and
seven enlisted men arined with carbines. On boarding the ship all
appropriate salutes were rendered and the authority of the United States
was recognized.
Following the ceremony in the ship's main saloon, the Cross of
Lorraine was hoisted on the mainmast, while the Tricolor continued to
f]y at the tafrail. Relations among the officers and crew, the boarding
party and the American gangway watch were described as so harmonious
that a general and cordial invitation was extended to the Americans to
participate in drinks and lunch following the flag consecration ceremony.
Tension relaxed to the extent that during the ensuing luncheon the
British Security Unit departed.
The Admiralty Office in Clasgow reported in the late afternoon of
March 30 that the Fighting French Naval authorities in anticipation of
the withdrawal of the United States armed gangway watch were making




preparations to place their own armed guard on board. The British
refused to sanction this step. They specifically requested the retention
of the American armed guard, which remained on board. "
The armed guard turned back several members of the crew who
wished to go ashore. These men protested and 1st Lt. Van Vechtin
spoke to the First Officer who said to make no exceptions and to keep
the men on board. One of the men then went to Captain Le Boles who
gave permission to the man and his shipmates to go ashore, because of
? 7the following letter from Langlais. ai The Captain had the letter posted
at the gangway:
Order of General de Gaulle.
General de Gaulle has personally examined the present
situation of the French ship JAMAIQUE and of its crew.
It goes without saying that this crew which belongs to
Fighting France, may receive orders only from the French
National Committee.
Taking into account the interest of France in the war,
General de Gaulle has directed that the JAMAIQUE should
complete the voyage arranged.
He salutes the ship which is going to take the sea for the
first time under the emblem of the Lorraine Cross.
s/ Langlais 28
To take this letter as a capitulation by de Gaulle would be to read
too much into it, but it was certainly a strategic retreat onto high ground.
26. Enclosure (B) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
27. Enclosure (A) to COMNAVEU letter serial 00127, April 17, 1943,
28. Enclosure (S) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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Once he found that he was unable to move Admiral Stark to request
him to order the crew to sail with the ship as scheduled, General de
Gaulle was faced with the necessity of insuring the departure of the
ship was not delayed because of acts of the Fighting French. In this
way he could avoid the onus of interfering with the war effort.
The next day, March 31, all reports received by the U. So Naval
Liaison Officer and the British Shipping Control office indicated that.
JAMAIQUE would sail that night on schedule. At 10:30 the ship anchored
in the stream preparatory to sailing. Five hours later the American
gangway watch was removed, and afterwards the Cross of Lorraine was'
no longer flying at the mainmast, but on the radio mast. Captain Le
Boles informed the U. S. Navy boarding officer that it would be removed
when the ship got underway. Shortly after midnight, JAMAIQUE
reached the convoy rendezvous point and by 3:30 the next morning had
sailed in convoy as scheduled. 7
The Fighting French did succeed, however, in removing two
officers from the ship. These men were reassigned to corvettes.
Captain Le Boles thought they had been removed in an attempt to
cripple the ship. Determined that his ship would sail as scheduled, the
Captain sailed almost single-handedly from the Clyde. Only two other
officers were aboard, both of whom were very junior. Upon reaching
New York, he told the boarding officer he had not been out of his clothes





Although JAMAIQUE sailed in convoy on schedule, it took several
days for the dust to settle. Referring to what he called unwarranted
interference with the control and operation of the ship, Admiral Stark
presented General de Gaulle with a bill of particulars:
(1) the enrollment of men of the JAMAIQUE in the
Fighting French forces;
(2) visits by Fighting French Naval Officers not
authorized by United States authorities;
(3) the issuance of a series of verbal and written orders,
not only to the Captain, but to members of the crew,
either during these visits or to personnel of the ship
while ashore;
(4) the hoisting of a pennant on the vessel symbolizing
some control other than that of the Tricolor, the
Flag of France (which alone was authorized),
contrary to the orders and inspite of the written
protest of the Captain;
(5) the boarding of the ship by an armed detachment of
Fighting French forces;
(6) the holding of a ceremony apparently designed to
symbolize an unauthorized transference of authority
over the crew or the ship or both;
(7) intimidation of the Captain and officers;
(8) disregard of requests that such interference with
the crew of the vessel be forbidden;
(9) issuance of formal orders, in General de Gaulle's
name, by Langlais on matters directly affecting the
operation of the ship, as follows: on March 21
30. District Intelligence Officer, Third Naval District (New York),
letter April 20, 1943, File: A8-2/EF28, in Chief of Naval
Operation files.

accepting the enrollment of the crew and instructing
them to wait further orders; on March 3 instructing
them to remain on the ship, but to accept orders
from no authority other than the French National
Committee.
The U.S. Navy regarded such activities as inimical to the war effort.
He observed that without the attempts of Langlais to assert an authority
Over the ship which neither the United States Government nor the Allied
Commander-in-Chief in North Africa would recognize, there would
have been no need for General de Gaulle's order to the crew to sail
3 1
with the ship.
Interestingly enough, General de Gaulle apparently never replied
to this letter. But on April 7, Massigli presented the French view of
the events of the JAMAIQUE incident. His view did not accord in all
respects with the information on hand, according to Kittredge. Unfor-
tunately this document, is not on file in the U. S. Navy records.
The First Lord of the Admiralty was advised of the Navy Depart-
ment's policy of viewing control of shipping as an operational rather
than a political matter. Since other vessels in a similar category were
expected in United Kingdom ports in the near future, Admiral Stark
said he would appreciate it if measures could be taken to prevent
32interference by the Fighting French.
This request was significant because at no time did there appear
31. Enclosure (Z) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
32. Enclosure (Y) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943.
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to be any British restraint on Langlais.
Admiral King was informed that JAMAIQUE had sailed as
3 3
scheduled. Admiral Stark stated that he handled the matter as
an operational rather than a political question, even before receipt of
34
orders from Admiral King to do so. ' Washington was officially
notified that Admiral Stark had ordered the armed guard to board
JAMAIQUE to prevent the "proselytizing interference" of Langlais.
Beyond saying he pressed the Admiralty to take positive action there
was no further criticism of the Admiralty action or lack of it, not even
an expression of regret or disappointment by Admiral Stark at the lack
of Admiralty action.
General Eisenhower, legally the charterer of the ship, was in-
formed of its sailing and of the incidents preceding the sailing. Admiral
Stark assured him that at no time did he recognize any right whatsoever
of the French National Committee to control the ship. He said he was
prepared to place an American crew on board, if necessary, and he
received authority from Admiral King to do so.
Admiral Stark told General Eisenhower of General de Gaulle's
repeated assurance that he wished to avoid any interference with the
war effort, and his insistence on the right to accept volunteers. The
33. COMNAVEU message 011701Z April 1943.
34. Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) message
311827Z March 1943.
35. COMNAVEU message 011702Z April 1943.
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Admiral felt the embarrassing recruiting incidents, then occurring
frequently in United States and United Kingdom, ports, might be avoided
by a joint de Gaulle - Giraud statement inviting Frenchmen to remain
in their present services pending formation of a joint military and
naval organization. Such a statement would be accoinpanied by an
Anglo-American guarantee that men might transfer to other services.
One thing is clear from this incident: so long as General de Gaulle
was unwilling to delay the sailing of the ship for whatever reason, there
was no need for Admiral Stark to accede to the French suggestion that
he request French assistance in getting the ship underway on time.
The French role, then, was confined to the generation of political
pressure to induce Admiral Stark to make the request.
The French attempts to gain control of at least the JAMAIQUE
crew, if not the entire ship, were not based on petty motives. They
were based on a specific perception of United States policy. The
Fighting French were convinced that the United States was engaged in
a deliberate campaign to discredit General de Gaulle and the National
Committee in the eyes of American, British and continental opinion.
This theory was derived from the American refusal to recognize
General de Gaulle as the representative of French interests, even to
the extent that he was recognized by the British. American dealings
with General Giraud pursuant to the Anfa Agreement, American
36. Enclosure (A A) to COMNAVEU letter, April 4, 1943,
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refusal to transport the Gaullist representative to Guiana while
expediting the transportation of General Giraud's man, American
objection to Fighting French recruiting of seamen — all these and
other Gaullist frustrations were seen as evidence supporting the
Fighting French theory.
Holding to this theory or perception, the French National Commit-
tee felt it was fighting for its very existence and for the ideals upon
which it was based. The JAMAIQUK incident was seen as a test case
as to whether the United States could persuade or induce the British to
abandon General de Gaulle and Fighting France. The National Commit-
tee sought to establish the right to represent the GauDist members of
the crew. With this point won, they reasoned, liberal opinion in the
United States and elsewhere, coupled with events in North Africa,
would force the United States to recognize the National Committee as
37
representing French interests and participation in the war.
JAMAIQUE, then, was seen as an important stepping stone to obtaining
American recognition.
The National Committee even went to the extent of consulting
several United Nations governments, including the Soviet Ambassador
in London, before General de Gaulle protested to Admiral Stark. The
French believed they had the support of the Soviet and exiled Govern-
ments. They sought to use JAMAIQUE during the Giraud- Catroux




legotiations, then underway in Algiers, to determine whether the
United States could destroy the influence of the National Committee
or whether the United States could be forced to recognize the legitimacy
38
of the National Committee's authority. Admiral Stark's firmness and
the sailing of the ship as scheduled disappointed the French in their
efforts to force American recognition.
While the Admiralty cooperated with Admiral Stark to a limited
extent, the prevailing view was that this affair was purely political and
that it could be dealt with between the French and American authorities.
The British position sharply diverged from the American position which
was that the question was strictly operational. Had the British position
coincided with the American one, Admiral Hill could have been given
authority to take positive action, such as restraint of Langlais, rather
than the insipid injunction not to encourage his activities. Also,
Admiral Auboyneau could have been summoned to the Admiralty and
told quite plainly that such activities must cease forthwith. The failure
of the British to take positive action undoubtedly left an impression that
they were not cooperating with the Americans.
The apparent lack of British cooperation was not derived from
any conscious attempt or desire to hinder the Ainericans. Rather,
British policy was based on the relationship established with General




subsequently developed. To the British the Fighting French represented
French action in the war against the Axis. For this reason the British
tended to support General de Gaulle and his followers. The North
African French were viewed at best as repentant Vichy French, who
after accepting the armistice, became neutral, if not active collaborator!
with the German military effort.
The United States did not have this early association with General
de Gaulle. It was American policy to deal with local authorities, who-
ever they might be, as men on the spot. It was a policy of expedience,
based on military considerations. It left the resolution of political
questions to the post-war period. Since the number of troops and ships
under General Giraud in North Africa exceeded those under General
de Gaulle, proportionally more support was given to the North African
39French than to the Fighting French under lend-lease. 7
For these reasons, it is not surprising that in a specific instance,
such as the JAMAIQUE incident, the British response would differ from
the American response. British cooperation was more passive than
active. They took measures to prevent ill-considered action by the
French authorities which would reveal the very deep divergencies of
American and British policy. Despite these differences the British
did not oppose or even caution Admiral Stark concerning the steps he
took. However, the Admiralty was concerned with the legal questions
39. Kittredge memorandum, April 30, 1943, Box 204, File;




Discussions with Admiralty officials brought, to light a serious
legal problem. C. H. M. Waldock, the legal scholar, noted that if
the question of the status of North African French ships and their crews
were raised in a British court, the result might be embarrassing.' There
was no basis for recognition by English courts of (1) the powers and
functions of an Allied Commander-in-Chief; (2) the military character
of services performed for an Allied force by agencies of a foreign
government; and (3) the legality of the North African Administration.
By successfully attacking the legal bases of the charter under
which JAMAIQUE was operated the Fighting French might possibly
obtain writs of habeas corpus. The British would then be obliged to
board North African French ships to remove any men wishing to join
Fighting France, if they were prevented from going ashore to do so.
Waldock also pointed out that if the legality of the North African French
regime were questioned, the Fighting French might obtain custody,
if not title, to North African French ships entering British ports. Under
British law, even though such ships were operated by agencies of the
United States Government under the authority of an Allied Commander-
in-Chief, they would probably be regarded as French merchant ships,
engaged in commercial traffic.




considerations as it was on legal grounds. The Americans sought
only to expedite the shipment of goods by sea for military purposes,
and for this they required North African French ships. The French
were somewhat more desperate, because they were seeking to establish
a principle
.
The JAMAIQUE incident was a prime example of the need for an
agreement between General de Gaulle and General Giraud. Even though
this incident soon passed, the question of recruiting continued to plague
American and British officials until the creation of the French Committee





Recent events had heightened American and British interest in
a resolution of the division of the French forces. Although Allied
officials were unable as before to effect a unification of the French
forces themselves, they continued to exert what influence they could
on the course of negotiations as they proceeded towards the desired
end. As far as Admiral Stark was concerned, it meant discussions
with Fighting French leaders on the progress of the negotiations. These
discussions were in the French interest as well, since American ap-
proval of the conditions of unification would increase the likelihood of
their acceptance by General Giraud.
As the recent crisis of hard feelings was abating, General Catroux
arrived in London on April 10 for discussions with the French National
Committee on General Giraud 1 s draft proposals which had been sent on
ahead. The National Committee discussed them exclusively at its
meetings of April 11, 13 and 15. A decision was reached at the final
meeting.
At least sixty percent of the provisional agreeinent between
1. Soustelle, Jacques, Envers et contre tout , (2 vols., Paris




Generals Giraud and Catroux was immediately acceptable to the Nation-
al Committee. Only the issue of the separation of civil and military
authority produced a substantial difference of opinion. General Giraud
felt that the head of any central provisional authority and the military
commander of the French armed forces should be the same person.
Among others, Massigli, National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs,
felt such a merger of authority was contrary to democratic
principles. While the National Committee agreed in principle that
civil and military authority should be separated, the arrangements
by which such separation would be accomplished were the occasion
of the debate.
Massigli hoped that the National Committee would leave General
Giraud free to choose the position he wanted. General de Gaulle was
prepared at that time to subordinate himself to General Giraud to
achieve unity, but he was not prepared to leave both civil and military
2
authority in the latter s hands. To facilitate agreement, General de
Gaulle and the National Committee were prepared to accept the designa-
tion of General Catroux to fill either of the two positions which General
.Giraud did not assume.
In discussing the de Gaulle-Giraud negotiations with Admiral Stark
2. Ibid.
3. Kittredge memorandum, April 13, 1943, Box 204, File:
April 1943, Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Europe
files (hereinafter referred to as COMNAVEU files), Naval
History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
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on April 12, Massigli expressed his deep concern about finding an
acceptable compromise. He was aware of the difficulty of persuading
either General de Gaulle or General Giraucl to subordinate himself to
the other. A way out might be the creation of a council or committee
with no permanent chairman, each member presiding in turn. Thus,
if General Giraud were to Choose the role of military commander, he
would be subordinate to the committee or council and not to General de
Gaulle. Another possibility might be to make General Catroux chair-
man, which would conceivably be acceptable to the North African
leaders. In that case, General Catroux would exercise general super-
4
vision over the Empire.
Under the compromise as conceived by Massigli, and explained
to Admiral Stark, General de Gaulle might accept a position as War
Commissioner, with the dual task of organizing and equipping the
"Secret Army" as well as training and equipping French forces to
participate in offensive actions on the continent. Massigli realized that
the identification of General de Gaulle with the resistance movement
in France was an essential condition to any agreement that might be
reached.
These questions were discussed by the National Committee at its





compromise proposals of any kind. The other members wanted either
General Catroux or General de Gaulle, to go to Algiers at once to urge
General Giraud to agree to the formation of a council or committee to
be presided over by General de Gaulle, the members of which would be
jointly agreed upon. Both Catroux and Massigli evidently realized
that this hard line would be unacceptable to General Giraud and that it
would in all probability be counter-productive in reaching an agreement.
Their opposition to it was so pronounced that they even made clear, at
a luncheon at the Foreign Office on April 14, their intention to resign
from the National Committee if their compromise proposals were not
accepted.
The principle of a separation of civil and military authority was
endorsed by the National Committee. General Catroux was instructed
to urge General Giraud to accept this principle, in the belief that the
French people, who were profoundly democratic, would neither under-
stand nor approve the establishment of a provisional organization in
which supreme civil and military authority were merged in either
General Giraud or in General de Gaulle. If General Giraud were to
accept this principle, the National Committee would permit him to
choose either to remain as commander of the French forces or to
become President of the new unified council or committee. If General
6. Ibid .




Giraud preferred to retain his military position, General de Gaulle
would expect to head the committee exercizing civil authority. In the
event General Giraud chose the military role and also wished to be a
member of the new council or committee, Catroux explained to Admiral
Stark that he was authorized to suggest that Generals Giraud and de
,
o
Gaulle become co-presidents of such a body.
This point was the last major question of principle that remained
to be resolved between the French in London and in Algiers. In his
speech on March 14, General Giraud had subscribed to the two other
premises the National Committee insisted upon. The first was that
decisions by the French people on the future government after the
liberation should not be prejudiced. The second was that any pro-
visional authority should be established as far as possible in accor-
dance with the laws of France and the French constitution and that it
should function within the framework of French republican institutions
and practices. Thus, if General Giraud accepted the principle of
separation of civil and military authority, the remaining questions
would be ones of implementation and identity of leadership.
Both Catroux and Massigli attached great importance to obtaining
full agreement of American and British authorities to any measure
proposed. For this reason, they called on Admiral Stark on April 15
as soon as the National Committee reached its decision. They went
8. Kittredge memorandum, April 16, 1943, Box 204, File:
April 1943, COMNAVEU files.
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to great lengths to explain the position of the National Committee to
Admiral Stark, as well as elucidating their own personal views as to
the possible role that might be assigned to the various French leaders
in the new organization.
If General Giraud were to agree to the principles and conditions
decided upon by the National Committee, then General Catroux would
suggest a meeting with General de Gaulle as soon as possible to work
out the details of the new organization, methods of action and the assign-
ment of French leaders to specific positions. It had been agreed that
both sides could make suggestions, but the final decisions would be
made by Generals de Gaulle and Giraud. Catroux personally felt that
if General Giraud gave up his military position, General Juin would
make an admirable successor, having demonstrated his loyalty to the
Allied cause and his ability to command and to influence French forces
in North Africa.
One reason General Catroux went to such lengths to explain to
Admiral Stark the position of the National Committee was his wish that
Admiral Stark would inform Washington. General Catroux made the
point that his chances of success in the forthcoming discussions with
General Giraud would be enhanced if Washington did not oppose the
suggestions he intended to make. He subtly requested American
support by expressing hope that it would be possible to inform General
Giraud of the opinion of the American authorities in regard to the
proposals for the unification of French action.
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Catroux and Massigli sounded a positive note when they empha-
sized that unity could be achieved only in a spirit of reconciliation in
the true spirit of fraternity. Only those who had deliberately destroyed
their country or aided the enemy would be excluded. All others would
be welcomed to the national effort to revive France to restore her
position in the world.
Admiral Stark agreed to report the efforts of the National Commit-
tee to Washington, saying he was sure there would be no opposition to
any constructive efforts to achieve the unity of French forces so long
urged by the President. He was sure that if an expression of their
9
opinion would help, it would be forthcoming. A summary of the con-
versation was reported to Washington by the Embassy on the basis of
information received from Admiral Stark.
Before leaving London for Algiers on April 16, General Catroux
explained to Winant and to Eden separately the outline of the proposals
he was authorized to make to General Giraud. General dc Gaulle made
it a point to inform Eden himself that he personally approved the formula
Catroux was taking to Algiers and that he was confident of an early agree-
ment. Once again, General de Gaulle stated a desire to visit Algiers to
complete the unification of French forces. However, and perhaps
9. Ibid.
10. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, (6 vols. ,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964),
vol. 2, p. 94.
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significantly because it implied a more cautious approach than hereto-
fore, General de Gaulle wanted to go to Algiers only after General
Giraud accepted the basic principles proposed. The purpose of the
visit then, was to work out the details of unification not to effect it in
principle. The statement the National Committee issued on the results
of the deliberations only referred to the "importance" of a visit by
General de Gaulle to Algiers and did not include the significant proviso
1 2the General expressed to Eden.
It was obvious to Winant and to Murphy, as it must have been to
Kittredge and Admiral Stark, that General de Gaulle and the National
Committee were engaged in the concluding and crucial phase of what
can best be described as a power drive to dominate the French war
effort, early unification of which was anticipated. The principle of
separation of civil and military authority found no doubt sincere and
devout adherents among the members of the National Committee, as an
essential part of the French democratic and republican tradition. It
was also a useful means or tool by which the Fighting French could
subvert General Giraud' s authority by dividing it. By making General
Giraud the nominal head of a unified authority, but also by divesting
him of his military authority, the Fighting French thought they could
shelve him.
11. Kittredge Diary, April 16, 1943.
12. De Gaulle, Charles, Uni ty- Documents , (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1959), "p. 143.
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General de Gaulle would be made War Commissioner, regardless
of whether General Giraud retained his military authority or civil
authority in the capacity as President of the unified body. In this
position, General de Gaulle would have control over the Secret Army
or resistance groups in metropolitan France. The implications for the
future course of events were tremendous, because then General de Gaulle
would have a decided advantage among the active patriots in France
whose support would be necessary when France would be liberated.
For this reason, General de Gaulle was prepared to accept a position
nominally inferior to that of General Giraud, although he was bitterly
opposed to any arrangement whereby General Giraud would in actuality
be in the superior position. Hence, the unalterable insistence upon the
principle of separation of civil and military authority.
By intimations and statements of Gaullist leaders and officials, it
was evident that General de Gaulle was coming out clearly in favor of a
provisional government. The position was strongly appealing to the
segment of French opinion that sincerely felt France would fare better
in the councils of the victors with a provisional government than without
one. It also appealed to opportunists who sought places within that
government. By endorsing or at least encouraging the concept of a.
provisional government, the Gaullists were in a stronger position than
General Giraud. The Gaullists could allege that General Giraud had the
support of the United States in opposing the renaissance of a strong
France capable of taking care of its own interests and most decidedly
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not subordinate to the Allies. Murphy noted that this trend had been
encouraged in North Africa by articles in the press and confusion in
the public mind over General Giraud' s views, of which there still was
considerable support. General de Gaulle exploited this confusion to
strengthen his claim that only under his leadership could real French
1 O
unity be achieved.
General Giraud sought to counter this confusion by publication
of his proposals, with an appropriate explanation. It was necessary for
General Giraud to reassure public opinion in North Africa and in metro-
politan France that he could and would maintain both contact and support
with all elements and that the Council would allow their representatives
to have a voice in the trusteeship of French affairs. So long as any
spirit of loyalty to Vichy pervaded some important French Army and
Navy circles, it was also necessary to counteract it by General Giraud
demonstrating progress towards unity. Murphy thought that if the
United States continued to rearm the North African French Army pur-
suant to the Anfa agreement, it would help bolster General Giraud.
Another step would be the removal of some Vichy-tainted senior
officers at the rapidly approaching successful conclusion of the
Tunisian campaign.
The reports General Catroux sent General de Gaulle from Algiers




wore more encouraging than any he had previously sent, even though he
reported there was still disagreement over some questions. General
Giraud protested against the continuing Fighting French recruitment
of seamen from North African French ships. This issue was relatively
minor in comparison with the question of the relation of civil and
military authorities. General Giraud insisted that the head of the civil
authority should be the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces.
Since the French constitution provided for the President of the Republic
to be the Supreme Commander
,
the head of the civil authority to be
formed should at least have nominal command of the military forces.
General Catroux pointed out that the head of the state under the constitu-
tion was not the active leader of the armed forces and he continued to
15insist upon the separation of civil and military authority.
What was really encouraging about Catroux' reports was his
recommendation that General de Gaulle go to North Africa at once.
General Giraud had suggested a site for their meeting in a quiet place
away from Algiers and free from distracting influences. The two
1 6generals agreed upon Marrakesh. Catroux had reversed his stand
of a few weeks before when he advised General de Gaulle to delay his
visit to Algiers, presumably because he felt at that time that conditions
in North Africa were not ripe for such a visit. But now he expressly





told General de Gaulle that the only way to resolve the outstanding
issues was in a personal meeting with General Giraud. When agreement
would be reached, the two generals could then return to Algiers. 17
The reason General Giraud wished to meet with General de Gaulle
away from Algiers was exactly the reason General de Gaulle wished to
meet there. General de Gaulle hoped that public demonstrations and
other indications of physical support for Fighting France would
strengthen his hand. Indeed, General de Gaulle's supporters in Algiers
were arranging a maximum demonstration on the occasion of his arrival
18there. He was correct in his apprehensions that while in North Africa
he would be in the other camp and to that extent he was probably wise
in not wishing to be placed in a relatively obscure spot where additional
pressures might be brought to bear, but rather wishing to meet where
he deemed his maximum support to exist. Whether such apprehensions
were in fact justified under the then current circumstances was a
matter of judgment. Catroux thought they were not. General de Gaulle
and the National Committee disagreed.
The annoyance and opposition Catroux' suggestion of a meeting
place aroused at Carlton Gardens, the Fighting French headquarters,
was sufficient to send Massigli on April 29 to Eden to request that
17. Ibid.
, p. 157.
18. Kittredge memorandum, April 30, 1943, in "Selected Docu-
ments from Correspondence of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.
Navy, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, " (herein-
after referred to as COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, p. 49.
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Macmillan suggest to Giraud that the meeting be held in Algiers, since
the Fighting French mission in North Africa was there. A similar
request was made of Admiral Stark to have Robert Murphy suggest to
Giraud that, the site of the meeting be changed. Admiral Stark declined
to interfere in what he considered to be a question that must be settled
19 ? namong Frenchmen. Ambassador Winant heartily agreed. cu
The issue that kept the two generals apart was the question of
where they would meet. In a speech at Grosvenor House on May 7,
General dc Gaulle gave General Giraud cause to break off negotiations
by severely deprecating the North African regime. * This speech was
more of a demonstration of frustration and oratorical skill than it was
an example of wisdom, tact and diplomacy. It thoroughly disgusted
Massigli, who had again confided to Admiral Stark his intention to quit
the National Committee if an agreement were not reached with General
Giraud. Catroux felt his role as a negotiator had been terminated by
General de Gaulle's choice of using the radio to conduct his own
22 .'
negotiations. Churchill, who was in Washington, told Hull the next
week that he personally was "utterly disgusted" with General de Gaulle.
Admiral Stark was at long last losing patience with the General He
thought a blow torch should be used, if necessary, to help produce
19. Ibid.
20. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, vol. 2, p. 108.
21. Soustelle, Envers et centre tout , vol. 2, pp. 236-241.
22. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 2, p. 108.
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either an agreement or a definite break, but in any case to end the
constant "fiddling and bickering" in one way or the other. 23
Realizing that he may have gone too far, or at least taking a more
diplomatic tack, General de Gaulle wrote a courteous letter on May 6 to
General Giraud in which he cogently explained his reasons for wanting
to meet in Algiers, as well as other points at issue. 24 The existence
of this letter was apparently not known to Admiral Stark and his staff,
at least no indication of it was found in the American files. Finally, on
May 17, General Giraud agreed to meet General de Gaulle in Algiers at
once and he urged the formation of a central "Executive Committee. "
General Catroux telegraphed the terms of this letter to General de Gaulle
on May 18. In his reply to Catroux the next day, the General saw
nothing of importance separating him and General Giraud, and recalled
him to London immediately. General Catroux departed Algiers on May
20 to return a week later. In the meantime General de Gaulle and
the National Committee had accepted General Giraud 1 s proposals and
General de Gaulle was at last on his way to Algiers. He arrived on
May 30.
23. Stark to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, May 21, 1943,
COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, p. 51.
24. De Gaulle, Unity-Documents, p. 160.
25. Ibid.
, p. 166.
26. General Catroux, Dans la bataille de Mediterranee , (Paris:
Rene Juillard, 1949), p. 360.
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With General de Gaulle's departure from London and the rapid
formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, the necessity
of a representative in London for consultations on political as opposed
to military questions passed. Changing conditions gave rise to new
arrangements and the shift of the center of French activity from London
to Algiers also shifted the center of discussions.
Admiral Stark and his staff still provided what assistance they
could, although in fact they were no longer intimately connected with
the political side of relations with the French. Admiral Stark sent
Kittrcdge to North Africa to assist Murphy and General Eisenhower
from May 25 to June 14. While in North Africa, Kittredge compiled
several thorough and astute reports which he delivered personally to
the Secretaries of State and the Navy when he returned to the United
States from June 18 to July 30.
Even though it was not until after the Quebec Conference in August
1943 that Admiral Stark was officially relieved of his diplomatic duties
which reverted to the Embassy, for all practical purposes the removal
of the center of activity to Algiers terminated the diplomatic activities
of Admiral Stark in regard to the French.
The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation
provided a superficial unity of the French war effort. It did not decide
which faction would ultimately triumph. The first few weeks saw
stormy meetings and violent controversies, until at last General de
Gaulle emerged in the dominant role, a position he had long coveted.
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Subsequent behavior and policies of the French can to a great degree
be explained by the attitudes and outlooks the Fighting French carried
over into the French Committee of National Liberation. For this reason,
it is important to examine them as they existed in May 1943.
Admiral Stark realized the usefulness in Washington of as com-
plete an exposition as possible of the attitudes of the Fighting French
particularly during Churchill's visit in May 1943. On May 21, he
sent to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, a description of the attitudes
of the Fighting French and of the legal and political bases of French
unity, which Kittredge prepared. The description was based on conver-
sations held with members of Fighting France, who were not members
of the National Committee, except Andre' Philip. Admiral Stark thought
27
it was a good picture of the French situation.
One of the more pronounced features of the Gaullist attitude,
Kittredge explained, was its anti- American nature, which was based
on what they saw as the American tendency to adopt expedients in the
name of a "realist" policy. The Gaullists saw these expedients as
consistently being at the expense of France. A current story was that
the United States was endeavoring to persuade Italy to leave the war,
and possibly to join in the action against Germany, in return for French
territories, such as Nice, Savoy, Tunis and Corsica. This story
27. Stark to Knox, May 21, 1943, Kittredge memorandum,
May 21, 1943, COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3, pp. 53-59-
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originated in General de Gaulle's headquarters at Carlton Gardens and
was also spread by the de Gaulle mission in Algiers. It was repeated
to Admiral Stark by visiting French resistance leaders. 28 The Gaullists
evidently found the anti-American line useful to pursue when the negotia-
tions with General Giraud were deadlocked.
The anti -American attitude was by no means held by all the
Fighting French, but it was prevalent among the extremist group, who,
as distinguished from the moderate group, based it on American
support for General Giraud. They saw the Giraud regime in North
Africa as a creation by the United States of a third French faction,
which was neither Gaullist nor Pe'tainist. Rather it was a bastard brand
of Vichy fascism, willing to cooperate with the Allies so it could join
in the spoils of victory, now that it was convinced the Germans would
lose the war. They reasoned the unjustified American support for this
regime justified the extremist anti-American line.
The position of the extremists was based on theoretical and
judicial arguments. To them the war was against fascism. It was not
limited solely to fighting against Hitler and Mussolini, but also against
Petain, Laval, Darlan and their followers and sympathizers . For this
reason, the organization of the French war effort would determine the
future of France. The North African Army would almost certainly be




army was officered by men of conservative and at times fascist tenden-
cies, it was conceivable that a fascist regime could be installed in post-
war France. In such a case, France would still have lost the war. The
extremists could not and did not know that President Roosevelt was
contemplating a military government, at least at the top levels of the
French government, following the liberation, to forestall such an
29accession to power of any French fascists. In that case the installa-
tion of a fascist regime probably would not have been tolerated. Every-
thing considered, it is just as well that the extremists were ignorant of
the President's intentions.
The moderates were described as the party of expediency. They
insisted that General de Gaulle reach an immediate agreement with
General Giraud on common military action and joint representation of
French interests to the Allies. Other controversial political, legal
and economic questions should be left for later determination. The
moderates criticized the extremists' arguments as being theoretical and
not strictly relevant to the practical problems of the moment. There
could be no hope for the liberation of France or for the restoration of
republican traditions, they pointed out, except by the action of the Allied
armies. The most effective contribution the French could make towards
the desired goals of liberation and restoration of the Republic was by
unified action, not only in the resistance forces within France, but
29. Foreign Relations of the. United States, 1943, vol. 2, p. 111.
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also among all Frenchmen everywhere. Thus unity was more important
than politics. When victory would bo achieved over the Germans on the
continent, it would be time to take up political issues.
General Catroux and several military leaders formed the core of
the moderates. Massigli was the only civilian commissioner to join
them. The extremist group included the civilians Philip, Pleven,
Diethelm. They were joined by Admirals Auboyneau and d'Argenlieu.
Naturally, it was led by General de Gaulle.
Since the extremist group ultimately triumphed not only in the
newly formed French Committee of National Liberation, but also in
establishing the provisional government of France in Paris following
the liberation of August 1944, the extremi sts'justification of Fighting
France, their case against General Giraud (with its anti- American
implications) and their conditions for unification are of more than
routine interest. They shed considerable light on the reasons for the
Gaullists' intransigence and the insistence upon the political side of the
questions raised, at times to the seeming exclusion of military considera-
tions. In this respect the description Kittredge prepared of the views of
the Fighting French based on conversations which he and Admiral Stark
held with various members of the Fighting French, was quite complete.
The Fighting French advanced to Kittredge several reasons for
their leadership of the French movement, Chief ainong them was the
30. Kittredge memorandum, May ?A , 1943.
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claim of legitimacy derived from the last legitimate government of the
Third Republic, and sustained by constant resistance to both the Germans
and to the Vichy brand of fascism. The leadership of the National Com-
mittee and General de Gaulle had been recognized by Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and other Allied governments. Until the United States
installed a rival regime in North Africa, there never was any question
of any other leadership of the French war effort. The British by turn-
ing over the administration of Syria, Somaliland and Madagascar to the
National Committee recognized that body as trustee of French interests.
The resistance organizations and public opinion in general as expressed
by leaders of the various political parties in metropolitan France
supported General de Gaulle and the National Committee.
Finally, in the absence of the ability to form a French government
in accordance with normal constitutional procedures, French political
leaders and officials gave informal recognition or acknowledgement to
the National Committee as the body qualified to represent French
interests. General de Gaulle received letters from the Presidents of
the French Senate, Jules Jeanneny, and the Chamber of Deputies,
Edouard Herriot, indicating their support as the only means of a solution
to the problems troubling France, and as the repository of political
legitimacy. Such pledges of support from, political leaders and officials
constituted, in the eyes of the Fighting French, a quasi-legal basis for
recognition of the. National Committee under the leadership of General
de Gaulle until the time came when the French people could freely
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choose their own government.
The arguments against the legitimacy of the North African regime
proceeded from those supporting the claims of the National Committee,
Kittredge reported. Since General Giraud had repudiated the armistice
and the authority of Vichy, he could not claim legitimacy derived from
that regime, or its successor in North Africa, the Darlan Imperial
Council. Foreign powers were without authority to designate French
commanders. Hence, the American and British appointment of Giraud
to command French forces had no legal effect. Since General Giraud'
s
authority in its inception came from Vichy appointees and was subsequent-
ly sustained by Allied action, both these reasons vitiated his then present
authority as civil and military commander. Thus, the Fighting French
rejected this claim.
The National Committee was unable to recognize either the
legality or the validity of any independent actions taken by General
Giraud which involved the application of French laws or the representa-
tion of French interests. Even though General Giraud absolved the
North African Army of its oath of personal allegiance to Marshal Petain,
their loyalty to republican traditions was questioned. Similarly, the
Fighting French questioned the right of General Giraud to enforce the
national conscription laws. Therefore, the Fighting French were
justified in helping men who wished to leave the North African forces
to join Fighting France.
Assuming the basic premise of legitimacy residing in Fighting
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France, these were formidable arguments which on their own terms
would justify total elimination of General Giraud and his supporters
from the French movement. Hence, the extremists considered it a
measure of generosity when they offered to extend under certain
conditions to General Giraud and his North African forces the Gaullist
legitimacy, moral support and recognition by the French people. One
condition was the elimination from the North and West African adminis-
tration of all persons who were Vichy appointed, who had actively
collaborated with the Germans and who were fascist sympathizers.
For all of these cumulative reasons, the National Committee felt
that any agreement with General Giraud should not compromise them.
Rather the agreement should provide for the. assumption by the central
body of the authority and status of a provisional government, rather
than si?nply that of an administrator of overseas territories. Precognition
by Allied Governments of this body as the true representative of French
interests was necessary. Finally, the higher ranks of the North African
Army and civil administration must be purged of all persons of doubtful
loyalty to democratic and republican ideals.
The extremists felt that their conditions for an agreement were
not only justified by logic and theory, as described by Kittredge, but
also by existing facts. They saw little or no support for General Giraud
in North Africa. In fact, they reasoned that without American support,
General Giraud would lose what backing he had, and French West and
North Africa would go over to Fighting France. Because the British
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had turned Syria, Madagascar and Somaliland over to the National
Committee, the extremists saw no reason for British opposition to
the addition of West and North Africa to Fighting France. The only
reason the British supported General Giraud in any way, they con-
cluded, was solely due to American influence. From this rationale, it
is not difficult to understand either the basis for or the depth of the
extremists' anti-American feeling.
The Fighting French were, not at all insensitive to the strained
relations with Washington. While Generals Giraud and de Gaulle v/ere
haggling over the place, for their meeting, Adrieh Tixier, the head of
the Fighting French delegation to Washington, who was then in London,
called on Admiral Stark on May 7 to discuss Gaullist-American rela-
3
1
tions. Tixier felt the irritation that existed between Carlton Gardens
and Washington resulted from a mutual failure to understand each
other's intentions and policies.
Tixier tactfully stated the Fighting French grievances against
American policy in North Afric a. He personally regretted certain acts
and statements of General de Gaulle and the National Committee. He
referred to the exclusion of Fighting French participation in the North
African campaign and subsequent political developments as grounds for
the Fighting French conclusion that the United States was deliberately
maintaining in power the present regime in North Africa. He hoped for
31. Kittredge memorandum, May 7, J 943, Box 204, File:
May 1943, COMNAVEU files.
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a successful conclusion to the negotiations in progress in North Africa.
While Admiral Stark earnestly expressed his own desire for an
agreement, he confessed he found it difficult to understand General de
Gaulle's hesitancy to meet General Giraud at any place in North Africa,
particularly since the views of both men appeared to have coincided.
He repeated the American policy of urging the vital necessity of such a
union of French action in the war. This was the limit to which his
authority and discretion would permit him to go.
In explaining the differences that still separated the two French
camps, Tixier emphasized that decisions made at that time would
definitely affect the condition and the later development of French
political activity in the re-establishment of republican government in
France after the liberation. There were other problems, notably the
residual Vichy officials who were still exercising authority in North
Africa. Regardless of their present politics, the past acts and policies
of these men could never be forgotten or forgiven. They must go.
Nothing could be resolved by this conversation. But it did indicate
an awareness by the National Committee of a strain in relations with the
United States. Tixier never established a reputation for skillful
diplomacy and tact. Aside from his position as head of the delegation
to Washington, the choice of him to make such representations is curious
Perhaps it was because he belonged to the extremist group. The
minutes of this conversation contained no adjectives indicating cordiality
or other positive tones.
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What this conversation did accomplish was to restate both positions
and to underline the fundamental dichotomy. Tixier spoke from the
position of the extremists and emphasized the necessity of an agreement
for practical military -reasons, with political questions being subordinated.
Even though each man may have understood the position of the other,
their conversation revealed no real meshing of policies. Indeed there
could be none, because the positions froin which each spoke were in a
large measure antithetical.
While General de Gaulle was preparing to embark for Algiers
to conclude arrangements for the unification of French forces outside
of France, Jean Moulin succeeded in unifying the resistance forces
within metropolitan France. This audacious and resourceful man,
known as Rex in the resistance, presided over the first meeting of
32
the National Council of the Resistance in Paris on May 25, 1943.
This meeting signified a more efficient and effective domestic French
resistance movement to conduct sabotage operations against the Germans
and to wage the battle of the interior when the time was ripe following
the expected Allied invasion of the continent. It also signified the
triumph of General de Gaulle in unifying and in establishing formally
his control over the resistance movement. In this way General de Gaulle
established himself and his movement in France. When the Allies
arrived a year later, they would find as complete a Gaullist infra-
32. Colonel Passy (Andre Dewavrin), Missions Secretes en France ,
(Paris: Librairie Plon, 1951), p. 240.
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structure as courage, hard work and patriotism could construct.
The reasons for the creation of the Resistance Council were
twofold: efficiency and politics. A centralized organization could
coordinate operations, direct the flow of supplies from England and
conduct espionage against the Germans on a larger scale. The Resis-
tance Council was intended to form the nucleus of a reduced national
representation. Indeed, under the circumstances it was the only
national representation possible, whatever its limitations. General de
Gaulle was the president of the Resistance Council and would maintain
contact with it through his delegate, at first Jean Moulin and later
Georges Bidault. There was no doubt that the Resistance Council was
to be under the direction of General de Gaulle and the National Committee
The instructions the General gave Jean Moulin in this respect were
quite specific.
The ultimate goal was to insure that the liberation and victory
were French, as General de Gaulle explained in his message to the
34first meeting of the Resistance Council. To achieve this goal it was
an imperative necessity that the nation organize for itself a concerted
French effort. The Resistance Council was to be the focal point of all
the energies of the metropole against both the Germans and the collabo-
rationists in the struggle for victory and liberation.
33. De Gaulle, Unity- Documents , pp. 134-135.
34. Passy, Missions Secretes en France, p. 239.
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The resistance groups did become organized to the extent that
they were called a "Secret Army". Subsequent events in 1944 showed
the efficacy of this organization. However, in their inception many
organizations spontaneously arose in the Occupied Zone soon after the
1940 armistice was concluded. At the end of 1940 the British Govern-
ment set up a Special Operations Executive, or S. O.E. , to maintain
contact with the resistance groups. Later, after the United States had
entered the war, the Allies agreed that the S. O. E. should act as the
coordinating authority to deal with the general staffs of the Allied
Governments in preparing and coordinating resistance activities with
Allied military operations.
By the summer of 1942 General de Gaulle realized that perhaps
the most significant military contribution the French could make in the
war effort would be by organizing and coordinating resistance activities
in France. Accordingly, he made fairly detailed plans and he requested
considerable material aid. During the summer of 1942, arrangements
were made in London for support of the French resistance movement.
The S. O.E. was to be the overall coordinator and the American Office
of Strategic Services (O. S. S. ) was to supply additional material and
personnel as required.
The North African operation and the subsequent establishment of
35. Kittredge memorandum, May 6, 1943, Enclosure (A) to




the Darlan regime worked radical changes in the relationship of the
French to Allied planning. The establishment of a third major French
group produced a potential rival to General de Gaulle and the National
Committee for dominance of the resistance movement in metropolitan
France. The Fighting French increased pressure on the Allied staffs
to recognize General de Gaulle and the National Committee as the
channel through which support of the resistance movement should be
provided. The Anglo-American alliance in this instance was somewhat
embarrassed by American backing of General Giraud while the British
continued to back General de Gaulle.
The arrival in North Africa of officers from the Vichy Armistice
Army gave the Fighting French some grounds for their anxiety over
the possibility of rival resistance organizations. However, a compromise,
of sorts was devised in London in November and December 1942, by
which the O. S. S. assumed responsibility for coordinating resistance
activities in the Mediterranean regions of France, presumably with
the participation of those former Vichy Army Officers. The S Q O. E.
retained its original jurisdiction, as it were, over the greater part of
France. Both the O. S„ S. and the S. O. E. cooperated to a great extent
and the division of jurisdiction was apparently of little practical
importance .
By the spring of 1943, the resistance groups in France had
become large enough for serious consideration of sending arms and
other material to a force which the resistance leaders claimed
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numbered 150, 000. General de Gaulle had directed Jean Moulin at
the end of February to consolidate the resistance movement into the
Resistance Council. The resistance had become large enough and
sufficiently well organized to raise its level of operations from local
sabotage and intelligence gathering to sustaining a veritable Secret
Army, capable of waging the coming battle of the interior. The amount
of supplies required and the aircraft for their delivery would not be
small items. Clearly, this was a matter for discussion and eventual
determination at the level of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Matters had
reached this point when General de Gaulle departed London for Algiers
on May 30.
Admiral Stark and his staff were generally well-informed about
the organizations and plans of the resistance groups. On March 5,
General de Gaulle sent four resistance leaders who were temporarily
in London to give Admiral Stark a first hand account of the resistance,
after they had talked to General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff. Among the four were Jean Moulin and Emmanuel
d'Astier, a brother of General Francois d'Astier.
All four men were emphatic in their insistance that the French
resistance organizations accept the leadership of General de Gaulle.
They informed Admiral Stark that since October, 1942, the leadership
of the resistance movements had been unified under a directory of
General de Gaulle's representatives, of whom d'Astier and Moulin were
two. The resistance groups considered themselves Gaullists, which in
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France was synonymous with resistance to Germans and to Vichy
iborators. They looked to General de Gaulle for direction and for
collaboration with the British and American Governments. The resis-
tance had penetrated nearly all existing French Government services
and they had been assured of all the support of highly placed officials
in nearly all of them. Finally, they gave Admiral Stark a description
of current operations and the planning and conduct of the battle of the
interior, as well as an outline of the supplies required for a successful
prosecution of their plans. '
One evident French purpose was to persuade the Allies to admit
them to the Allied Staffs for planning any contemplated activities of the
resistance groups and for insuring the maximum of coordination with
the Allies when the cross -channel operation would take place. Colonel
Pierre Billotte, of General de Gaulle's staff, frankly admitted that
security was a problem. But he felt that if only a few Fighting French
liaison officers were given sufficient information to coordinate the
activities of the Secret Army, the inclusion of an unduly large number
of the Fighting French in the secrets disclosed would be avoided. The
claim was made that coordinated Secret Army activity could reduce
38German counter-activity on D-Day by at least one third.
37. Kittredge memorandum, March 5, 1943, COMNAVEU
Documents, vol. 3, p. 34.
38. Matthews to Hull, Telegram 179], March 13, 1943, U.S.
National Archives, Department of State , 851.01/1058.

267
General do Gaulle was giving these discussions special attention.
He had already held discussions with General Sir Alan Brooke and he
spoke to Admiral Stark specifically about it. He felt it was a matter
that ought to be considered by the highest American authorities and by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 3 The substance of the talks was reported
to Washington by Freeman Matthews of the Embassy to the Secretary of
40State, and by Admiral Stark in a personal letter to Admiral Ernest J.
King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. 41
Emmanuel d'Astier discussed the resistance movement again
with Admiral Stark on April 30. He urged the immediate consideration
by the British and American staffs of the problem of the coordination
of the resistance movement activities with present and future allied
operations. While he repeated much of what had already been said, he
did give some interesting details, such as the existence of 102 airfields
suitable for landing aircraft delivering supplies to the resistance and
comments on the state of German morale.
D'Astier insisted again that all anti-German sentiment was
Gaullist. Although few of the Gaullists in France knew anything of
General de Gaulle as a man, they all knew him as a symbol of unrelenting,
active opposition to the Germans and to the collaborators. Ever since
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., Also Matthews to Hull, Telegram 1792, March 13, 1943,
U.S. National Archives, Department of State , 851.01/10 59.
41. COMNAVEU Documents, vol. 3. p. 33.
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June 1940 he had expressed by radio what the majority of Frenchmen
had felt. Although most of the resistance groups were by necessity
autonomous and independent at that time, they nevertheless looked to
General de Gaulle and to his staff for leadership and they expected to
cooperate with the Allies through General de Gaulle's staff. He warned
that since General Giraud had no following in France, the elimination
of General de Gaulle would probably mean the resistance groups would
act independently of any other French group and of the Allies. In other
words, d'Astier told Admiral Stark that only General de Gaulle could
be counted on to produce the cooperation and coordination of the sizeable
Secret Army.
When General de Gaulle left London for AJgiers on May 30, his
purpose was to come to an agreement with General Giraud for the
unification of French forces outside of France. Such an agreement
would put him in a position where he could eventually dominate the
entire French war effort. A vital part of his almost mystic claim to
legitimacy was the support he alleged by the French people in France.
The primary indicator of this support was the adherence of the resis-
tance groups to "Gaullism, " even if to many of them it meant only
active opposition to the Germans and to the Vichy collaborators. Thus
in the short run the establishment of the Resistance Council and its
expression of loyalty to General de Gaulle was of crucial importance.
42. Enclosure (M) to Kittredge memorandum, May 6, 1943.
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The meaning for the future was equally apparent to him. If a large
part of the liberation of France could be accomplished by the Secret
Army, loyal to General de Gaulle, he would be in an extremely strong,
if not virtually impregnable, position to control the provisional
government of France following the liberation.
It is a curious phenomenon that for all of the astute political
insight and sagacity exhibited by American Embassy and Navy officials
in London at that time, their dispatches, memoranda and letters, did
not reveal an awareness of this possibility. The absence of such a
conclusion is even more curious in the light of their undoubted knowledge
of the distrust of General de Gaulle by the President and the Secretary of
State, who saw the General as a potential dictator. This distrust was
in no way allayed by General de Gaulle's Grosvenor House speech on
May 4, at which time Murphy, Macmillan and Catroux, among others
took it for an open confession of a drive for personal power. Murphy
cabled their apprehensions to Hull in Washington. Catroux went
even farther and recommended that the American and British Govern-
ments, possibly through Admiral Stark, take a firm stand by expressing
their support of French unity, and also their opposition to General de
Gaulle's drive for personal power. Neverthless, the Secret Army
was seen only in a military context with little or no recorded thought
to its political implications.
43. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943
,







Any attempt to draw conclusions from an examination of the
conduct of United States relations with General de Gaulle and the
Fighting French is fraught with difficulties. Both sides looked at
the major issues from entirely different viewpoints. Washington
constantly complained that General de Gaulle was more interested in
politics than in pursuing the war. General de Gaulle, feeling victory
was inevitable, devoted the bulk of his time and energy towards
assuring a position for France among the victors. This position would
be consonant with her status as a great power. Since Fighting France
commanded far less military resources than the United States or Great
Britain, the position of France would have to be achieved by political
means. Thus the stage was set for real difficulties, which were in
their turn exacerbated by the conflicting personalities of the main
players.
United States policy towards General de Gaulle and the French
National Committee was anything but sympathetic. American and French
interests conflicted on more than one occasion. In addition, the person-




Where the President sought to guide and at times to manipulate General
de Gaulle, the General stood firm and remained intransigent. Moreover,
the President suspected the General of harboring aspirations for personal
power and the General in turn suspected the President of a fundamental
hostility towards French interests. The fact the evidence shows neither
suspicion was really justified is not as important as the fact that both
men thought they were.
Admiral Stark in London and General Eisenhower in Algiers were
caught between these upper and nether millstones. That they succeeded
in retaining the confidence of the President and gaining that of the
General, or at least establishing and keeping good relations with him,
speaks well of their sagacity and diplomatic skill.
The Gaullist press, their publicists and their supporters
criticized American policy more frequently than not. Most of the
criticism was centered on American reluctance or failure to pursue
French interests as assiduously as the United States Government pur-
sued its own. Domestic American critics also attacked United States
policy on ideological lines. They favored embracing General de Gaulle
as the courageous hero of French resistance to Hitler and to the un-
popular Vichy regime. Both criticisms were far from the mark.
The United States Government, as any government must, had to
identify its interests and then pursue them. It is fair ground for the
contemporary critic or the historian in later years to take issue with
the identification of these interests and with how they were pursued.
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The purpose of this study was not so much to comment on this point,
as it was to examine how those interests were pursued by Admiral
Stark in London and to elucidate any lessons that might be learned.
The over-riding interest of the United States in 1942 and 1943
was the successful prosecution of the war to the unconditional surrender
of the Axis. Whether military considerations should have taken
precedence over political considerations in regard to post-war settle-
ments was not particularly relevant to this inquiry. The fact was the
President was determined to win the war before making political
commitments. For American policy this objective was paramount.
That General de Gaulle early saw the Axis inevitably losing and
sought to achieve his political goals as a result of the war is relevant.
Herein lay the essential divergence of French and American views,
which may also be explained in terms of their relative power or lack of
it. The United States as a dominant partner in the Allied camp could
be expected to wield sufficient weight as to have no doubt that its views
would prevail in any post-war settlement. Fighting France, on the
other hand, lacking the great power of the United States, would have
to be in an advantageous political position at the end of the war in order
to influence any settlement. Therefore, political maneuvering was far
more important for General de Gaulle than it was for President Roosevelt.
Much mischief arose out of this divergence.
The ultimate military operation was to be a cross channel attack
to liberate the continent of Europe. Before it could be attempted,
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Allied Planners felt it was necessary to invade North Africa. This
first operation would relieve pressure on Egypt, reduce the danger of
Suez falling to the Nazis, and end the possibility of German use of
Dakar and the threat such an eventuality posed to the security of the
Western hemisphere. Once North Africa was in Allied hands, the way
would be clear for attacks on Sicily and Italy.
In planning the North African invasion, Operation TORCH, the
Fighting French were deliberately excluded at the specific insistance
of the President. Aside from any personal prejudices the President
may have had, there were two good reasons for their exclusion. First
was the probable lack of security of secrets divulged to members of
the French National Committee. Leaks, unauthorized disclosures and
indiscretions in that group were more the rule than the exception. The
memory of the unsuccessful Dakar expedition of 1940 and the suspected
French leaks in security weighed heavily on the planners minds.
Second, the influence of General de Gaulle and the French National
Committee in North Africa was non-existent for all practical purposes.
One of the Allied aims was to obtain cooperation or at least non-resistance
by the French forces in North Africa. It was felt that the participation
of Fighting French forces would only induce resistance to the Allied
landings by the North African French.
Once the Axis had been eliminated from French North and West
Africa, the Allies sought to bring the Fighting French and the North
African French into some sort of a union to provide for a coordinated
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French war effort. Such a fusion could only be effected by the French
themselves. Even so, American and British interests and obligations
were deeply involved, or thought to be, in the conditions under which a
fusion might be brought about. The interplay of the three parties
produced a complicated political situation.
The United States in pursuing a policy directed only towards
unconditional surrender looked for a fusion of the French forces for
military purposes. General de Gaulle in pursuing a policy of restoring
France to her former position sought a fusion for political purposes.
The objectives of the United States not only differed from those of
General de Gaulle, but Washington also suspected his motives. The
^ legacy of St. Pierre and Miquelon was the lingering antipathy of
Secretary of State Hull towards General de Gaulle and his suspected
dictatorial aspirations. In addition, General de Gaulle's personality
and that of the President did not make for smooth relations under any
conditions.
Even if the United States had wished to install General de Gaulle
instead of General Giraud as civil and military commander in North
Africa, it would have been impossible, because he lacked the necessary
support there. Actually, the North African Army was actively opposed
to him at first. Murphy reported that Admiral Darlan had offered to
replace any official the Allies desired to remove, provided a qualified
replacement could be found, no matter what his politics. Murphy noted




General Calroux was aware of the practical limitations of
installing a Gaullist regime or even of establishing Gaullist influence
in North Africa. This was the reason he advised General de Gaulle as
late as March 1943 to delay going to North Africa. In London, General
de Gaulle and his supporters could have it both ways: complain of
obstruction of their attempts to unify the two French camps without'
having to accept responsibility for possible failure, because the British
prevented General de Gaulle from going to North Africa.
United States policy was crystal clear: we would deal with those
French authorities, wherever they might be, who were in effective
control of their own jurisdictions. This was the local authorities
doctrine which explained American policy towards the various parts of
the French Empire. Admiral Stark and General Bolte were directed to
consult with the French National Committee only when it exercised
control over areas which had become strategically important to the
United States.
The United States dealt only with those persons exercising
authority in North Africa. If this policy did not conform to General
de Gaulle's underlying political philosophy and concept of France,
1. Murphy to Hull and Davis, Telegram Algiers 6774, NAF 119,
231046Z January 1943, Box 204, Files: February 1943,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, files, Naval History




the United States can hardly be blamed justifiably on this count.
General de Gaulle was dealt with at least in proportion to his political
importance. However, his personality and skillful intransigence won
him more consideration from the Americans and the British than
could otherwise have been expected.
This study has been primarily concerned with the political issues
of a lesser magnitude and how they were dealt with by the United
States representatives to the French National Committee in London.
But it has been necessary to deal with the larger political issues,
conflicts and rivalries to place the area of main concern into a proper
perspective. Any evaluation of the actual conduct of United States
relations with Fighting France at this working level, as opposed to the
level of the personal diplomacy of the President, must necessarily
turn on how Admiral Stark performed his diplomatic duties.
The choice of Adiniral Stark for this delicate but important
diplomatic duty was a happy one. As a former Chief of Naval
Operations, he brought an enormous amount of prestige to his primary
duties as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. In this capacity
he was designated to conduct consultations with the French National
Committee for the conduct of the war. But the course of events soon
turned his collateral consultative functions on military matters into
those of a de facto ainbassador, dealing with political questions.
Of all the American and British leaders who dealt with General
de Gaulle in this period, Admiral Stark was the only one who actually
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got along well with him. Perhaps there was some form of inherent
compatibility- between the two professional military men, the one a
deep water sailor and the other a tank commander. Both were frank
and honest with each other and they enjoyed mutual respect. This is
not to say that both men were immune to anger, frustration and
irritations. The point remains that despite whatever difficultire may
have existed, personal relations between the two men never became
bitter. No breach was ever so serious as to be irreconcilable.
Admiral Stark's tasks included reporting functions as well as
conducting consultations. In both tasks he was fortunate in having the
assistance of Commander Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR. Kittredge
performed an invaluable staff service for Admiral Stark by Composing
countless memoranda, which were notable for their lucidity and keeness
of perception. Many of these memoranda were the basis for telegrams
sent from the Embassy in London to the State Department. History
has borne out their accuracy.
The specific problems dealt with by Admiral Stark were deriva-
tives of the larger political questions which were the specific concern
of the highest levels in London, Washington, Algiers and Carlton
Gardens. Despite their relatively minor importance, these problems
could have grown to major proportions if they had not been handled
properly. For example, Admiral Stark returned the "treachery
letter" General de Gaulle sent him in protest to the Ciark-Darlan
agreement on grounds that it was sent by mistake. The alternative
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would have been to make further conversations impossible.
Similarly, Admiral Stark had to tell General de Gaulle his trip
to Washington, scheduled for early December 1942, had been postponed
until late December. The Admiral was conversant with the President's
position as well as understanding that of General de Gaulle.
The question of recruitment of seamen was one issue that could
not be resolved in London. The ultimate solution was an acreementO
between General de Gaulle and General Giraud. But Admiral Stark did
succeed in reaching a compromise, which General de Gaulle repudiated
in a heavy-handed manner. That this repudiation did not do any
permanent damage testifies more to Admiral Stark's patience and his
good personal relations with General de Gaulle than it does to the
diplomacy of the General.
In the JAMAIQUE incident, Admiral Stark was protecting a
specific American interest. His order to place an armed gangway
watch on the ship was a determining factor in the sailing of the ship as
scheduled. He stood firm. He refused the blandishments of various
Fighting French officials to ask General de Gaulle to insure the timely
sailing of the ship. This firmness succeeded in frustrating Gaullist
attempts to wrest control of the ship and its crew.
Admiral Stark was only an interested bystander in the events
leading up to the British refusal to provide transportation for General
de Gaulle's proposed North African odyssey. The situation came to a
head when the Allied staff in Algiers replied in the: name of General
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Eisenhower and suggested a delay in General dc Gaulle's visit until
the Tunisian campaign ended. General de Gaulle took this message to
be a personal reply from General Eisenhower. He addressed a
stinging reply to him through the U. S. communications services.
Admiral Stark's tactful return to General de Gaulle of this reply saved
the General later embarrassment and avoided what would have been a
wholly unnecessary and unpleasant uproar.
In each of these incidents described, as well as in many other
minor ones. American relations were conducted with firmness, tact
and a notable absence of rancor, whatever may have been the private
feelings of Admiral Stark and Kittredge. This absence of rancor in
London was in direct contrast to the harsh comments of the President
to Churchill and the then prevailing State Department predilection
against General de Gaulle. While American officials in London may
not have agreed with General de Gaulle, they at least understood the
essential elements of the Fi rrhtin rr French nos i- t'or. ^nd th° Gaulli c ^
rationale. The same could not be said of Washington.
The conception of the role of France in the prosecution of the
war, or at the very least the role she should play, was central to
General de Gaulle's conception of the war and its aims. Out of this
conception it is possible to distill some essential strands of Gaullist
2. Memorandum, March 1, 1943, in "Selected Documents from
Correspondence of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy,




thought which, although circumstances may have changed, have them-
selves generally remained constant. Thus, it may truly be said that
the Gaullist era in France began on June 18, 1940 when General de
Gaulle raised high the flag of France and commenced his arduous
efforts to redeem his country's honor. Although this era was interrupted
from 1946 to 19 58, it continues today as the Fifth Republic.
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull cannot be blamed for
failing to anticipate the course of events for the ensuing quarter of a
century. But from such a perspective, it is possible to look back, to
analyze and to identify major strands or conceptions which have endured.
It may also be profitable to do so, since only General de Gaulle's
circumstances have changed dramatically, but not his conceptions.
This is not to say that General de Gaulle has necessarily failed to
keep up with the times, but rather that his assumptions and conceptions
are fundamental and not susceptible to changing circumstances.
The cornerstone of General de Gaulle's conception of France was
that she remained a great power. As such, France must be independent
of other powers. A third factor was the essential unity of France,
which was a product of her history and traditions. France was far
more than the sum of its parts. This concept lends a mystical tone to
General de Gaulle's concept of France. It also provided the basis for
his claim to legitimacy, if not to legality, in representing French
interests. These three elements run like red threads through the




Two corollaries may be derived from these elements of Gaullism.
The first was the essential unity of political realities and military
operations. The purpose of conducting military operations was to
preserve, protect, achieve or to create political realities. Politics
should govern military operations. The second corollary was a
suspicion of the United States. The Gaullists saw American opposition
to them, or at least non-acceptance of their position, as an expression
of hostility and not as an expression of American reluctance to concur
in their outlooks.
For sound tactical reasons, General de Gaulle did not stress
France's status as a great power to the President, although it was
central to his beliefs. He alluded to it in his letter to the President
when he stressed the necessity of a victory which would reconcile
France with herself and with her friends. Without such a victory
European reconstruction and the peace of the world would be
3jeopardized. Obviously, only a great power could carry such weight.
General de Gaulle, however, did remind Eden that France was a great
4power. '
General de Gaulle did stress the factor of independence to the
3. General de Gaulle to president Roosevelt, letter October 6,
1942, U.S. National Archives, Department of State,
851. 01/722 1/3.




President. He maintained that only Frenchmen could be the judge of
French interests. The French should be consulted each time there was
a question of French interests or of French participation in the war.
At least part of the basis of General de Gaulle's constant insistence on
French participation in the planning of military operations can be found
in this assertion. The remainder can be found in his concept of France
as a great power.
The factor of the essential unity of France is both difficult to
describe and to understand. It is a somewhat mystical conception in
which France exists over and above Frenchmen. It is a quality of
"nation-ness" which gives a legitimacy to those who apprehend it. In
this way, General de Gaulle who refused to accept the armistice of
1940, actually acted in accordance with the concept of the essential
unity of France, regardless of any legalistic rationale which may have
given colorable constitutional authority to the conclusion of the armis-
tice and later to the investiture of plenary powers in Marshal Petain.
The essential unity of France might be taken as an expression of
the soul of the nation, which can exist independently of the regularly
constituted national authority. It is an expression of French history,
which in previous troubled tiines produced figures such as Joan of Arc
and Henry IV to lead the nation to salvation. In this respect, Charles
de Gaulle was following a well-established historical pattern. It is
important to remember that no important civil or military leaders
in 194 joined General de Gaulle in continuing the fight and that he
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repeatedly offered to serve under anyone more qualified to head the
movement. Thus the mantle devolved on him.
Humility is a virtue not often ascribed to Charles de Gaulle, but
in 1940 it fit him. In the absence of any other leaders coming to the
fore, he held high the flag of France. Reluctantly and really by default,
General de Gaulle became the symbol of French courage and resistance.
By force of circumstances, the Fighting French in their own eyes
became a French moral entity.
Washington generally misperceived the moral content of the
Fighting French outlook. General de Gaulle's strong and difficult
personality and his policy of intransigence antagonized the President
and Secretary of State. Whether another leader of Fighting France
could have achieved results similar to those General de Gaulle,
ultimately achieved is an intriguing, but irrelevant question. The
point is Washington not only suspected General de Gaulle of dictatorial
aspirations, but also refused to make post-war political commitments.
The substantive differences were as important as the personality
differences
.
The perspective of time shows the American suspicions were
actually erroneous, although they may have been quite reasonable at
the time. In this respect, General de Gaulle must be held at least
partially accountable for his failure to convince Washington otherwise
by his diplomacy and by his acts of his real intentions. But such a
judgment should be tempered with a realization that in the State
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Department the Secretary, the Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, and the
Assistant Secretary, Adolf Berle, were genuinely and at times unreason-
ably hostile to General de Gaulle. Also, Admiral Leahy who, upon his
return from his post at Vichy, became Chief of Staff to the Commander-
in-Chief, exercised an anti-Gaullist influence.
While it cannot be said with certainty, there is sufficient evidence
to suggest that the American position may have hardened to a degree,
perhaps beyond changing, eight months before Admiral Stark commenced
formal consultations with the French National Committee in August 1942.
The Gaullist occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon in December 1941
under circumstances almost constituting a breach of faith, less than
three weeks after Pearl Harbor and in clear violation of expressed
hemisphere policy in the Act of Havana could only create a major stir.
It is not clear whether General de Gaulle appreciated the probable effect
on the United States of his unilateral and unexpected act. But it is clear
that he "viewed the situation as a purely internal French affair.
Here is a clue to General de Gaulle's greatness and to the weakness
of his politics. Whatever greatness history will give hirn, will probably
be because he very clearly and correctly saw the role that France
should play in the world, and with courage and skill he achieved that
role for France. If indeed, the honor a:id the soul of France were saved,
Charles de Gaulle must be given a large share of the credit.
Like a classical tr£tgic hero, General de Gaulle had a tragic flaw
which may unfairly in time bring him down, as it kept him down in the

early war years. That flaw was his viewing the world only through
French eyes, with neither regard nor sympathy for the interests, con-
cerns or politics of others. This myopia explained General de Gaulle's
genuine surprise over American reaction to the occupation of St. Pierre
and Miquelon. It also goes .a long way towards explaining why he was
not able after that to enjoy 'the confidence of Washington. He was
simply pro-French to a fault.
The saving grace of United States relations with Fighting France
was the good personal relations between Admiral Stark and General de
Gaulle, as well as those between Kittredge and the French staff. With-
out these bright spots the story might very well have been an unrelieved
one of suspicions, frustrations and recriminations. Whatever success
there was could be measured more in terms of people than of policy.

APPENDIX
In the mass of original documents contained in the files of Com-
mander, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, two were found to be of such
special interest that their publication is warranted. The first is a
rough draft by Captain Tracy B, Kittredge, USNR, of the background
and negotiations leading to the extension of Lend- Lease aid to the
Fighting French. Apparently Captain Kittredge intended this draft to be
part of his proposed history of United States - French relations, 1942-
1944. This Lend-Lease agreement was negotiated by Brigadier-General
Charles L. Bolte, at the request of Secretary of State Hull. Thus, it
did not fall strictly within the purview of Admiral Stark's diplomatic
duties. However, extension of Lend-Lease aid was an important aspect
of American relations with the Fighting French.
The text has not been edited beyond minor and obvious corrections.
Footnote references have been added for clarity. All documents referred
to in the footnotes can be found in Box 207, File: Lend-Lease, Comman-
der
, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, files, Naval History Division, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The second document is a telegram sent by Robert Murphy, Per-




of Stale on January 23, 1943. It is a spirited defense of American
policy in North Africa at that time. It has hitherto not been published,

Document I
Rough Draft by Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR
The collapse of France in June 1940 marked the end of the era of
cooperation and trust between France and the United States. At the
blackest moment when the French Government was considering surren-
der or flight to Africa, France appealed to the United States for help.
At that time, however, American opinion would not have backed an entry
into the war, and distance and lack of war material in the United States
barred any offer which might give France the hope of continued success.
Now France and all of her colonies could not be considered as a single
political entity, but only as a group of loosely connected units bound
together more by tradition than by control.
On Novem.be r 7, 1941, the French National Committee, under
General de Gaulle, controlled the very useful Pacific Ocean island of
New Caledonia, so situated as to be a much needed stationary aircraft
carrier and base from which to operate in the South Seas against any
Japanese invasion of Australia. The Committee also controlled French
Equatorial Africa, the Camcroons and Tchad: a strip running from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which could save almost




ment bound for the Middle East.
By a letter of November 11, 1941, President Roosevelt declared
that the defense of any French territory under the control of the French
National Committee was vital to the defense of the United States. For
almost a year Fighting France had been receiving Lend- Lease aid
through transfers of goods requested by British requisitions. The
French Purchasing Commission submitted requests received from the
French National Committee to the British Supply Council. If these
requests met with the approval of various British officials, a British
requisition was then prepared and submitted. French requirements
were submitted by the British as a part of British requirements, and
no separate allocations were made to the French. Their needs for
allocated products were included in allocations made to the British.
Bids for goods to be assigned by the Munitions Assignment Board were
made in behalf of the French by the British, and in all respects Lend-
Lease aid to French territories was handled just as if these territories
were a part of the British Empire.
The Army had bumped its nose twice, once in New Caledonia and
once in Brazzaville, at the advice of the State Department which could
not see in the French National Committee, already acknowledged and
recognized by eight European Governments-in-Exile , either a de facto
or de jure government. The General on the spot had been advised and
encouraged to come to local agreements in regard to any reciprocal aid
with the local governors. These governors, however, felt that since
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they had been appointed by the French National Committee, they should
report to and be guided by London, in accordance with the best tradi-
tions of French Bureaucracy. Since the Army plans for global warfare
required the organization of many territories, the State Department was
at last requested to arrange, some understanding with the French Nation-
al Committee. *
On July 29, 1942, the State Department cabled the American
Embassy in London, instructing them to have General Charles L. Bolte,
recently appointed, together with Admiral Harold R. Stark as Military
Representatives of the United States near the French National Committee,
exchange letters with the French National Committee, and cabled the
suggested text of a letter from the French National Committee which
would be acceptable to the United States. The Embassy was also
instructed to designate one of its officers to work with General Bolte as
a technical advisor. The State Department stressed the fact that the
Fighting French were not a government, but that they had been receiving
some lend-lease assistance from the United States. General Bolte was
to stress the past assistance, and secure General de Gaulle's agreement
that reciprocal aid should be provided immediately in African territories
and in New Caledonia. Information was also requested as to the names
of the authorities with whom the matter should be discussed in Africa
and in New Caledonia by the American Generals in the field.




The following day, July 30, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Counselor
of the Embassy, furnished General Bolte with copies of the State Depart-
ment cables and suggested that Mr. Alan N. Steyne, Second Secretary of
the Embassy, might be assigned to work with the General on the particu-
lar question of Lend- Lease aid. Mr. Steyne reported with drafts of two
proposed letters for General Bolte »s signature:
(a) Letter to General de Gaulle on African Rubber Supplies
(b) Letter to General de Gaulle proposing an Anglo-American-
French Tripartite Agreement.
General Bolte, armed with these letters, called on General de
Gaulle to break the ice. He furnished the Embassy with copies for the
Embassy files, the State Department and the British Foreign Office.
On the first of August; M. Rene Pleven, called on Mr. Steyne, at
the latter's request. He was read pertinent extracts from the State
Department's cables, and the complete draft of the proposed letter
from the French National Committee to the Government of the United
States. M. Pleven suggested several minor changes in view of the
financial position of the National Committee. He feared that as worded
the United States might have the right to call upon the colonies for much
of their exportable material upon which the National Committee was
dependent for foreign exchange. Mr. Steyne assured him that only such
materials as were to be used in situ would be called for under Lend-Lease
2. Matthews to Bolte July 30, 1942.
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and that any exportable material would be taken under the Tripartite
Agreement. M. Pleven then agreed that the text of General de Gaulle's
letter would follow the State Department's proposed draft. 3
General Bolte called on General de Gaulle on August 3 and pre-
sented him a letter which. enclosed the State Department's proposed
draft of the letter from the French National Committee which would be
agreeable to the United States Government. General Bolte requested
and was granted, immediate agreement to the application of reciprocal
aid to the French African territories, New Caledonia, however, remain-
ed under discussion.
On the 6th and 8th of August, Mr. Steyne, Major Walker and
Commander Kittredge, conferred with M. Herve Alphand, who raised
certain objections to the basic text:
(a) The drain of liquid funds of the French National Committee and
the loss of foreign exchange from the possible loss of exports.
(b) The possibility of an eventual balancing of the account in cash.
3. Memorandum August 2, 1942 from Steyne to Bolte, Subject:
Conversation with M. Pleven about Agreement for an Exchange
of Letters Relative to Reciprocal Aid by the U. S A„ to Fighting
France and by Fighting France to the IL S„ A.
4. Message from General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of
Staff, to European Theater Commander, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, No. 2812 July 31, 1942, directed Bolte to
endeavor to arrange for immediate application of reciprocal
Lend- Lease in Fighting French African territories and in
New Caledonia. Eisenhower replied to Marshall on August 3.




(c)The phraseology which would permit French aid to be used
outside of French territories.
(d) The lack of any official confirmation that the exports of the
colonies were to be excluded from the Lend- Lease agreement
and were to be handled under Tripartite procedures.
These French objections were immediately cabled to the State Department
for consideration. In a cable on August 18, the State Department inform-
ed General Boltc that it agreed to all modifications proposed by the French,
This information was incorporated into a letter from Major Walker to
M. Alphand.
A State Department cable of August 19 suggested the deletion of the
phrase "have the honor" from the French note. This cable also gave
a draft of General Bolte's reply, and suggested that he sign as "Military
Representative of the United States of American near the French National
Committee. " For the purpose of preparing a press release information
was requested as to who would sign the French note and with what title.
The National Committee informed the Embassy by telephone that M.
Maurice Dejean would sign for the French using the title of "National
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. " The State Department was so in-
•7
formed that day.
The National Committee proposed that the letter from them should
be a French translation of the Department's text. The Embassy informed
6. Hull to Ambassador John G. Winant in London, August 19, 1942,
No. 3928.
7. Winant to Hull, August 20, 1942, No. 4649.
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them that only the English text could be considered to be authoritative
without submission to the State Department. In view of the urgency of
completing the agreement, the National Committee and the Embassy
agreed that the text might be submitted in both languages, the English
text, however to be authoritative.
On the 20th of August,' the State Department cabled the Embassy
instructions not to conclude any exchange of notes with the French
pending further instructions. 9 England was paying for her cable policy
of the last hundred years. Apparently New Zealand had not given final
instructions to her Ambassador , and it was desired to announce the
signature of the French, Australian, and New Zealand Governments in
the same press release. (Sic semper propagandae).
On August 20, M. Alphand received from the Delegation of the
Fighting French in Washington, a document entitled "An Agreement for
Direct Assistance to New Caledonia. " M. Alphand forwarded a copy to
Mr. Steyne at the same time suggesting that the document was now super-
ceded by the letter from the French National Committee to General
Bolte. He stated that in any event the procedure suggested would be
unacceptable to the National Committee. M. Alphand stated that the
National Committee felt that any requests for supplies or services to be
furnished by France or programs of supplies to be provided by the
8. Major Walker to Hervc Alphand August 20, 1942.
9. Hull to Winant in London August 20, 1942, No. 3955.
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Americans, must be approved by the Committee, "who had sole respon-
sibility in the matter. " 10 A priority cable to Washington was immediately
answered by the State Department, informing the Embassy that the New
Caledonia Agreement was covered by paragraph 6 of the French note.
The State Department's cable also revised the exchange procedure.
In the absence of General de Gaulle, and of General Bolte, the Depart-
ment strongly preferred an exchange of third person notes. The Ameri-
can acceptance note would be initialed by General Dahlquist in place of
General Bolte. c M. Alphand was informed of the contents of the
Department's cable by Mr. Steync by phone, and by Major Walker in a
letter.
A cable from the State Department on September 2 requested that
the note be exchanged at 9:30 A.M. Washington time (2:30 P.M. London
time) on September 3. The cable gave the text of the press release that
the Department proposed to release at that time. The National Commit-
tee were immediately informed and all arrangements made. The French
desired to make a brief release, and the text of the proposed release was
cabled immediately to Washington. The release was immediately approved
by Washington, with the exception that the notes were to be exchanged
"between Brigadier General John E. Dahlquist, Acting Military
10. Alphand to Steyne, August 20, 1942.
11. Hull to Winant in London, August 21, 1942, No. 3875.




Representative of the United States of America, and Monsieur Maurice
Dejean, representing the French National Committee."13 The proposed
French release would have designated M. Dejean as "Commissioner for
Foreign Affairs, representing the French National Committee. "
The exchange of notes.was completed in London at 1420 London
time on 3 September, 1942,' and press release was made at 1430.
13. Hull to Winant September 2, 1942, No. 4205.

Document II
Telegram, Murphy to Hull, January 23, 1943 1
It seems clear to me that the unfavorable press comment results
largely from the fundamental mistake of interpreting current events in
North Africa in terms of Metropolitan France of other days. This area
is not France, but a colonial region that has always been socially,
religiously, racially and psychologically different from France.
In the light of events since 1940, the political situation here,
always different from that in France, is even less understandable today
by those who attempt to do so in terms of the France of 1914-1918.
There is a great shortage of qualified men to fill special positions
in Morocco and Algeria. A continued orderly administration is essential
and serious consequences to our military operations result from abrupt
and radical changes, especially if little known or unqualified personnel
were introduced.
Critics have failed to understand: (a) our objective here, and
(b) the problems which confronted us on our arrival. We arc engaged
1. Algiers 6774, NAF 119 231046Z January, 1943, in Box 204,
File: February 1943, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in





on a military operation, whose purpose is to gain control of North
Africa and the southern shore of the Mediterranean.
In order to accomplish this objective we dealt with those French
whom we found in power here who were willing to aid us by maintaining
order and our lines of communication and by putting the French armed
forces at their disposal into the fight.
We did not find the ideal Frenchman whom the critics see from
the heights of their Ivory Towers. We found Frenchmen who, after
being defeated by Germany, had undergone two years of German pressure
and propaganda. We found Frenchmen who have changed and who no
longer think as did Clemenceau. In working with them we made only one
condition: that they showed a wish to fight Germany.
Our critics seem primarily interested, not in the military opera-
tion, but in a return to the ideal of France they have in their memories.
That is simply impossible in this colonial area. It inust wait until the
people of continental France are again free. Pressures to accomplish
the impossible in French Africa can only have one result: embarrass
military operations and make our task harder.
A regenerated France can be brought into being only in France
itself. Any attempt to set the pattern for that regeneration before France
is liberated is doomed to utter failure and would be inconsistent with the
President's declared policy. It must come from within the French,
aided by what influence we may be able to exert. It would be fatal for us
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to try to impose it prematurely from without.
Peyrouton's appointment has led to expressions of dissatisfaction.
We have constantly refrained from assuming the responsibility of
forcing people of our choice on local authorities. We deem it wiser
to hold them responsible for what they do in respect to the war.
Admiral Darlan had offered before his death to discharge any
official if the Allied Staff could offer a qualified and locally acceptable
substitute who could be acceptable to the Allies and to the British
and American press. We were unable to make useful suggestions. A
de Gaullist would have been impossible as they are considered to be
extremists by the vast majority here, especially in the armed forces.
Many critics have a tendency to divide all Frenchmen into the sheep
and the goats. They feel that all French must be pro-Ally or pro-German,
Anyone who held office after the Armistice is labelled "Vichy" which is
considered to be equivalent to pro-German.
Such is not the case as many prominent French who hate the
Bochc and much as Foch ever did, have felt it to be their duty to stick
by their government in adversity and do their honest best to resist
Germany from within.
It is about time to stop theorizing while there is a desperate fight
to win, and allow the light of realism to penetrate the obscurity of




The great bulk of the documents and source material used was
found in the files of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, held by
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division,
Operational Archives. These files are held in 276 boxes, of which
numbers 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208 and 2 10 contained most of the
material used in the preparation of this thesis. The remaining 269
boxes contain records pertaining to the administrative history of the
command as well as to purely technical military and naval questions,
such as construction and repair of landing craft for the planned
amphibious operations. The official files of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions also provided much useful information.
The diplomatic papers from the State Department in the United
States National Archives were useful in fleshing out various aspects
and in supplying amplifying details.
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